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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we introduce the theoretical foundations, research objectives, and the 
characteristics of the empirical domains used in this dissertation. First, we provide a 
short discussion on the importance of studying individual market participants’ behavior 
in the food industry. This is followed by a brief description of approaches used to study 
the decision-making behavior of individual market participants in economics, market-
ing, and finance. The theoretical foundations of each chapter are discussed. Next, the 
research objectives are defined, followed by a discussion of the distinguishing characteris-
tics of the empirical studies. Finally, an outline of the chapters is presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 12 
1.1 General Context: Individual Market Participants’ Behavior 
Recent research in investment and consumer behavior has put the human decision-
making process in the spotlight (Smith, 1982; 2003). The great challenge nowa-
days for economists, marketers, and financial analysts is the understanding of eco-
nomic phenomena, which are the revealed outcomes of the human decision-
making process (Pennings et al., 2005). Scholars and practitioners show an increas-
ing interest in identifying and understanding these outcomes in order to make 
better predictions of (economic) phenomena, develop successful corporate strate-
gies, and suggest better and updated public policies (Camerer et al., 2004). Particu-
larly, scholars in business economics emphasize the need for more interdisciplinary 
studies into the composition and structure of human decision-making processes 
(Heckman, 2001). Despite this recognized need, the study on revealed economic 
behavior of market participants is still dominated by theoretical, normative, and 
aggregate approaches, which cannot directly observe and capture the dynamics and 
changes in the latent decision-making process of individual market participants 
(Smidts, 1990, 1997; Wedel & Kamakura, 1998, Heckman, 2001). 
In this dissertation, we recognize that the study of economic behavior (i.e., 
preferences, decisions) of individuals with respect to investing and consuming re-
quires the consideration of their latent decision-making process both from an ade-
quate methodological as well as measurement-based perspective (Keeney & Raiffa, 
1972, 1993; Little, 1986; Schoemaker, 1982; 1993). This study contributes to the 
understanding of economic behavior of individual producers and consumers in the 
food industry, who are experiencing dynamic strategic processes. In our study, we 
use and integrate theoretical, methodological, and modeling approaches from eco-
nomics, the marketing-finance interface, and psychology. 
1.1.1 Importance of Studying Individuals’ Behavior in the Food Industry 
The food industry is a dynamic one and in a constant state of flux (Kohls & Uhl, 
2002). The successive liberalization of food markets forces the food industry to 
respond to rapid and radical changes in the marketplace through globalization and 
large-scale operations (Tilburg et al., 2000). Understanding changing economic 
behavior at different stages of the food supply chain is critical in formulating up-
dated and well-informed corporate investment and marketing strategies (Wierenga 
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et al., 1997). We study the revealed economic behavior of individual food produc-
ers and consumers who are market participants at upstream and downstream stages 
of the food supply chain, respectively. 
Producers 
Studying the economic behavior of food producers who are member-investors of 
co-operative (co-op) firms is important. Co-ops are important economic players. 
Recent figures of International Co-op Alliance (ICA) show that the 300 top co-op 
firms globally are responsible for an aggregate turnover of $1.1 trillion (ICA, 
2008). Financial co-ops, including credit unions, serve millions of member-
investors and some of the largest retailers in the world are consumer co-ops. The 
co-op sector worldwide has about 800 million members in over 100 countries, and 
it is estimated that co-ops account for more than 100 million jobs around the 
world (UN, 2009). In the European Union (EU) co-op firms represent over 
256,000 enterprises operating with 5.4 million employees and 163 million mem-
bers (EUCC, 2008). Co-op enterprises in the United States (US) serve 120 million 
members, or 4 in 10 Americans (NCBA, 2009). Four thousand two hundred 
(4,200) European co-op banks, under the protection and supervision of the Euro-
pean Association of Cooperative Banks, serve 149 million clients, including small 
and medium enterprises, and 49,000 credit unions serve 177 million members in 
96 countries, which operate under the supervision of the World Council of Credit 
Unions (ICA, 2008). 
Meanwhile, agribusiness co-ops account for a significant part of agricultural 
and food production and marketing. The EU has 132,000 agribusiness co-ops with 
83.5 million members (CEC, 2007), and the US has 47,000 co-ops with 100 mil-
lion members (USDA, 2002). One third of the world’s food production passes 
through agribusiness co-ops (Pattison, 2000), and it is estimated that 50 per cent 
of global agricultural output is marketed through co-ops (Bibby & Show, 2005). 
In the EU, co-ops are responsible for over 60% of the harvesting, processing, and 
marketing of agricultural products, with a turnover of 210 billion Euros (Galdeano 
et al., 2005). The sheer figures indicate that the co-op firm is a widespread organ-
izational form in both the European and the American market. Agribusiness co-ops 
worldwide have been instrumental in providing market access and competitive 
returns to their member-investors. As market conditions change rapidly, questions 
arise as to how the organizational structures of co-ops can meet the challenges that 
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these new conditions pose to satisfying the demand and achieving the co-alignment 
in economic interests of their member-investors. Acquiring information about and 
knowledge of the member-investors’ needs and demands, may aid co-op policy-
makers in continuously developing and improving co-op services provided to par-
ticipating producers and better balancing their demands and heterogeneous prefer-
ences. 
Consumers 
Studying consumer risk reactions to a food product crisis over time is also impor-
tant. Property damages, injuries and deaths related to market crises cost over $700 
billion annually in the US (US Consumer Product Safety Commission, 2005).  In 
2000, the US Surgeon General stated that food safety emerged as a significant 
global issue with international trade and public health implications (Satcher, 
2000). For instance, food-borne pathogens have been estimated to cause 70 per-
cent of the roughly 1.5 episodes of stomach irregularities and 3 million deaths of 
children under the age of 5 annually (WHO, 2000). Unexpected natural hazards 
(e.g., food scares) may cause global consumer panic due to the heightened media 
attention (Kamins, et al. 1997). Consumer risk reactions during a product-harm 
crisis may substantially have a devastating impact on the demand of food products 
and other services, affect business reputations and sales, and compromise the per-
formance of marketing channels of an entire industry (e.g., Dawar & Pilluta, 2000; 
Van Heerde et al., 2007). 
The financial losses for the companies involved in the operation of these 
channels also tend to be substantial. For instance, the food poisoning scandal in 
Japan incurred a loss of 51.6 billion yen for the producing company (Snow Brand 
Milk) in 2001, compared to a net profit of 3.3. billion in 2000 (Finkelstein, 2005). 
Nonetheless, consumer reactions vary greatly among countries because of cultural 
differences and diverging public and industry risk-management policies regarding 
the communication of the “actual” level of risk (Schroeder et al., 2007). Knowl-
edge of the drivers of consumers’ reactions over time may reveal crucial informa-
tion on how marketing strategies and public policies might adapt to contingent 
market conditions in times of a product-harm crisis. 
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1.2 Theoretical Approaches to Studying the Behavior of Individual Market 
Participants 
Three main fundamental approaches to the study of the decision making of indi-
vidual market participants can be distinguished in the economics and marketing-
finance literature. First, in the utility theory approach, the expected-utility rule, 
derived from a limited rule of axioms, dominates the field. This rule is based on the 
seminal work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and describes how an 
individual decision maker chooses between alternatives. Recently, attention has 
been given to the development of new or weakened axioms that account for dis-
crepancies between the choice behavior predicted by the expected-utility rule and 
actual behavior (Machina, 1982; Smidts, 1997). Second, in the behavioral decision 
approach, the focus is on how an individual market participant decides and on 
which simplifying rules individuals apply to reach decisions in complex (risky) 
situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Pennings & Smidts, 2003). The applica-
tion of this approach gives rise to descriptive decision-making models as alterna-
tives to the expected-utility model. 
In the utility theory approach, the emphasis is clearly on theoretical and nor-
mative models. In contrast, behavioral decision theory is dominated by experimental 
research. A third approach, the decision utility analysis, reconciles the aforemen-
tioned approaches in that it attempts a synthesis of notions from both theories in 
applications to important, unstructured, multi-attributed, and complex decision-
making problems (Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). Deci-
sion analysis benefits from the behavioral decision theory since this theory clarifies 
when, how and why people make risky decisions that depart from the normative 
models supplied by utility theory (Smidts, 1997). It consists of a set of techniques 
and procedures aiming to help organizations and individuals make inferences and 
better decisions. Nowadays, apart from the psychologically minded economists, 
theoretical mainstream economists have also begun to recognize the importance of 
decision utility analysis (Kahneman et al., 1997). Refinements of the utility concept 
(i.e., a relaxation of the normative properties of representative utility functions) 
have been continuously attempted and have been derived empirically over the last 
three decades (Loewenstein, 1999). 
In this dissertation, theoretical utility notions and methodological considera-
tions taken from all three approaches will be used in order to study the revealed 
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economic behavior of individual market participants in turbulent, complex, and 
dynamic decision environments. Below, we discuss in more detail the theoretical 
foundations on which each study relies.  
1.2.1 Theoretical Foundations 
One of the major objectives of this dissertation is to examine the underlying deci-
sion-making behavior of individual market participants by following the behavioral 
and experimental microeconomic school of thought (e.g., Smith, 1982; 2003; Har-
rison & List, 2004). Experimental microeconomics includes, among others, the 
empirical study of “real” individuals’ decision-making behavior. Consideration and 
empirical examination of the unobservable (i.e., latent) and observable factors that 
drive individual behavior may portray a more complete and, potentially, more 
accurate picture of the development of the decision-making process in specific 
decision contexts. A number of theories have played a dominant role in the devel-
opment of research models in this dissertation. We briefly describe these theories 
and their interconnections hereafter. 
Business Structures as System of Attributes 
Scholars have analyzed the nature of co-ops as organizations that seek to “maximize 
a single objective function” (e.g., Sexton, 1990; Feinerman & Falkovitz, 1991), as 
a “coalition” of utility-maximizing subgroups (e.g., Staatz, 1983; Zusman & 
Rausser, 1994; Bourgeon and Chambers, 1999), and as a “nexus of contracts” 
wherein business relationships among co-op stakeholders are viewed as contractual 
relationships (e.g., Eilers & Hanf, 1999; Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002). All three 
theoretical angles view co-op member-investors as rational market participants who 
aim to maximize utility from their participation in a collective equity and govern-
ance business structure. Yet, member-investors exhibit puzzling economic interests. 
While they are tied up contractually to collective economic interests on a voluntary 
basis, they often strive to influence corporate strategies to reflect their own eco-
nomic self-interest. We argue that one may shed light on this puzzling behavior by 
studying the utility that member-investors derive, rather than maximize, from the 
ownership, governance, allocation of benefits, and strategic marketing relationships 
that they develop among themselves and within the co-op. In delineating these 
relationships we draw on industrial organization theory, in which organizations are 
viewed as a system of attributes (Milgrom & Roberts 1990). This theoretical per-
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spective proposes that firms are composed of attributes which represent certain 
aspects, whereby each aspect has certain alternatives (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1994). 
While the idea of viewing co-ops as a system of attributes has been introduced 
in the co-op economics literature (Hendrsike & Veerman, 1997; Bijman, 2002; 
Feng & Hendrikse, 2008), it has, however, received little systematic attention at an 
empirical level. Yet, existing (analytical) studies account only for the ownership- or 
governance-related attributes and not for the strategic attributes of co-ops. Building 
on principles of co-op organization (Barton, 1989; Cook & Chaddad, 2004) and 
drawing from recent literature that emphasizes the market challenges that co-ops 
face (Meulenberg, 1979; 1997; 2000; Van Dijk & Mackel, 1991, Kyriakopoulos, 
2000, Hernandez-Espallardo & Arcas-Lario, 2003), we focus on two sets of attrib-
utes: intra-organizational and strategic attributes. We support the notion that the 
subjective utility (i.e., preferences) that member-investors attach to particular at-
tributes signals the level of their commitment to the co-op’s organizational and 
strategic business activities. That is, we adopt notions from the theory of market 
participants’ commitment in the operations of marketing channels (e.g., Stern & El-
Ansary, 1990; Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Gilliland & Bello, 2002). We explicitly 
emphasize member-investors’ commitment to the business activities of a co-op by 
examining the preference structure of members for a mix of intra-organizational 
and strategic attributes that compose a co-op firm rather than intra-organizational 
attributes only. The identification of the preferred structure of member-investors is 
achieved through the application of mutli-attribute utility theory (Luce & Tukey, 
1964). We decompose the utility that member-investors attach to co-op attributes 
and their corresponding alternatives by applying a multi-attribute utility research 
framework (Green & Srinivasan, 1978; 1990). 
Latent Heterogeneity in Preference Structures 
We recognize that the average preferences may mask critical relationships when 
studying business structures and producers’ economic behaviors (Pennings & Leu-
thold, 2000). Hence, we account for the heterogeneity in the member-investors’ 
preference structure for the attributes that make up a co-op firm. Member-
investors involved in collective action often strive to influence corporate structure 
and decisions to reflect their self-interest and preferences, resulting in organiza-
tional policies that fail to benefit the membership as a whole (Olson, 1971, Vitali-
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ano, 1983; Cook, 1995). As such, member-investors exhibit opportunistic behavior 
and may have different preferences for specific intra-organizational and strategic 
attributes of co-ops (Buccola & Subaei, 1985; Banerjee et al., 2001). Opportunism 
follows from the notion that partners in an economic exchange are motivated by 
self-interest and are likely to exploit the situation, if they can, to further their self-
interest and economic incentives (Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 2000). That is, member-
investors can possess disparate preferences for attribute alternatives, and disagree-
ments can emerge as to which combination is the most desirable (Zusman, 1992). 
Whereas co-op research has traditionally focused on the consequences of a-
priori heterogeneous preferences for single pricing and governance attributes (Cook 
et al., 2004), latent segmentation theory argues that unobserved heterogeneity in 
economic behavior can be identified through the careful examination of the under-
lying (latent) decision-making process of individual market participants (e.g. produc-
ers, investors, and consumers) in specific market contexts (Wedel & Kamakura, 
1998; Pennings & Garcia, 2009). To capture the influence of latent heterogeneity 
in the member-investors’ preference structure, we draw upon an approach that 
emphasizes the role of theory in the empirical analysis as attributes are used to dis-
criminate among segments of members with similar preferences as well as to identify 
how observable (e.g., business size) and latent factors (e.g., risk attitude) affect the 
diversity in member preferences. The procedure allows for segmentation of mem-
ber-investors based on their underlying (latent) decision-making process, and it is 
consistent with Heckman’s (2001) thinking that the identification of unobservable 
heterogeneity is instrumental in explaining real-world economic phenomena, 
which are the outcomes of revealed economic behavior of market participants. We 
adopt this thinking and use latent segmentation theory to advance our understanding 
of how segments of member-investors may strive for corporate policies that reflect 
their own preference structure (e.g., derived utility) for co-op attribute alternatives. 
Decoupling Consumer Risk Behavior Over Time 
Recent research has argued that, while ‘perceived risk’ has often been used as an 
explanatory variable in studying risk behavior, the decisions of market participants 
can be better understood by decoupling their risk behavior into the separate com-
ponents attitude and perception (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987; Weber & Milliman, 
1997; Pennings et al., 2002; Pennings & Wansink, 2004; Nosic & Weber, 2007). 
Particularly, Pennings et al., (2002) propose a new framework for examining con-
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sumer risk behavior as consisting of two dimensions that play a crucial role in how 
consumers make decisions in a market crisis situation: a) the content of risk; and b) 
the chance of exposure to the risk content. These two dimensions are strongly 
linked to the two fundamental drivers of an individual’s decision-making behavior 
under risk: risk attitude and risk perception. This approach is different from the 
perceived-risk approach, which is often taken in marketing and consumer-behavior 
studies. It is rooted in disciplines such as economics and statistical decision theory and 
it is particularly useful in financial and health-related domains where there can be 
wide differences between the risk attitudes and perceptions of individual market 
participants (March & Shapira, 1987; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990; Schroe-
der et al., 2007) 
Based on the seminal works of Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) regarding the 
drivers of risk premium, Pennings et al., (2002) and Pennings & Wansink (2004) 
provide further insights into the separate components of consumer risk behavior. 
They argue that not only risk attitude and risk perception, but also the interaction 
between risk attitude and perception, drive consumer risk behavior (see: Pennings & 
Wansink, 2004). By decoupling consumer risk behavior into the separate compo-
nents of risk attitude, risk perception, and the interaction of the two, a more robust 
conceptualization and prediction of the puzzling consumer reactions to a market 
crisis situation may be possible. Consumers risk reactions are not often consistent 
with the “actual” level of risk that they face in different crisis phases. We expand 
the economics and statistical decision view of consumer risk behavior by hypothesizing 
that risk attitude, risk perception and their interaction not only drive a consumer’s 
decision with respect to participation in the consumption of a product, but also 
his/her decision about the amount of product to be consumed over time. Specifi-
cally, we draw on recent management science theory which argues that the ongoing 
update of the components of the decision-making process have an incremental and 
continuous character in context-based decision environments (Hogarth 1981; 
Kleinmuntz, 1985; Endsley, 1995). We account for the dynamic adjustment of the 
determinants of consumer risk behavior in and across market crisis phases (i.e., pre-
, incipient and post-phases of a product-harm crisis). Therefore, we view the deci-
sion-making behavior of a consumer as a part of a dynamic decision problem that 
does not simply terminate with a decision at a specific point in time (i.e., in a spe-
cific crisis phase). Instead, the behavior of an individual consumer during the phas-
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es of a product-harm crisis may be adaptive to the contingent conditions occurring 
in a dynamic decision environment. 
In sum, we mainly employ industrial organizational theory, commitment the-
ory, multi-attribute decision theory, latent segmentation theory, and consumer 
risk-behavior foundations rooted in economics and statistical decision theory in 
developing the conceptual frameworks in each of the chapters. Using these theo-
retical foundations allows us to make predictions about the latent and observable 
factors that drive revealed economic behavior (i.e., derived utility) of individual 
market participants in dynamic and naturalistic decision environments.1 Hence, a 
more comprehensive array of knowledge is generated regarding the behavior of 
market participants (in the food industry), who are increasingly confronted with 
important and complex decisions. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This dissertation bundles three empirical studies that revolve around the revealed 
economic behavior of individual market participants, as well as the latent and ob-
servable factors that drive this behavior. The insights that emerge from these stud-
ies have implications for marketers, financial analysts, and public policy-makers 
when it comes to the design of organizational and supply-chain management strat-
egies. The major link between these three studies is the overall focus on identifying 
and understanding the nature and the drivers of the latent decision-making process 
of “real” individual market participants (Figure 1.1) 
 
                                                     
1 The terms naturalistic decision-making and naturalistic decision environment emerged in economics 
research in the late 1980s and refer to the study of how people make decisions in real-world settings 
(see: Zsambok & Klein, 1997).  
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Figure 1.1 Revealed Economic Behavior: Relationships Examined in this Dissertation 
 
Specifically, chapter two analyses the overall utility that member-investors derive 
from the multidimensional structure of a marketing institution. Chapter three 
identifies the heterogeneous preferences of member-investors for the attributes that 
make up the structure of a marketing institution, as well as the factors (economic 
size and risk attitude) that drive heterogeneity. In Figure 1.1., these relationships 
are displayed with solid arrows. Finally, chapter four examines the drivers (first-line 
latent factors: risk attitude, risk perception and the interaction of the two) of con-
sumer risk behavior within and across the phases of a product-harm crisis and the 
factors (second-line latent factors: knowledge and trust) that influence the changes 
of these drivers over time. In the figure above, the hypothesized relationships are 
indicated by the dashed arrows. Below, we discuss in more detail these hypothe-
sized relationships and we define the research objectives of each study. 
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Background & Objectives 
Chapter two addresses member-investors’ preferences for the structure of a volun-
tary marketing institution (VMI). According to Meulenberg (1997; 2000), these 
institutions take an intermediate position in the spectrum of different marketing 
institutions: Government-owned marketing institutions – Government-controlled 
marketing institutions – Government-supported marketing institutions – Volun-
tarily marketing institutions (VMI) – Individual Company or Investor-owned firm 
(IOF). The economic function of a VMI is the maximization of net proceeds for its 
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participating member firms, which can be achieved by, e.g., adding value to the 
members’ products or services. A prominent example of a VMI is the marketing 
co-op (MC) firm. Although voluntary co-operation has a long history and increas-
ingly represents common innovation and branding strategies (Karantininis & Nils-
son, 2007), many collective partnerships tend to fail (Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000) 
because the implementation of growth and market-oriented strategies require addi-
tional equity capital for the implementation of strategic marketing plans, which is 
not always available (Hart & Moore, 1996; Hansmann, 1996). 
In order to align the equity-capital requirements with a market-oriented stra-
tegic focus, MCs often emulate the organizational structure of investor-owned 
firms (IOFs). The lack of funding from internal sources, such as direct investments 
of participating member firms, forces MCs to seek for other funding sources and 
opportunities. MCs often merge, allow individualized equity shares, invite non-
member parties to finance their operations, and issue initial public offerings (Cook 
& Chaddad, 2004). Yet, these efforts are not always in line with the interests of the 
member-investors and may therefore reduce their commitment (Fulton, 1999; 
Fulton & Giannakas, 2001). Commitment implies that market participants are 
confident about the stability of the economic relationships that they develop with 
other parties (Anderson & Weitz, 1989). The realization of long-term benefits 
requires the development of stable relationships among market participants who 
pursue common strategic goals (Dwyer et al., 1987). 
Commitment to the activities of a marketing institution is critical for an MC’s 
success in the marketplace. This success is linked to a marketing institution’s ability 
to develop differentiated products or services that are desired by its customers (An-
derson & Weitz, 1992). The development of niche products may raise the prod-
uct’s/service’s price without a significant decrease in market share (Robinson & 
Fornell, 1985; Kalyanaram et al., 1995). Marketing institutions that enjoy high 
commitment have also developed a niche product/service that is highly desired by 
its investors (Stern & El-Ansary, 1990; Anderson & Narus, 1990). Commitment is 
important to MCs because the active participation and loyalty of their member-
investors are crucial for the success of these co-ops in the marketplace (Hakelius, 
1996). Co-op policies that provide member-investors with additional benefits (e.g., 
investments further down the supply chain) may provide solutions to problems 
associated with opportunistic behavior by member-investors (Olson, 1971; Sexton 
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& Sexton, 1987). Member-investors may perceive an MC as low-quality when they 
believe that aspects of its organizational structure do not capture their economic 
incentives. The source of this perceived quality is the overall utility (e.g., prefer-
ences) that member-investors derive from patronizing the MC (Fulton & Gianna-
kas, 2001). The revealed preference structure (i.e., derived utility) of member-
investors for several aspects of an MC may provide useful insights on which aspects 
are more preferred than others and hence enhance their commitment to the eco-
nomic activities of this firm, for example, through extra investments. 
Therefore, the objective of chapter two is to examine how member-investors 
evaluate the aspects that make up the structure of an MC and that are hypothesized 
to be important for members’ commitment. Specifically, building on the premise 
that an MC can be viewed as a system of attributes (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; 
Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994; Hendrikse & Veerman, 1997; Bijman, 2002), we 
assess the utility that individual member-investors derive from the intra-
organizational and strategic attributes of an MC’s organizational structure. 
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Background & Objectives 
Chapter three examines the heterogeneous preferences of an MC’s member-
investors. This examination has been inspired by Heckmann’s Nobel lecture 
(2001), which emphasizes that the heterogeneity in economic behavior can only be 
understood when identifying and examining the underlying decision-making proc-
ess of individual market participants. Zusman, (1992) and Bijman (2002), among 
others, argue that member-investors of an MC firm can possess diverse preferences 
for attribute alternatives, and disagreements can emerge as to which combination is 
most desirable. Conflicting preferences, which are most likely to emerge in periods 
of organizational transition (Holmstrom, 1999), can cause inefficient resource 
allocation (Staatz, 1983) and force co-ops to adapt (Cook, 1995). As analyzed by 
several co-op scholars (e.g., Vitaliano, 1983; Hansmann, 1996; Cook et al., 2004), 
financial economists (e.g., Jensen & Mecking, 1974; Copeland & Weston, 1983; 
Jensen, 1993), and theoretical economists (e.g., Myerson, 1979; Holmstrom & 
Milgrom, 1994), the divergence in incentives and preferences of member-investors 
with diverse characteristics is particularly problematic for the assignment of con-
tractual property rights and corporate governance/control. 
Member-investors of an MC with different characteristics and conflicting pre-
ferences are expected to compete for rents (e.g., Staatz, 1983; Buccola & Subaei, 
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1985; Banerjee et al., 2001) due to their diverse economic interests and characteris-
tics such as their business size and risk attitude. Differences in member-investors’ 
business size and risk-taking behavior have been hypothesized to affect their efforts 
to capture rents generated by the risk-bearing capital activities of co-ops (e.g., Ba-
nerjee et al., 2001; Gripsurd et al., 2001; Zusman, 1992). These differences often 
result in increasing conflicting preferences of member-investors. Subsequently, 
increasing heterogeneity in preferences may result in member-investors’ declining 
commitment, decreasing willingness to provide equity capital, increasing influence 
costs, and incoherent strategic focus (Cook, 1995, Hansmann, 1996, Fulton & 
Giannakas, 2001). 
Therefore, the objective of chapter three is to extend the literature by identify-
ing the heterogeneity in member-investors’ preferences (i.e., utility) for intra-
organizational and strategic co-op attributes, and examine the effects of business 
size and risk attitude on these preferences. We focus on the study of attributes re-
lated to the co-op’s equity, control, benefits’ allocation, and strategic positioning. 
We selected these attributes because they are at the core of collective co-op struc-
tures and important for understanding the relationship between the internal struc-
ture and the co-op’s choice, particularly in a competitive marketing environment 
(e.g., Meulenberg, 1979, 2000; Barton, 1989; Hendrikse & Veerman, 1997; Bij-
man, 2002). Further, we examine how the inconsistency in the revealed prefer-
ence-structure between segments of member-investors is affected by their business 
size and risk attitude (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2001; Buccola & Subaei, 1985; Staatz, 
1983; Zusman, 1992) to explain differences in preferences. 
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Background & Objectives 
In chapter four, we study consumer risk behavior during a market crisis (i.e., a 
product-harm crisis). Marketing and financial economics research indicate that a 
product-harm crisis may substantially affect business reputations and sales, change 
consumers’ perceptions and behaviors with respect to a particular product, service 
or brand, and compromise an entire industry (e.g., Shrivistava et al., 1988; Dawar 
& Pillutla, 2000; Marsh et al., 2004; Chu et al., 2005). Recent research suggested 
that decomposing consumer risk behavior into the separate components of risk 
perception and risk attitude leads to a more robust conceptualization and predic-
tion of consumers’ risk responses (Shapira, 1995; Pennings et al., 2002; Pennings 
& Wansink, 2004). Furthermore, it has been argued that the influence of risk atti-
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tudes and risk perceptions on consumer behavior can be used to formulate effective 
marketing strategies in case of a product-harm crisis (Pennings et al., 2002; 
Schroeder et al., 2007). 
In addition, recent research showed that the influences of the risk attitude and 
risk perception on consumer risk behavior vary across different segments of the 
population at specific points in time and therefore suggest that each segment re-
quires specific strategies and policies (e.g., Pennings et al., 2002; Schroeder et al., 
2007). Yet, the impact of these risk variables on risk behavior changes over time, 
for example, due to changes in the decision environment. Studies in marketing 
(e.g., van Heerde et al., 2007; Cleeren et al., 2008) and health economics (e.g., 
Viscusi, 1993) suggest that the risk reactions of consumers may change across the 
different phases of a product-harm crisis (pre-, incipient- and post-crisis phases) as 
a result of changes in consumers’ assumptions about safety. The decision-making 
behavior of individuals has been argued to be adaptive to the specificities of “real-
world” contingent market conditions (e.g., Hogarth, 1981; Klein et al., 1993, 
Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). Thus, time variation in the determinants of consumer 
risk behavior (i.e., risk attitudes, risk perceptions and the interaction between 
them) should be taken into account to better understand the dynamic nature of 
consumers’ decision-making processes. The presence of time effects captures the 
dynamics of the decision environment (i.e., the contingent context) within and 
across the different phases of a product-harm crisis (Lowenstein & Mather, 1990; 
Johnston, 2001; Kotler, 2002). 
Moreover, consumers may change their attitudes and perceptions as they gain 
experience with the nature of a decision event or the attributes of a product/service 
(e.g., Hoch & Deighton, 1989). Differences in attitudes and perceptions arise as 
consumers become more knowledgeable over time with respect to the content of 
the attributes of a product/service and gain more trust in the information provided 
about this content (e.g., Moorman et al., 1992; Alba & Hutchinson, 2000). In 
other words, the identification and examination of the drivers of risk attitudes and 
perception over time may reveal crucial information about the impact of these 
factors on consumer decision making within and across different phases of a prod-
uct-harm crisis. Therefore, the objectives of chapter four are: a) to evaluate con-
sumer risk attitudes towards and risk perceptions of a harmed product across dif-
ferent countries in which different contingent market conditions occur b) to quan-
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tify how these attitudes and perceptions affect the consumption of the harmed 
product within and across different crisis phases, and c) to examine how latent 
factors (e.g., knowledge, trust) influence consumers’ risk attitudes and perceptions 
within different crisis phases. 
1.4 Decision Context Characteristics 
The empirical studies in this dissertation include the following distinguishing fea-
tures in their decision contexts: the individuals’ relevance to the decision environ-
ment; the high familiarity of “real” individual decision makers with the decision 
contexts; the fairly large samples; and the combined application of direct measure-
ment techniques (qualitative and quantitative) at a highly disaggregate level. 
1.4.1 Individual’s Relevance to the Decision Environment 
The first distinguishing characteristic of the empirical studies in this dissertation is 
the highly relevant decision environment in which individual market participants 
were asked to express their preferences, make decisions, and express their attitudes 
and perceptions. The systematic measurement of behavior was conducted in natu-
ralistic and dynamic decision contexts: the interviews with producers were con-
ducted at their farms, and the interviews with consumers were conducted at gro-
cery malls. 
Member-investor Preferences for the Restructuring of an MC 
In chapters two and three, we study empirically the behavior of member-investors 
of an MC (VTN/The Greenery-TG) in the Netherlands. The VTN/TG offers a 
unique opportunity to study member behavior because it has passed through sev-
eral restructuring phases historically. Co-ops are dominant in the Dutch economy, 
particularly in banking, financial services and agribusiness. In the last decade, simi-
lar to many US co-ops, Dutch co-ops have restructured their economic activities, 
evolving towards entrepreneurial organizations that increasingly adopt IOF-like 
organizational characteristics. The Nationale Cooperatiëve Raad (NCR) - the Fed-
eration of Agricultural Cooperatives in the Netherlands - indicated that the interest 
in co-ops continued to increase in 2008, despite the effects of the credit crisis in 
the Dutch and European agribusiness sector (AGD, 2008). In response to the 
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changing economic environment, the structure of many co-ops and their relation-
ship with members has changed considerably. 
We had the opportunity to study member-investor preferences for an MC’s 
organizational structure at a point when there were several indications of a lack of 
commitment due to the co-op’s equity constraints and a perceived mismatch be-
tween the vision of the members and the corporate strategic goals of the institu-
tion. Particularly, member-investors felt that their interests were not represented in 
the corporate decision-making procedures and that they had lost control over the 
marketing policy. These conditions resulted in the exit of large-sized members, 
which had a substantial impact on the financial performance of the MC. Members 
regularly expressed their concerns regarding the transparency of management and 
the high degree of uncertainty with respect to cost-benefit-allocation mechanisms. 
Several efforts have been made to develop an organizational decision-making struc-
ture that could satisfy the members’ demands and needs. In fact, the organizational 
restructuring of the VTN/The Greenery is an ongoing process, highlighting the 
importance of this research from a methodological as well as an applied economics 
perspective. 
Consumers’ Risk Response in Times of a Product-Harm Crisis 
In Chapter 4 we study empirically the puzzling behavior of consumers in a market-
crisis setting in two major economies: the US and Germany. We conducted natural 
experiments when the devastating impact of the mad cow crisis on the demand for 
beef was in the headlines of the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, CNN, and 
other global media networks. Consumer concerns about the BSE crisis were 
aligned with the scientific fact that contaminated beef can cause the fatal “Creutz-
feldt–Jacob Disease - (CJD)”. It seems that consumer behavior in these types of 
product-harm crisis is not always consistent with the actual level of risk faced. Al-
though the World Health Organization had confirmed that the chance of contract-
ing CJD by eating beef was extremely small (clearly below 1%), beef consumption 
decreased dramatically in Germany when the first BSE case was detected (Novem-
ber 26, 2000). In some cases, beef sales plunges of up to 90 percent were reported 
(Gfk, 2001). Although German beef consumption recovered slightly afterwards, 
demand kept showing an overall decline. 
Only two years after the BSE outbreaks in Germany, outbreaks in the US were 
reported on December 23, 2003, causing the US to lose access to its traditional 
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export market in Japan. Evidence shows that the security values of firms in the beef 
sector were negatively affected by the BSE event for a period of about three months 
(Tse & Hackard, 2006; Jin & Kim, 2008). Stock prices for restaurants and other 
food-related companies fell by up to 6% (Goldstein & Wilson, 2005), and declin-
ing trends were visible in several other markets including Feeder Cattle Futures 
(FCF), which were decreased by up to 9% (FAS, 2004). Yet, the reactions of 
American consumers were much milder than those of German consumers: the 
decrease in beef sales was limited in the US and the downward effect dissipated 
within two weeks after the first media announcements of BSE (Kuchler & Tegene, 
2006). 
1.4.2 Disaggregate Analysis of “Real” Decision Maker Behaviors 
Most previous empirical studies have analyzed and modeled the decision-making 
behavior of individual market participants (e.g., producers’ preferences for the 
structure of a marketing firm or consumers’ reactions to a market crisis) only in 
descriptive case-based settings. Rather than attempting to quantify latent behavior, 
they focus on suggesting marketing strategies. These studies are typically conducted 
with convenient samples (i.e., students) rather than relevant samples (i.e., real pro-
ducers and consumers), use hypothetical decision contexts (e.g., lab experiments) 
rather than non-hypothetical decision contexts (e.g., field studies), and employ ag-
gregate (macroeconomic) performance indicators rather than disaggregate (micro-
economic) analytical measures. Furthermore, the use of experimentally manipu-
lated hypothetical decision contexts limits the external validity of insights and in-
ferences drawn from them, and the use of aggregate performance metrics may not 
be as informative as more disaggregate measures. Following closely the thinking of 
Vernon, L. Smith (1982; 2003), Nobel prize winner in economics in 2002, we 
focus our examination on the behavior of “real” market participants (i.e., producers 
and consumers), who are “real” decision makers familiar with non-hypothetical 
decision contexts in which their decisions have real consequences for them. We 
seek to quantify latent behavior at a highly disaggregate level. 
Field Studies with Individual Member-Investors of an MC firm 
The research objectives of chapter two and three were addressed by using a combi-
nation of qualitative (i.e., archived data sources, in-depth interviews and focus-
group discussions) and quantitative survey techniques (conjoint design). As noted, 
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the producers (i.e., farmers) are member-investors of an MC firm that has passed 
through several re-structuring phases. Member-investors participated in two focus-
group discussions and were selected to provide a wide range of characteristics in-
cluding age; region; differences in products; enterprise age and structure; and in-
volvement in the corporate decision making of the MC. Members who participated 
in the conjoint interviews were selected using a stratified sample design accounting 
for their economic size and involvement in corporate decision making. The struc-
ture of this sample design allowed for a representative range of investor-members 
who were aware of the restructuring phases of the MC. Both the use of a case-study 
method (i.e., examining the behavior of the member-investors of only one market-
ing co-op) and the quantification of individuals’ decision-making processes provide 
an opportunity to gain insights regarding member preferences for the co-op’s struc-
ture at a highly disaggregated level. This research design allows the empirical as-
sessment of the factors, which, in more aggregate analysis, are often hypothesized 
to drive economic behavior. 
Individual Consumers’ Risk Behavior in a Highly Uncertain Environment 
Chapter four employed a longitudinal between-subjects research design to examine 
the risk reactions of American and German consumers to the BSE crisis in different 
crisis phases (e.g., pre-crisis, incipient, and post-crisis phases). Since natural hazards 
and product-related crises (e.g., food scares, disease epidemics, weather calamities, 
terrorist attacks, etc.) are unexpected and can compromise an entire industry, the 
selected decision context entailed high risk and uncertainty (e.g., a deadly outcome 
for consumers). This highly uncertain and risky decision context provided us with 
a unique opportunity to observe and analyze consumers’ risk reactions to a market 
crisis over time. We conducted a qualitative study on risk-analysis dimensions (as-
sessment, management, and communication) and risk reactions of consumers in 
both countries across several crisis phases in the period 2001–2004. We collected 
relevant information based on archived data sources including policy reports, 
newspaper articles, media, and industry announcements. The final field studies 
were conducted during a period in which the harmful effects were being highly 
publicized by the global media. The first data were collected during the first 
months of 2001. At the time, several cases of infected cattle had been reported in 
Germany - with the first case reported on November 26, 2000 - but no cases had 
yet been reported in the US. The second data were collected in the first two 
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months of 2004, shortly after BSE had been confirmed in the US on December 
23, 2003. The interviews in both countries and in each crisis phase were conducted 
in different cities and states in the US and Germany, resulting in a geographically 
diverse and representative sample of consumers in both countries. 
1.4.3 Sample Size & Measurement Techniques 
Most studies dealing with the behavior of individual member-investors of an MC 
or consumers’ risk reactions to a market crisis typically employ only a small num-
ber of respondents. Also, they do not use direct measurement techniques (face-to-
face interviews) but rather online data-gathering instruments. The empirical studies 
in this dissertation employ fairly large samples collected through face-to-face inter-
views. In chapters two and three, several co-op experts and managers of the 
VTN/TG participated in in-depth interviews, 30 member-investors participated in 
two focus-group discussions (15 in each session), 8 member-investors participated 
in a pilot test, and 120 member-investors participated in the final field study. In 
chapter four, a total of 228 Americans and 298 Germans were interviewed in 2001; 
595 American and 301 German consumers were interviewed in 2004 while a pilot 
test on 10 consumers was conducted in each country to check the degree to which 
consumers could easily understand the content of the questions. 
1.5 Dissertation Outline 
The dissertation contains three empirical studies dealing with the behavior of indi-
vidual market participants, which are discussed in chapters two, three and four, 
respectively. The data for these studies were collected in large-scale field studies of 
the Dutch agribusiness sector and in the American and German food-retailing 
markets. Table 1.1 offers a summary of the outline of the chapters with respect to 
their objectives, research context, data-collection procedures, as well as modeling 
approaches employed for the analyses. The final chapter, chapter 5, contains a 
summary of the major findings of the empirical studies, offers an overview of the 
theoretical and managerial implications, and discusses several research caveats and 
directions for future research. 
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Table 1.1 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter Study Objectives  Research Context  Data-collection  
Procedure 
Model  
1 Introduction     
2 Study 1: The struc-
ture of a marketing 
co-op:  
A member-investors’ 
perspective 
 
Evaluating those 
aspects of a market-
ing co-op’s structure 
that are hypothesized 
to be important for 
member-investors’ 
commitment 
158 Dutch produc-
ers, member-investors 
of a marketing co-op 
 
2 focus-groups (15 
participants in each 
session); 8 face-to-face 
interviews for the pilot 
test; and 120 face-to-
face interviews on an 
individual basis in the 
final field study 
Conjoint model 
3 Study 2: Under-
standing the hetero-
geneous preferences 
of co-op member-
investors 
Identifying the 
heterogeneity in 
member-investor 
preferences (i.e., 
utility) for the attrib-
utes of a marketing 
co-op and assessing 
the factors that affect 
these preferences 
158 Dutch produc-
ers, member-investors 
of a marketing co-op  
2 focus-group discus-
sions (15 participants in 
each session); 8 face-to 
face interviews for the 
pilot test; and 120 face-
to-face interviews on an 
individual basis in the 
final field study 
Generalized 
mixture model 
 
4 Study 3: Consu-mer 
risk behavior in 
times of crisis:  
A natural experiment 
 
Examining the 
drivers of consumer 
risk behavior within 
and across different 
phases of a product-
harm crisis and the 
factors impacting 
changing risk atti-
tudes and percep-
tions.  
238 American and 
308 German con-
sumers in 2001; and 
595 American and 
301 German con-
sumers in 2004 in the 
food-retailing market 
10 face-to-face inter-
views for the pilot test 
in the US and Germany 
in 2001. Face-to-face 
interviews with 228 
Americans and 298 
Germans in 2001 and 
595 Americans and 301 
Germans in 2004 in 
grocery malls of big 
cities across different 
states  
Double-hurdle 
and bivariate 
censored regres-
sion 
5 Conclusion     
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Chapter 2 
THE STRUCTURE OF A MARKETING 
COOPERATIVE: A MEMBER-INVESTORS’ 
PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter examines marketing cooperative’s (MC’s) structure from a member-
investors’ perspective. We support the notion that the utility that member-investors (i.e., 
producers) derive from the attributes of an MC structure enhances our insight in pro-
ducers’ commitment. Using a conjoint experimental design, we elicit the utility that 
producers attach to attributes of an MC. These attributes are related to the MC’s intra-
organizational structure and strategic behavior. The results of 120 producers of a Dutch 
MC operating in the horticultural sector show that the selected attributes are significant 
drivers of producers’ utility. In particular, producers attach high importance to strategic 
attributes and prefer a more individualized intra-organizational structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been published as Kalogeras, N., Pennings, J.M.E., Van Dijk, G., Van der Lans, I.A. 
(2007). The Structure of a Marketing Cooperative: A Members’ Perspective. In: Karantinis, K., & 
Nilsson, J. (Eds.) Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer 
Academic Publications, pp. 73–92. 
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2.1 Introduction2 
Many marketing cooperatives (MCs) in the agribusiness sector have modified their 
organizational structures because of changes in agricultural policy (Sexton, 1990), 
technology and member-investors’ individualism (Fulton, 1995), consumer con-
cerns about food quality and safety (Meulenberg, 2000), and globalization (Cook, 
1997).3 
In response to the changing economic environment, the structure of many co-
operatives (co-ops) and the relationships with their members have changed consid-
erably after the 1990s. Today’s co-ops have changed or are considering a change in 
their corporate governance operations, equity structures, benefits allocation me-
chanisms, and strategic business behavior. During this transition process co-ops 
abandon their passive service-oriented role and move towards an active customer-
oriented role (Van Dijk & Mackel, 1991) by adopting more “member-investor”-
oriented (Cook & Chaddad, 2004) and/or “individualized” (Van Bekkum, 2001) 
organizational structures. However, the effect of these structural changes for co-op 
members’ commitment and satisfaction has raised questions for scholars and practi-
tioners. 
Members’ dissatisfaction seems to have increased as new forms of governance 
and strategic behavior have led producers to question whether co-ops are acting in 
their best interest (Fulton, 1999). Active participation and member loyalty are 
crucial for the success of the co-ops (Hakelius, 1996). Hence, attention is centered 
on the member firms and the question that emerges is how one can evaluate the 
co-op’s organization structure in the light of members’ commitment. Failure to 
identify and evaluate members’ preferences for the aspects of co-op structures may 
result in declining market shares (Fulton & Gibbings, 2000) and financial pres-
sures (Anderson & Henehan, 2002). Co-op quality might be perceived to be low 
when members believe that the elements of its structure do not capture their eco-
nomic interests (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001). 
The research question addressed in this paper is how members evaluate the as-
pects that make up a co-op structure and that are hypothesized to be important for 
                                                     
2 The authors gratefully acknowledge all the members of the VTN/The Greenery, who participated in 
the focus-group sessions (30), pilot test-study (8) and final field study (120).  
3 Henceforth, we refer to “member-investor(s)” as “member(s)”. 
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members’ commitment. Information about these structural aspects may be crucial 
for the management and re-structuring of co-ops. Co-op policies that provide 
members with additional benefits (e.g., to invest further down the supply chain) to 
those being provided collectively may solve collective action problems (Olson, 
1971) such as opportunistic behavior of members to deliver their produce to an 
investor-owned firm (IOF) if they are given the incentive (better price) (Sexton & 
Sexton, 1987). Cotterill (2001) calls for empirical advances (i.e., solid case studies 
and quantitative analysis of real world applications) beyond the conceptual stage to 
study membership commitment. Therefore, the empirical study of member prefer-
ences for an MC structural aspects, which are directly linked to the degree that an 
MC is perceived to act as an agent that captures their economic interests, is a chal-
lenging task. 
We study members’ preferences for two classes of attributes (i.e., intra-
organizational and strategic) that make up the structure an MC and that are hy-
pothesized to be important for members’ commitment. The empirical study con-
cerns a Dutch MC operating in the horticultural sector, the VTN/The Greenery. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the crucial 
role of member commitment in a co-op business setting. Second, we specify the 
methodology and model to study members’ preferences for co-op structures. 
Third, we elaborate on the formation of the VTN/The Greenery’s structure. 
Fourth, the study’s design is described in detail. The presentation of the results and 
a discussion on them follow. Finally, managerial implications of the results are 
mentioned and suggestions for further research are made. 
2.2 Members’ Commitment 
Commitment implies that market participants are confident about the stability of 
the economic relationships that they develop with other parties (Anderson & 
Weitz, 1989). The realization of benefits requires the development of stable rela-
tionships among investors who pursue common strategic goals (Dwyer et al., 
1987). Marketing institutions that enjoy high commitment, also develop a niche 
product/service that is highly desired by its investors (Stern & El-Ansary, 1990; 
Anderson & Narus, 1990). Member commitment is a critical issue for co-ops’ 
success in the marketplace, because it may be viewed as a measure of how well a co-
op is able to differentiate itself from an investor-owned firm - IOF (Hakelious, 
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1996; Fulton, 1999). The greater the co-op’s ability to differentiate from an IOF, 
the greater the retaining and expansion of its market share (Fulton & Giannakas, 
2001). 
There are three principles that distinguish the aspects of co-op’s organizational 
structure from other businesses’ structures (e.g., from an IOF): user-owner, user-
controller, and user-benefit principles. Members are those persons, market partici-
pants, who own, use and control the co-op and receive co-op benefits on the basis 
of their use (Barton, 1989). Yet, in order to align the equity-capital requirements 
with a market-oriented strategic focus and maintain member commitment, co-ops 
often emulate the organizational structure of IOFs. The lack of funding from in-
ternal sources, such as direct investments of participating member firms, forces 
MCs to seek for other funding sources and opportunities. For instance, MCs often 
merge, allow individualized equity shares, invite non-member parties to finance 
their operations, and issue initial public offerings (Cook & Chaddad, 2004, Van 
Bekkum and Bijman, 2006). However, these efforts are not always in line with the 
interests of co-op members and may therefore reduce their commitment (Fulton, 
1999; Fulton & Giannakas, 2001). Co-op policies that provide member with addi-
tional benefits (e.g., investments further down the supply chain) may provide solu-
tions to free rider problems (Olson, 1971; Sexton & Sexton, 1987). 
Members may perceive an MC as low-quality when they believe that aspects of 
its organizational structure do not capture their economic incentives. Fulton 
(1999) supports that members may have dual incentives; while they would like to 
see the co-op raise the product prices paid to its members or advance its processing 
capacities and technology, they may not necessarily have the incentive to use co-op 
services or to invest more of their own equity into co-op activities. Fulton & Gian-
nakas (2001) explain that commitment to co-op activities (e.g., contribute capital 
to the co-op) increases when members perceive co-op’s quality as high. The source 
of this perceived quality reflects the overall utility (e.g., preferences) that members 
derive from patronizing the MC. The revealed preference structure (i.e., derived 
utility) of members for several aspects of an MC may provide useful insights on 
what aspects are more preferred than others, and hence enhance their commitment 
to the economic activities of MCs. 
Therefore, one may assume that members derive utility from selected aspects 
of an MC’s structure. Building on the premise that a firm can be viewed as a sys-
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tem of attributes (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994; 
Hendrikse & Veerman, 1997; Bijman, 2002), we assess the utility that individual 
members derive from the attributes of an MC. Based on previous research that 
dealt with market-oriented and/or market-driven co-ops (e.g., Staatz, 1987a; Co-
bia, 1989; Peterson & Anderson, 1996; Nilsson & Van Dijk, 1997; Sykuta & 
Cook, 2001; Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004), we propose that a MC’s structure con-
sists of two classes of attributes: intra-organizational attributes (MC’s internal 
structure) and strategic behavior attributes. The control, equity formation and 
benefit allocation mechanisms are the three organizational attributes of the MC’s 
internal structure.4 The strategic behavior attributes are related to the MC’s strate-
gic choices in developing and implementing a plan for success in the market place. 
2.3 Methodology & Model 
Applied research in agribusiness economics and marketing-finance should confront 
models with micro-level data to investigate the drivers of behavior of market par-
ticipants (e.g., producers) (Brorsen & Irwin, 1996). In the organizational and man-
agement sciences literature the use of methodologies that are rooted in experimen-
tal and behavioral economics are emerging to study empirically the utility that 
individual decision makers derive from the attributes of a product or service 
(Schoemaker, 1982; 1993, Little, 1986). In the context of this study a behavioral 
methodology may be properly used to examine the utility that individual members 
derive from the attributes of an MC’s structure. The assessment of this utility de-
mands the consideration of subjective values (Keeney & Raiffa 1972; 1993). 
Hence, the application of a suitable methodological approach, which allows the 
measurement and analysis of multi-attribute preferences, should consider how 
preference measurement parameters are elicited from the members’ (subjects’) ho-
listic evaluative responses (overall utility) to different combinations of all the at-
tributes. Statistical methods should then be applied to estimate the contribution of 
                                                     
4 A detailed description about the different co-op attributes (i.e., intra-organizational) and models 
that vary from traditional to co-op inversed in an IOF (individualized business structure), is given by 
Cook & Chaddad (2004), and Van Bekkum (2001) who uses an extreme classification of a collective 
versus an individualized structure in order to describe differences in the functionality of their organ-
izational attributes.  
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the attributes (and their levels) to the overall utility that members derive from a 
particular MC structure. 
We use conjoint analysis to determine members’ preferences for MC struc-
tures. Conjoint analysis is a multivariate market research technique which allows 
for the evaluation of the relative importance of a product’s/service’s attributes using 
preference ratings (Green & Wind, 1975). In contrast to expectancy-value models 
that utilize compositional approaches, conjoint methodology is based on a decom-
positional approach, in which subjects judge a set of “full profile” descriptions. Full 
profiles are constructed as combinations of levels of all attributes (one per attrib-
ute). They are bundles of attributes that make up the product, service or, in the 
context of this study, the organizational structure of the MC. This approach, 
which is based on some type of an additive or multiplicative rule, results in a set of 
part worths (i.e., values) for individual attributes that are most consistent with the 
subject’s overall preferences (Green & Srinivasan, 1978). 
The use of conjoint analysis is grounded in the basic utility framework and as-
sumes that decision-makers derive utility from the attributes of a product or service 
(Green & Srinivasan, 1990). In this study it is assumed that the levels of the se-
lected MC attributes contribute in an additive way to the members’ overall utility 
as given in Equation 2.1: 
jkjlp
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= =   (2.1) 
where: yjk is the preference of member j (j=1,…, J) for profile k (k = 1, . . . , K) 
which represents a hypothetical MC design; p (p = 1, . . . , P) is an index for attrib-
utes, with P being the total number of attributes; l (l = 1, . . . , Lp) is an index for 
attribute levels with Lp being the number of levels defined for attribute p; xjklp is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when level l of attribute p holds in profile k 
for j and xjklp = 0 otherwise; βjlp is the utility that member j attaches to level l of 
attribute p, and ejk  is a normal i.i.d. error term with variance σ2. Based on the 
structure of preferences (yjk), which is often defined in terms of a specific scale or 
metric and the value of the dummy variables (xjklp), the utility weights (βjlp) can be 
estimated for each member. The formulation simply assumes that the members 
add-up the values for each attribute (the part-worths) to assess the total value (sum 
of part-worths) for a combination of attributes that describes an MC’s profile. 
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In order to first explore and then examine the behavioral aspects of subjects’ 
(members’) decision making process, there is a need for a case study (Vazsonyi, 
1990). In agribusiness marketing-finance research the use of case studies generates 
a robust and comprehensive array of knowledge (Sterns et al., 1998). We estimate 
the conjoint model specified in Equation 2.1 using experimental data collected 
from members of a Dutch MC operating in the horticultural sector. This research 
design allows us to examine the relative importance of an MC’s intra-
organizational and strategic attributes. 
2.4 Decision Context: VTN/The Greenery 
An example of an MC in which members have a prominent influence in the collec-
tive organizational structure and strategy is The Greenery (TG), which is a distri-
bution, sales and marketing company of fresh produce (fruits and vegetables) estab-
lished and operating in The Netherlands. The shares of the TG are owned by the 
horticultural co-op Voedings Tuinbouw Nederland (VTN). The VTN/TG emerged 
after a merger of nine co-op fruit and vegetable auctions in 1996. Here, we discuss 
the reasons for the transition of the co-op auctions into a single MC and the reac-
tion of members to the transition, particularly their responses to the institutional 
arrangements. The VTN/TG is a representative example of the changes that have 
emerged in MCs because it has passed through several re-structuring phases and it 
provides a unique decision context because of the extent of information available in 
the form of past research.  
2.4.1 From an Auction to a Marketing Co-op 
The auctions had long been the logistic centers and the locus of price formation of 
fruit and vegetables marketing in The Netherlands. A serious disadvantage of the 
auction systems was that the information flow through the supply chain was lim-
ited to price information. The information flow through the chain about delivery 
conditions (special quality aspects, packaging, time and quantity of delivery, as-
sortment) was low (Bijman, 2002). In addition, transaction costs in the auction 
system were high, particularly for large buyers since they had to have buying agents 
at each auction. Because the information flow regarding quality demanded by cus-
tomers was not effective in the auction system, large buyers (e.g., supermarkets) 
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started to bypass the auction and conduct business with the larger producers di-
rectly. 
As a result, the co-op auctions were unable to keep the members loyal because 
solidarity among producers had disappeared. The merger of all horticultural auc-
tions in order to achieve sufficient scale resulted in the VTN/TG. The business 
goal of the new organization was to rely on principles that reflect both market and 
production developments. The business plan involved: a) the separation of the co-
op (VTN) from the marketing company (TG) through the creation of autonomous 
legal entities to facilitate market-oriented strategies, and b) the appointment of 
professional managers to take over activities related to the organization’s transition 
and marketing strategy (Veerman, 1998). 
The organizational attributes (i.e., intra-organizational and strategic) of the 
new-established co-op and the response from its members are discussed. The in-
formation presented is based on a synthesis of various sources (personal contact 
with VTN/TG’s members; managers; and personnel, annual reports and recent 
studies using the VTN/TG as a case study).  
2.4.2 The Structure of the New Co-op 
After the VTN/TG was established, both members and the leaders of TG had con-
siderable freedom to pursue their views. The constitution of TG determined how 
business was to be conducted in the co-op setting. The case of TG is unique in that 
members are not as dependent on their co-op, for instance, as are the dairy farmers 
or the sugar beet growers (Van Dijk, 1999). The producers of fruit and vegetables 
are in the position to determine the product attributes themselves and, for the most 
part, are able to do the essential post-harvest handling as well. We discuss the de-
velopments and transition of internal organization of VTN/TG for the period 
1996–2002. 
Cost-Benefits Distribution 
The VTN/TG developed a cost-benefit differential system based on cross-subsidies 
between various groups of producers. This mechanism discriminated prices per 
product category to reflect market prices and differentiated cost tariffs based on the 
volumes delivered by the producers. This pricing mechanism resulted in com-
plaints as members questioned the transparency of the price formation. Some 
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groups of members (e.g., cucumber producers) formed their own producer associa-
tions that negotiated product-related issues with the TG and with food retailers. 
Control Relations 
The VTN/TG’s governance structure was developed such that the decision-making 
between TG and VTN is separated. In VTN, which has the legal structure of a co-
op, the ownership rights of members are exercised via regional representation (Fig-
ure 2.1). The general assembly of VTN consists of 105 members (M) of regional 
boards (each of 15 regions provides seven representatives). These members elect the 
11 members of VTN’s board of directors (BOD). The VTN also has a supervisory 
board that consists of nine members. The co-op VTN is the owner of TG, which 
has the legal structure of a limited liability company under Dutch law (BV). For 
the period 1998–1999, TG was governed by a management board (six profession-
als: P) and was supervised by a board consisting of seven VTN members, other 
than the members in the BOD or in the Board of Supervisors of VTN. The Board 
of Supervisors of TG also included non-members.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 VTN/TG’s Corporate Control 
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From the very beginning of the new organization’s establishment, members did not 
only exercise control rights in VTN. They were also represented in the transaction 
relationship with TG through their Product Market Advisory Committees 
(PMACs). These committees acquired a formal decision-making role since 1999. 
PMACs aimed to be co-decision making bodies for different product market com-
binations and discuss product transaction issues. In PMACs both professional em-
ployees of TG and member representatives held a position. However, the formal 
separation in decision-making resulted in poor communication among members 
and VTN’s BOD regarding the control of TG. Several times TG’s management 
board was involved in conflicts with PMACs concerning selling policies. Members 
felt that the influence on TG’s marketing policy was lost and their interests were 
not well represented by the governance structure of the organization (Van Dijk, 
1999). Many of them exited VTN at that time. In 1998 several members of VTN’s 
BOD and supervisory board resigned. Also, cost cutting strategies resulted in the 
canceling of positions of the management board of TG. 
A direct and transparent link between VTN’s Board and TG’s supervisory 
board was demanded by members. Hence, a new corporate governance structure 
was formed after 1999. Since that time the BOD’s members of VTN became 
members of the board of supervisors of TG at the same time. Also, in the supervi-
sory board of TG participated non-member directors (i.e., experts), including the 
chairman (VTN Annual Reports 1998; 1999). Figure 2.1 depicts the role of vari-
ous bodies with respect to these control relationships in VTN/TG in the two dif-
ferent periods. The number of member representatives (BOD) and professionals 
participating in these decision-making bodies are mentioned. 
Equity Capital 
The transition from an auction to an MC organization turned out to be more cost-
ly than expected. Additional equity capital needed to come from members’ “out-of-
pocket” investments for financing the implementation of the ambitious marketing 
plan. Special financial instruments (e.g., loans) were developed in cooperation with 
credit organizations (e.g., Rabobank) but were not successful because of members’ 
low willingness to invest. The TG started issuing individual ownership titles (cer-
tificates) in addition to its equity capital in 1998 (TG Annual Report, 1998). Each 
member received 2.5% of his average patronage the last three years before the mer-
ger. Approximately 30% of shares were represented by unallocated equity. These 
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were called A-shares and collectively held by VTN. The B-shares were allocated to 
members, who held certificates of B-shares. The VTN’s BOD represented the con-
trol rights of both A-shares and B-shares. The income rights of B-shares were indi-
vidualized (Kyriakopoulos, 2000).  
2.4.3 Strategic Behavior of VTN/TG 
The stated objective of VTN/TG was that it would be a market-oriented company. 
Market-orientation implies that marketing plays a central role in organizational 
policies. As a result, VTN/TG planned to implement some aggressive marketing 
strategies, but the high costs for marketing and innovation in combination with a 
low solvency made TG’s marketing plan too ambitious and it could not always be 
executed. Marketing strategies that have been implemented include product differ-
entiation, brand promotion, market research, product planning and innovation, 
logistics of high quality, and managerial expertise (TG Annual Report 2002). The 
market-oriented focused strategic plan was forced upon the producers by coercion 
(Kyriakopoulos, 2000).  
2.4.4 Members’ Response: Loss of Commitment 
The members’ lack of commitment because of the perceived mismatch between 
producers’ and management’s vision, resulted in the exit of a considerable number 
of members (Bijman, 2002). Members felt that their interests were not represented 
in the corporate decision-making procedures and they had lost control on the mar-
keting policy. The exit of members had a substantial impact on the financial per-
formance of TG as a large share of turnover was lost. 
In the effort to “raise their voice” in the marketing of their produce the re-
maining members established producer associations. This development was also 
strongly stimulated by subsidies from the European Union (EU) for the establish-
ment of marketing associations. The TG gradually acknowledged these associations 
and developed a “unity in diversity” policy that carries the greenery brand name for 
building a strong business image (TG Annual Report, 2002). The TG also ac-
quired a few strong wholesale and exporting firms and integrated these with their 
own business units. This move towards forward integration in wholesaling activi-
ties was considered necessary for the successful implementation of its marketing 
strategy. 
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Members regularly expressed their concerns regarding the transparency in the cor-
porate management of the organization and regarding the high uncertainty with 
respect to cost-benefit allocation mechanisms. Several efforts were made for the 
development of an organizational decision-making structure which satisfies the 
members’ demands and needs. In fact, the organizational restructuring of 
VTN/TG has been an ongoing process (personal contact, 2003). 
In the next section, the design of the survey is presented. 
2.5 Research Design 
A field study was conducted in 2003. We used both qualitative and quantitative 
research techniques. Focus-group discussions were held with VTN/TG’s members 
in spring and winter 2003. The results of these discussions were used as input for 
the design of conjoint data collection instrument. Below we present in detail the 
development of our data-gathering instrument.  
2.5.1 Identification of Attributes: A Focus-Group Study 
We identified the attributes of the MC and the corresponding levels based on the 
literature of co-ops. In addition we collected data of members using the focus-
group technique to empirically verify the attributes identified by our desk research 
(Shocker & Srinivasan, 1979). This research design ensures that the attributes that 
we use in our final field study are based on theory and are relevant for our decision 
context, thereby minimizing response biases. Two focus-group sessions were con-
ducted. Members were selected on the basis of demographic (lifetime of member’s 
enterprise, region at which company is located), product related (nature of pro-
duce, protected or unprotected cultivation), economic (business size and structure), 
and the degree to which they are involved in the MC’s decision making (e.g., par-
ticipation in PMACs) criteria, to ensure that we had a representative sample of all 
members of the VTN/TG. Each session consisted of 15 members. 
In both sessions members were asked to discuss the two broad categories of at-
tributes (i.e., intra-organizational and strategic) that were assumed to make up the 
VTN/TG’s structure. The two sessions were coordinated by an expert on co-op 
policy issues and an expert on research methodology to ensure a high degree of 
accuracy in the arguments and opinions of interviewed members. Members identi-
fied six attributes, each with two levels, as attributes that are very important to 
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them when choosing among different types of MCs (table 2.1). Below we explain 
the attributes and their corresponding levels (i.e., alternatives). 
Members’ benefits. Members’ opinions on how net income should be allocated 
were split. Some participants supported the traditional notion that performance 
should be based primarily on net price through a well-defined contract between the 
co-op and the member (i.e., based on a proportional pricing mechanism). Other 
members preferred a mechanism based on return on capital invested in addition to 
the product price. 
Corporate governance. The need to ensure corporate control of VTN/TG’s ac-
tivities by effective collaboration among members, the board of directors (BOD-
members’ representatives) and hired managers was important to all participants. 
However the preferred structure of control (governance) varied. One form placed 
corporate control primarily in the hands of the BOD which would directly admin-
ister VTN (co-op) and supervise hired managers who would assume the role of 
board of directors of TG (marketing firm). The alternative form was for hired 
managers to administer VTN under the supervision of the BOD, and for managers 
to also administer TG (as in previous form) but under the supervision of a profes-
sional board. This professional supervisory board of directors (PSB) would include 
external non-member professionals (i.e., experts) and the member representatives 
would be a minority. The general assembly of members would appoint and super-
vise the PSB. 
Product-related decision making. The relevant question here is: Who should de-
termine VTN/TG’s product quality, price setting and sales methods for different 
market segments? Members indicated their dissatisfaction with current pricing 
procedures and marketing strategies. Some members wanted to make decisions 
directly on these product-related issues themselves (through VTN BOD’s, 
PMACs’, and established crop-specific associations’ representation), while others 
indicated that they were more comfortable placing the decisions in the hands of 
knowledgeable market managers. 
Financial structure. Members explained that capitalization was a contentious 
and major problem for implementing VTN/TG’s marketing plan. The introduc-
tion of individual ownership titles gave the residual right to members for cumula-
tive preferential dividends and resulted in low equity/debt ratios for TG through 
2002. Some members indicated that establishment of a traditional general reserves 
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system might be the solution for increasing equity capital through retained earn-
ings. In contrast, others preferred increasing VTN/TG’s equity by issuing individ-
ual ownership titles. 
 
Table 2.1 MC Attributes and Levels Identified in Focus-Group Studya 
Attributes  Attribute Levels (Alternatives)b 
Intra-organizational   
1. Product price  Members’ Benefits  
2. Product price and return on capital  
1.VTN: Board of Directors (BOD); 
     TG: Managers supervised by VTN’s BOD 
Corporate Governance 
2.VTN: Managers supervised by VTN’s BOD; 
     TG: Managers supervised by PSBc 
1. Members  Product-Related Decision Making  
2. Managers  
1. General reserves  Financial Structure 
2. Individualized equity  
Strategic   
1. Market-oriented organization  Business Issue/Scope 
2. Intermediary organization  
1. General grading of products  Product Quality 
2. Client-specific grading of products  
a MC refers to the VTN, which is the horticultural co-op Voedings Tuinbouw Nederland. TG is the 
Greenery (marketing firm) that markets fresh produce for the co-op VTN who is its only shareholder. 
b Each attribute has two levels (alternatives). 
c PSB=professional supervisory board. 
 
Business issue/scope. Members were concerned that the scope of VTN/TG’s 
business operations did not capture their economic interests. Members indicated 
that VTN/TG needs to maintain its user orientation as it increases in economic 
size and managerial complexity. However, there were differences regarding whether 
VTN/TG should solely act as an intermediary channel that buys and sells its mem-
bers’ produce or be active in developing a more comprehensive market-oriented 
firm in its own right. 
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Product quality. Finally the critical role of product quality in VTN/TG’s mar-
keting strategy received considerable attention. Two main strategies emerged. Sev-
eral members felt that the co-op should follow a more traditional path of selling 
rather generic products using the market’s general grading schemes. This strategy 
would be based on competitive prices, efficiency in production and logistics, and 
serve price-conscious consumers. In contrast, other members felt strongly that 
VTN/TG should focus on marketing products to meet client-specific quality 
needs.  
2.5.2 Conjoint Design 
The number of attributes allowed us to use a full-profile conjoint design. The main 
advantage of a full-profile approach is that it gives a realistic description of stimuli 
by defining the levels of each of the factors (Green & Srinivasan, 1978). A 2 
(Members’ Benefits) × 2 (Corporate Governance) × 2 (Product-Related Decision-
Making) × 2 (Financial Structure) × 2 (Business Issue/Scope) × 2 (Product Quality) 
fractional-factorial main-effect-only design generated a set of eight calibration pro-
files. In addition, three pairs of holdout profiles were generated. We chose the frac-
tional-factorial main-effects-only design to keep the number of profiles to be evalu-
ated at a level that could be managed by the respondents (Green, 1974, Hair et al., 
1998). 
A pilot test consisting of eight face-to-face interviews was conducted to check 
the face validity and degree of comprehensiveness of the conjoint task. Based on 
these interviews, the wording of the attributes was changed at some places. Re-
spondents indicated that they understood the selected attributes and levels included 
in the hypothetical MC profiles and that they are actionable (i.e., realistic).5 The 
respondents in the pilot test expressed a desire to “build” their own VTN/TG’s 
profile by choosing one of the two given levels of each examined attribute. 
                                                     
5 The evaluation process of communicable and actionable measures determines the degree to which 
the attributes and levels are easily communicable for realistic evaluation and capable of being put in 
practice, respectively. These technical terms as well as the evaluation of first-order interactions among 
the attributes of a product/service are described in detail by Hair et al., 1998 (pp. 405–407). 
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We tested first-order interactions of the pilot test’s preference data. No interactions 
were identified except for a low-level interaction between the attributes of financial 
structure and members’ benefits.6 
In the large-scale field study, respondents were asked to rate the eight calibration 
profiles according to their preferences on a nine-point rating scale, which ranged 
from one (least preferred) to nine (most preferred). Subsequently, the respondents 
were asked to choose their most preferred profile for each pair of holdout profiles, 
and rate the extent of their preference for that profile on a seven-point rating scale 
ranging from one (a little more preferred) to seven (much more preferred). The 
two rating scales adopted for the evaluation of conjoint profiles and holdout cases 
are interval and commonly used in conjoint experiments (Wedel & Kamakura, 
1998). Respondents were also asked to design their preferred co-op structure by 
selecting one of the two levels for each attribute. 
For the large scale field study, respondents were selected on the basis of their 
economic size (i.e., members with high annual turnovers so they are not at margin 
and represent the future of co-op) and the degree of their involvement in the 
VTN/TG’s decision-making functioning (e.g., participation in PMACs, BOD). 
Most interviews were conducted at the farm of the respondent and some at the 
annual meeting of the members in 2003. A total of 120 producers participated. All 
interviews were held on an individual basis and they were presented to the mem-
bers through a computer-assisted display. 
2.6 Results & Discussion 
The results of the additive conjoint model are presented in the table 2.2. The part-
worth estimates (i.e., the utilities of the attribute levels) show that for the attributes 
of corporate governance and product-related decision making the first levels are 
more preferred. That is, members prefer that the BOD of VTN also supervises 
TG. A similar result is found for the product-related decision-making attribute: 
Members prefer that they hold the control regarding decisions on transaction con-
ditions (quantity, cost and quality of their produce). For the other two attributes of 
                                                     
6 Such an interaction was somehow expected considering that the members’ gains are closely related 
to the co-ops’s net income allocation and equity redemption mechanisms. However, we kept these 
attributes within the conjoint design as they were stated by members participated in focus-group 
sessions. 
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the intra-organizational structure of the VTN/TG the second levels were more 
preferred. That is, members prefer a more individualized equity structure based on 
dividend reward on their invested equity in addition to product price. 
The conjoint results show that in the case of the strategic attributes members prefer 
to participate in a market-oriented organization. This implies a business model that 
is responsive to market intelligence and that supports grading lines based on prod-
uct quality to fulfill the wishes of its existing or potential market segments. These 
findings confirm the theoretical work done by Van Dijk & Mackel (1991); Cook 
(1995); Van Dijk (1999); Meulenberg (2000); and Cook & Chaddad (2004), 
among others, who argue that many MCs adopt more individualized organiza-
tional structures (alike IOFs) and customer-oriented strategies. The regression coef-
ficients of all six attributes (represented by average part worths - APWs – for each 
attribute level in table 2.2) indicate that the selected attributes are significant driv-
ers of member preferences for the MC’s structure, substantiating the validity of the 
chosen attributes in our experimental design. 
In table 2.2 descriptive statistics of individual part worths are also presented. 
The standard deviation of part worths (presented in second column of table 2.2, 
Std.D., for each attribute) are relatively small compared to the estimated average 
values (mean) for each attribute and indicate that the APWs are accurate represen-
tations of members’ ratings. In addition, the standard errors (second column of 
table 2.2, Std.E.), are small relative to sample mean (APW of each attribute pre-
sented in first column of table 2.2) and imply that most individual member part 
worths are similar to the total sample mean. So we have several indications that the 
APWs of each attributes are accurate reflections of individual members’ part 
worths. However, looking at the part worths for different percentiles (see percen-
tiles presented in last three columns of table 2.2) some variability among individual 
preferences is identified. Individual member part worths vary below different per-
centile levels (25, 50, 75). For example, the 75th percentile (of a set of 100 num-
bers) for the attribute ‘Business Issue/scope’ has the value 0.625, hence 75% of the 
estimated part worths have a value smaller than 0.625; the median of the set is the 
50th percentile. The percentile results show that the estimated conjoint model for 
each individual member follows a specific distribution based on his/her estimated 
part worths. These results indicate that individual member preferences vary in the 
sample. This may be due to the fact that the overall utility, which is the conceptual 
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basis for measuring value in conjoint analysis, is a subjective judgment of prefer-
ence unique to each individual. 
 
Table 2.2 Average Part Worths (APWs) of MC’s Attributes Based on Individual Estimates (N=120)a,b 
   APWs Std. D. Std.E.  Percentiles 
    25 50 75 
Intra-organizational Attributes  
Members’ Benefits 
1.Product price 
2.Product price & return on capital 
 
-0.213 
 0.213* 
 
 
0.515 
 
 
0.047 
 
 
-0.125 
 
 
0.125 
 
 
0.500 
Corporate Governance 
1.VTN: Board of Directors (BOD); 
   TG: Managers supervised by VTN’s BOD 
2.VTN:Managers supervised by VTN’s BOD 
   TG: Managers supervised by PSBc 
 
 
 0.183* 
-0.183  
 
 
 
0.643 
 
 
 
0.054 
 
 
 
 
-0.125 
 
 
 
0.125 
 
 
 
0.625 
Product-Related Decision-making 
1.Members 
2.Managers 
 
 0.247* 
-0.247  
 
 
0.636 
 
 
0.058 
 
 
-0.125 
 
 
0.250 
 
 
0.625 
Financial Structure 
1.General reserves 
2.Individualized equity 
 
-0.215 
 0.215* 
 
 
0.501 
 
 
0.046 
 
 
0.500 
 
 
-0.125 
 
 
0.125 
Strategic Attributes  
Business Issue/Scope 
1.Market-oriented organization 
2.Intermediary organization  
 
 0.309* 
-0.309  
 
 
0.560 
 
 
0.051 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.250 
 
 
0.625 
Product Quality 
1.General grading of products 
2.Client-specific grading of products  
 
-0.271 
 0.271* 
 
 
0.571 
 
 
0.052 
 
 
-0.125 
 
 
0.250 
 
 
0.625 
a Table 2.2 presents the estimated part-worth results for the selected attributes that drive members’ 
overall utility of the MC’s structure (dependent variable) based on individual estimates. The levels 
that have a positive APW (value) are the preferred ones. 
b We tested the predictive validity for the individual part worth estimates by computing the Tucker 
Coefficient (Zegers and Berge, 1985) in order to identify the degree of association between the pre-
dicted and the observed ratings of holdout pairs. The results showed that almost all individual part 
worths’ predictive validity is satisfactory. An extra validity test using the self-constructed MC most 
preferred levels revealed similarity with the predicted results derived from the ratings of the calibra-
tion profile. 
c PSB=professional supervisory board. 
* p < 0.05. 
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In addition, we calculated the attributes’ relative importance, based on the range of 
the attribute part-worth estimates (see Figure 2.2).7 The attributes related to the 
co-op strategic behavior, business issue/scope and product quality strategy are the 
most important. Members attach a high importance to the business issue/scope 
(21.4%) and the product quality strategy (18.7 %). The attributes related to the 
intra-organizational structure are almost equally important except for the product-
related decision-making attribute (17.2%). The attributes of the financial structure 
(14.9%) and members’ benefits (14.8%) are less important. The corporate govern-
ance attributes has the lowest relative importance (13%). These results indicate 
that members consider the examined strategic attributes as very important for the 
MC’s structure. Members prefer the VTN/TG to behave as an entrepreneurial and 
market-oriented organization using a market segmentation strategy based on the 
superior quality of its products. The last reveals their high interest for investing via 
collective action in forward integration in the food supply chain. These findings are 
in line with notions from the theory of market participants’ commitment in the op-
erations of marketing channels and their participating institutions (e.g., Stern & 
El-Ansary, 1990; Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Gilliland & Bello, 2002). The mem-
bers of the VTN/TG seem to anticipate benefits through the development of long-
term, strategic, relationships between TG and other stakeholders (e.g., retailers, 
consumers) engaged in the food sector. Members also assign a high importance to 
the decision-making issues regarding the pricing, quantity and quality of their pro-
duce. This result may be caused by the fact that the members of TG were dissatis-
fied regarding the poor communication between members and experts on product-
related and marketing issues.  
                                                     
7 The range of the part-worth estimates was calculated for each attribute by taking differences be-
tween the highest and the lowest part-worth estimate. The sum of the ranges of all attributes equals to 
the total range. Dividing every individual attribute’s range by the sum of the ranges across attributes 
and multiplying by 100 gives the relative importance of each attribute for members’ preferences in 
terms of a percentage. For a more detailed description of attribute-importance calculations in conjoint 
analysis experiments see Hair et al., (1998). 
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Figure 2.2  Importance of MC’s Attributes 
 
Our findings confirm previous research in the co-op economics literature (e.g., 
Shaffer, 1987; Staatz, 1987b; Schrader, 1989; Peterson & Anderson, 1996; Hake-
lious, 1996; Fulton, 1999; Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004) that argued that co-ops 
should better communicate product and service specification needs backward 
(member-suppliers) and forward (retailers, final consumers) in the food market 
chain in order to create value for their members’ produce and enhance their mem-
bers’ commitment. Furthermore, these results confirm recent neo-institutional 
economic (organizational economic and strategic management) theoretical ad-
vances (e.g., Teece et al., 1997; Lewin & Volberda, 1999; Sykuta & Cook, 2001), 
namely that the competitive environment is reflected in the organizational struc-
tures and strategies of businesses. 
2.7 Conclusions 
An explicit hypothesis in the MCs’ literature is that perceived quality of the co-op 
is the source of members’ commitment. Perceived quality can be conceptualized as 
the utility that members derive from the use of the services provided by the co-op. 
The perceived quality will be high when members believe that the co-op operates 
on behalf of their interests as it attempts to meet the challenges posed by a com-
petitive market place (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001). In this study we investigated an 
MC’s structure based on the attributes that are related to the internal organization 
and the strategic behavior of MCs. This paper is the first that empirically identifies 
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the relevance of these attributes for co-op organizations from a member’s perspec-
tive. 
We developed an empirical research design to identify and evaluate the subjec-
tive utility that individual members attach to an MC attributes. The empirical 
context is the Dutch horticultural MC, the VTN/TG, an organization that re-
sulted from a merger of co-op auctions. The transformation into an MC was con-
fronted with a decline of members’ commitment. The declining commitment of 
the VTN/TG members was caused by the corporate decision-making plan, prod-
uct-related issues, and the transparency about cost-benefit allocations. The results 
show that members prefer to participate in a more entrepreneurial and market-
oriented organization which will involve them in long-term relationships and de-
velop a more direct link between its members and market segments. The high im-
portance that members attach to product-related decision-making attributes reveals 
their preference for more active participation in functional operations at the up-
stream and downstream stages of the food supply chain. In addition, members 
prefer that their MC’s equity structure moves from the proportional type of finan-
cial arrangements to a more investor-oriented one. This implies that members de-
sire that the MC distributes benefits to members’ shareholdings in addition to 
product price. The latter is a fundamental shift from the traditional co-op para-
digm (Cook, 1995; Cook & Chaddad, 2004). The results of the empirical analysis 
also show that the attributes that we identified (i.e., intra-organizational and strate-
gic attributes), drive members’ preferences (utility) regarding the MC’s structure. 
The findings of this study may have managerial implications for MC’s organi-
zations. The great importance that members attach to the strategic attributes sug-
gests that members prefer to benefit from market opportunities via the vertical 
integration offered by an MC. This may be an element which substantially rein-
forces their commitment toward co-op participation and willingness to invest in 
collective actions. Such information may be utilized by co-op policy makers when 
re-structuring an MC. Recent research in behavioral economics shows the impor-
tance of the information revealed through market participants’ preferences. Prefer-
ences are constructed, hence driven, by variables that describe the environment 
such as the competitive environment (e.g., see: Bettman et al., 1998). Therefore, 
relying on this kind of information, managers of co-ops may develop policies that 
satisfy the needs and demands of members. Likewise, members’ commitment and 
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willingness to invest in collective activities may be reinforced by adjusting internal 
organization and strategic behavior. 
Traditionally, the theoretical study on MC’s formation involves only pricing 
as a unique attribute from which members derive utility. Our results clearly show 
that several other intra-organizational attributes (e.g., product-related decision 
making) and the strategic behavior (e.g., product quality) of co-ops can also signifi-
cantly drive member preferences for an MC’s structure. Overall, strategic attributes 
are considered by members as more important rather than the attributes related to 
pricing policy (i.e., members’ benefits) and financing (i.e., financial structure). 
These findings may provide guidelines and fruitful thought for further theoretical 
and empirical research on the res-structuring of marketing institutions. That is, 
future research may build on these results and examine whether other strategic 
attributes (e.g., brand-orientation) of marketing institutions, which are highly de-
sired by several stakeholders in the same marketing channel, may also be the ones 
that can drive stakeholders’ commitment and willingness to invest in the long-term 
business goals of these institutions. Moreover, two major limitations of our re-
search should be mentioned here. First, we conceptualized and measured attributes 
related to internal organization and strategic behavior of an MC operating in the 
horticultural sector. Although the focus-group discussions and the pre-testing of 
our hypothetical MC profiles characterized the combinations of these attributes as 
actionable and coherent, we suggest that further empirical research should pay 
special attention on the design of different attribute and level combinations. In 
particular, future research may account for the interaction effects among attributes 
within the existing range of co-op models (i.e., ranging from traditional to more 
individualized co-op models). Second, we assumed that the membership has ho-
mogeneous preferences. We mentioned the actions undertaken by various groups 
of the VTN/TG’s members in order to better represent their interests via the col-
lective action. We also indicated briefly how the individual preferences vary in the 
sample. Our analysis did not account for the fact that members may value the at-
tributes of the co-op structure differently. This may be caused by differences in 
member firms’ structure (Staatz, 1983), entrepreneurial skills (Karantininis & Za-
go, 2001), and risk preferences regarding operational and strategic co-op issues 
(Vitaliano, 1983; Cook, 1995). The heterogeneity in members’ behavior may ad-
versely influence members’ commitment when co-ops expand and diversify (Sex-
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ton, 1986). Taking the heterogeneity of members into account is a challenging task 
since one has to allow the part-worth (value for an attribute) to differ across groups 
of members. In the next chapter we examine the impact of members’ heterogeneity 
on co-op structural designs.  
 
Notes: 
Beside the publications referenced in the text and listed above, the following 
sources have been used for this study: 
 
VTN Annual Reports 1998 and 1999 
 
The Greenery Annual Reports, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 
 
Interviews with Prof. M.T.G. Meulenberg, Wageningen University, The Nether-
lands, September, 2003; Prof. G. Van Dijk, General Director of the Dutch Na-
tional Co-op Council for Horticulture and Agriculture, Den Haag, October, 2003; 
A.J.M. van De Riet, Manager Co-operative Affairs, Utrecht, February, 2003 and 
March, 2003; Sabien Henselmans, Administrative Staff of Co-operative Affairs 
Office, March, 2003; Dr. O. F. van Bekkum, Senior Researcher of The Nether-
lands Institute for Co-op Entrepreneurship (NICE), June, 2003, the Netherlands.  
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Chapter 3 
UNDERSTANDING HETEROGENEOUS 
PREFERENCES OF COOPERATIVE MEMBER-
INVESTORS 
We study the heterogeneity in the preference structure of cooperative member-investors 
(i.e., members). Using conjoint analysis the utility that members attach to intra-
organizational and strategic attributes of their cooperative is elicited. Recognizing that 
members are not homogenous a concomitant finite-mixture regression model is employed 
to allow preferences to vary across different member-segments. With data from 120 
cooperative members, we find that most members demonstrate rather similar preferences 
for strategic attributes, but differ with respect to the intra-organizational attributes of 
control and management. Members’ preference structures are affected by business size 
and attitudes towards risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been published as Kalogeras, N., Pennings, J.M.E., Van der Lans, I.A., Garcia, P., 
Van Dijk, G. (2009). Understanding Heterogeneous Preferences of Cooperative Members. Agribusi-
ness: An International Journal 25(1): 90–111. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Identifying the preferences of member-investors and the heterogeneity for the at-
tributes of cooperatives (co-ops) is fundamental for understanding co-ops’ structure 
and behavior.8 Members involved in collective action often strive to influence cor-
porate structure and decisions to reflect their preferences, resulting in organiza-
tional policies that fail to benefit the membership as a whole (Olson, 1971). Con-
flicting preferences can generate problems in a co-op setting. Increasing heteroge-
neity in members preferences may result in declining member commitment (Ful-
ton & Giannakas, 2001), decreasing member willingness to provide equity capital 
(Van Bekkum, 2001), increasing costs related to damaging influence activities 
(Cook, 1995), laborious decision-making processes (Hansmann, 1996), and inco-
herent strategic focus (Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002). Despite their recognized im-
portance within collective decision making and resulting organizational policies, 
knowledge of actual members’ preferences for the attributes of co-op structure is 
limited. Most research has maintained a primarily analytical focus and studied the 
consequences of a priori heterogeneous preferences for single pricing and govern-
ance attributes (Cook et al., 2004). The lack of empirical evidence, which can 
negatively affect the quality of decision-maker choice and researcher understanding 
of co-op behavior, is due in part to data constraints, and difficulties in determining 
member’s preferences – which are not always directly observable – and in account-
ing for their heterogeneous nature. 
Kalogeras et al., (2007) have conducted empirical research on members’ pref-
erences for attributes related to internal organization and strategic behavior of 
Dutch marketing co-ops to reveal what kind of co-op structure members mostly 
desire. They show that members on average prefer a more market-oriented man-
agement and an internal co-op structure closer to an investor-owned-firm (IOF), 
rather than the traditional proportional type. However, such average preferences 
may mask critical relationships when studying and analyzing agribusinesses’ struc-
tures and producers’ economic behavior (Pennings & Leuthold, 2000). For in-
stance, one might expect that not all members necessarily have the same prefer-
ences’ structure because of differences in their own firm’s characteristics. Here, we 
expand the literature by identifying the heterogeneity in member preferences (i.e., 
                                                     
8 Henceforth, we refer to “member-investor(s)” as “member(s)”.  
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utility) for intra-organizational and strategic co-op attributes and assessing the fac-
tors that affect members’ heterogeneous preferences for these attributes. We inves-
tigate attributes related to co-op’s equity, control, benefits’ allocation, and planning 
and implementation of strategic positioning, and examine the effects of business 
size and risk attitude on preferences. We select these attributes because they are at 
the core of collective co-op structure and because of their importance for under-
standing the relationship between internal structure and co-op choice particularly 
in a competitive marketing environment (e.g., Meulenberg, 1979, 2000; Hen-
drikse & Veerman, 1997, Bijman, 2002). We investigate the effect of business size 
and risk attitude on preferences since these are common factors that emerge in the 
co-op literature (e.g., Staatz, 1983; Reynolds, 1997; Buccola & Subaei, 1985; Ba-
nerjee et al., 2001, Zusman, 1992) to explain differences in preferences. 
To address our objectives, we use a research design that includes focus groups, 
individual member interviews, conjoint analysis and a concomitant finite mixture 
regression model. In the empirical analysis, we investigate the preferences of agri-
cultural co-op members of a Dutch marketing co-op, VTN/The Greenery 
(VTN/TG). Co-ops are dominant in the Dutch economy, particularly in banking, 
financial services, and agribusiness. In the last decade, similar to many US co-ops, 
Dutch horticultural co-ops have restructured their economic activities, evolving 
toward entrepreneurial organizations which increasingly adopt IOFs’-like organiza-
tional attributes. Investigation of the VTN/TG which is experiencing this change 
permits an opportunity to develop an understanding of producer concerns and 
their implications for co-op structure during this transition. Our use of a case-
study method is consistent with Sterns, Schweikhardt, & Peterson’s (1998) call for 
more detailed investigations of business firms in agriculture, and Cotterill’s (2001) 
recommendations for agricultural co-op research to develop a better understanding 
of economic behavior. The elicitation framework combined with the concomitant 
mixture approach permits us to identify segments in which members posses a simi-
lar preference structure and relate these segments to member characteristics (Wedel 
& Kamakura, 1998). The analysis provides an opportunity to gain insight at a 
highly disaggregate level into member preferences for their co-op structure, and the 
degree of heterogeneity that exists even in one marketing co-op (MC). Further, the 
investigation allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the behavior of co-
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op members, and permits an assessment of the factors affecting behavior which 
often are the maintained hypotheses in more aggregate analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section dis-
cusses the organizational attributes of co-ops and the factors influencing heteroge-
neity in member preference structures. The third section explains the statistical 
specifications of our empirical model. The fourth and fifth sections describe the 
research design and present the empirical findings. Finally conclusions and impli-
cations follow. 
3.2. Heterogeneity in Member Preference Structures 
This study focuses on the diversity in members’ preferences for co-op attributes. 
Emphasis is placed on the individual and subgroups preferences for these key or-
ganizational attributes of a co-op. First, we discuss these attributes and then the 
factors affecting heterogeneity in member preferences. 
3.2.1 Attributes of Co-ops 
Building on principles of co-op organization and drawing from recent literature 
that emphasizes market challenges that co-ops face, we focus on two set of attrib-
utes: intra-organizational and strategic attributes. 
Intra-organizational attributes are based on the definition of co-op as user-
owned and user-controlled business that distributes benefits on the basis of use 
(USDA, 1995). The definition encompasses the basic foundation on which a co-
op’s internal structure is built: collective equity, control and benefit allocation to 
user-owners. Agricultural co-ops have traditionally adhered to exclusive members’ 
ownership in the form of direct investments or retained patronage refunds (Knoe-
ber & Baumer, 1983), democratic control (Barton, 1989) and uniform pricing 
policy (net income allocation through product prices). However, many co-ops in 
order to adapt to agricultural industrialization have relaxed one or more of these 
traditional principles, allowing for individualized equity shares, inviting nonmem-
ber parties to partially finance their operations, applying proportionality in decision 
control, and allocating net benefits through price and personal shares. The extent 
to which co-ops relax their definitional principles influences their organizational 
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form, ranging from traditional to more individualized (Van Bekkum, 2001) or 
IOF-like entities (Chaddad & Cook, 2004).9 
Strategic attributes refer to strategic market choices made by co-ops. Co-ops’ 
emulation of IOF-like organizational structures permits the acquisition of risk 
capital for the implementation of growth-related strategies to increase competitive-
ness (Bergman, 1997; Oustapassidis et al., 1998). Specific strategic choices deter-
mine the core characteristics of co-ops’ marketing mix and positioning (Meulen-
berg, 1979; Van Dijk & Mackel, 1991). For example, co-ops must choose among 
cost-leadership, product differentiation, and focus-segmentation strategies that can 
increase their competitive advantage (Meulenberg, 2000). Strategic management 
theory suggests a firm’s competitive advantage is derived from its ability to produce 
value by acquiring leadership in market knowledge and bringing its resources to 
their optimum value in a sustainable manner (e.g., Porter, 1985; Bucklin & Sen-
gupta, 1993). The co-op’s choice among different market strategies is especially 
critical in dynamic agricultural markets (Peterson & Anderson, 1996) or in periods 
of structural change where products become outdated and adaptation is required 
(Goldsmith & Gow, 2005). 
3.2.2 What Influences Members’ Heterogeneity? 
Co-op members have direct access to the decision-making process and can influ-
ence its financing, benefits allocation, corporate governance and strategic choices 
(Staatz, 1987a; Hansmann, 1996). Members can possess disparate preferences for 
attribute alternatives and disagreements can emerge as to which combination is 
most desirable (Zusman, 1992). Conflicting preferences which are most likely to 
emerge in periods of transition (Holmstrom, 1999) can cause inefficient resource 
allocation (Staatz, 1983) and force co-ops to adapt (Karantininis & Zago, 2001). 
As analyzed by Hansmann (1996) and discussed by Vitaliano (1983), and Cook 
(1995) the divergence in incentives and preferences is particularly problematic for 
the assignment of contractual property rights among members with diverse charac-
                                                     
9 For instance, in a “member-investor” co-op model, members’ benefits are realized either through 
dividends distribution to shares and/or appreciability of shares in addition to patronage. For a de-
tailed description of the organizational attributes of various co-op models and the problems encoun-
tered with the different collective structures, see: Cook & Iliopoulos (2000) and Chaddad & Cook 
(2004). 
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teristics. That is, members with different characteristics and conflicting preferences 
are inclined to compete for rents. 
Research has demonstrated that a decision-maker’s environment can influence 
decision criteria and preferences (March & Shapira, 1987; Smidts, 1990; Pennings 
& Leuthold, 2000; Pennings & Garcia, 2004). In a related vein, co-op researchers 
have maintained that the variance in the business size of members (e.g., Staatz, 
1987a,b; Reynolds, 1997; Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; Gripsurd et al., 2001; Baner-
jee et al., 2001) and risk attitude (e.g., Vitaliano, 1983; Buccola & Subaei, 1985; 
Zusman, 1992) are relevant factors influencing differences in members’ preferences 
for a co-op’s governance structure. In this context, the “large versus small” effect is 
the most important paradigm for explaining heterogeneity. Differences in mem-
bers’ cost efficiency associated with business size (large low-cost compared to small 
high-cost producers) have been hypothesized to affect their efforts to capture the 
rents generated by the risk-bearing capital activities of co-ops. 
A co-op’s ability to help members to successfully manage the riskiness of their 
assets is often subject to an equity acquisition problem, known in co-op literature 
as “portfolio problem” (Cook, 1995). The cause of this problem which often oc-
curs within traditional co-ops is the absence of secondary markets for trading, liq-
uidating, and investing residual claims (lliopoulos, 1998). The absence of relevant 
secondary markets may prevent members from adjusting co-op asset portfolio to 
their own risk preferences (Vitaliano, 1983). In this situation, members with differ-
ing risk preferences may argue for differentiated governance policies that better 
represent their risk portfolio (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000). 
In the paper we follow an approach which emphasizes the role of theory in the 
empirical analysis as attributes are used to discriminate among segments of mem-
bers with similar preferences as well as to identify how business size and risk atti-
tude affect the diversity in member preferences. The procedure allows for segmen-
tation of co-op members based on their underlying latent decision-making process, 
and is consistent with Heckman’s (2001) thinking that heterogeneity in economic 
behavior can only be understood when identifying and examining the underlying 
decision-making process of individual market participants (e.g., producers, inves-
tors, consumers) 
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3.3 Empirical Model 
The subjective utility that members attach to particular attributes is identified us-
ing an additive conjoint model. Conjoint analysis assumes that decision makers 
derive utility from the attributes of a product or service (Green & Rao, 1971). 
Levels (alternatives) of the selected co-op attributes contribute to members’ overall 
utility as given in Equation (3.1): 
jkjlp
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= =   (3.1) 
where: yjk is the preference of member j (j=1,…, J) for profile k (k = 1, . . . , K) 
which represents a hypothetical MC design; p (p = 1, . . . , P) is an index for attrib-
utes, with P being the total number of attributes; l (l = 1, . . . , Lp) is an index for 
attribute levels with Lp being the number of levels defined for attribute p; xjklp is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when level l of attribute p holds in profile k 
for j and xjklp = 0 otherwise; βjlp is the utility that member j attaches to level l of 
attribute p, and ejk  is a normal i.i.d. error term with variance σ2. Based on the 
structure of preferences (yjk), which is often defined in terms of a specific scale or 
metric and the value of the dummy variables (xjklp), the utility weights (βjlp) can be 
estimated for each member. Often, assuming that the attribute-level utilities are the 
same for all members, preferences are combined. Here, we allow for heterogeneity 
of attribute-level utilities across members. 
To account for heterogeneity, we apply a finite-mixture regression model to 
the conjoint data (DeSarbo et al., 1992). In finite-mixture regression models the 
sample of observations arises from a specified number of underlying populations 
(i.e., segments) of unknown proportions. A specific form of the density of observa-
tions in each of the underlying populations is specified. In our case, we specify 
these densities in terms of regression equations (Equation 3.1) that are, apart from 
to be estimated segment-specific regression weights and segment-specific variances 
of the error term, identical across segments. The approach permits simultaneous 
identification of segments and their respective sizes and the estimation of attribute-
level utilities for each identified segment. In addition, posterior probabilities of 
segment membership are obtained for each co-op member in the sample. 
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Members are assumed to come from a population that is composed of S unob-
served segments, with relative mixing proportions π1,…,πs  that are subject to the 
following constraint 
,0π 1,π  s
S
1s
s ≥=
=
∑  and s = 1, . . . , S.  (3.2) 
The mixing proportion πs is the prior probability that a member belongs to seg-
ment s. 
The distribution of yjk, given that the member j comes from segment s, is from 
the exponential family of distributions and denoted as fjk|s(yjk). The exponential 
family includes the normal, binomial, Poisson, and gamma distributions. We as-
sume a normal distribution since it has been shown to work well for rating-scaled 
conjoint data (DeSarbo et al., 1992), and the multivariate statistical nature of addi-
tive conjoint framework allows the joint effects of the independent variables to be 
normally distributed (Harris 1975). Given segment s the expectation of yjk is de-
noted by a linear predictor sjk∂ with i.i.d. error term and variance σs2. Within seg-
ments, these expectations are a function of the set of explanatory variables 
( ∑∑ pL 1l jklpP 1p x== ) - the representation of the attributes - and the segment-specific 
utility weights βlps in segments s 
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where g(.) is a link function. The function links the expectations of member prefer-
ence measurements to the co-op attributes in segment s. The βlps and the σs2 differ 
across segments. 
The unconditional probability density function of an observation yjk is now 
expressed in the finite mixture form 
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where Φ  is the vector including all parameters (πs, βlps , and σs) and the likelihood 
for Φ  is 
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where yj is the observation vector y of member j. 
As discussed, we expect that the business size and risk attitude of members will 
affect differences in member preferences. These factors are incorporated in the 
finite-mixture models as so-called concomitant variables (cf. Wedel & Kamakura, 
1998). That is, we now specify the conditional distribution of the member’s prefer-
ence structure for MC’s design, given the two concomitant variables. The core of 
this sub-modeling is that the prior probabilities of each potentially identified seg-
ment can be re-parameterized by a multinomial logit model in terms of function of 
the concomitant variables as shown in Equation 3.6. 
∑ ∑
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where: λ= 1, …, Λ  is an index for concomitant variables, γλs denotes the impact of 
the λth concomitant variable on the prior probability of segment s, zjλ  the value of 
λth concomitant variable for member j, and zj is a vector of values of respondent j 
on the Λ concomitant variables. For identification purposes it is commonly as-
sumed that γλs = 0. The parameters of the multinomial logit sub-model are specific 
to each concomitant variable and member segment. A positive γλs implies that a 
higher value of a concomitant variable increases the probability that a member j 
belongs to segment s. 
The unconditional probability of yj is now obtained by combining the uncon-
ditional probabilities of Equation 3.4 with the re-parameterized probabilities from 
Equation 3.6. So, πs is replaced by πs|z which varies systematically across members. 
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  (3.7) 
Equation 3.7 accounts for influence of the concomitant variables on the conjoint 
equation’s probability density function. The parameter vector Φ (also including the 
γλs) in Equation 3.7 is estimated via maximum likelihood using the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm. The likelihood describes the probability that the 
data are generated given the specific set of model parameters, and its maximization 
gives the set of parameters most likely to have given rise to the data. The EM algo-
rithm is used because dummy indicators (i.e., the 0/1 membership of the producers 
in the segments) are introduced that specify to which particular segment each 
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member belongs, but are considered to be missing. The EM algorithm involves 
calculating posterior membership probabilities according to Bayes’ rule and the 
current parameter estimates of Φ and substituting them into the likelihood as esti-
mates of the unknown dummy indicators, in an E (expectation)-step. Once this is 
accomplished, the likelihood is maximized over the parameter space Φ, in an M 
(maximization) step. Given new estimates of Φ, new posteriors are calculated in the 
next E-step, followed by a new M-step to find a new Φ. The E- and M-steps are 
repeated until convergence.10 
The actual number of member segments is unknown and, in practice, must be 
inferred. We use Bozdogan’s (1987) consistent Akaike’s information criterion 
(CAIC) to determine the number of segments.11 The CAIC is defined as 
 
))(ln(J)SS(PlnLCAIC 11 +−+⋅+−= 2   (3.8) 
The CAIC gives a trade-off between the likelihood and the number of estimated 
parameters. The number of segments for which CAIC reaches a minimum is sup-
posed to give the best trade-off. In addition, for any set of identified segments an 
Entropy statistic, Es, is calculated to assess whether the segments are well separated. 
Es is defined by 
Jα lnαE js
S
1s
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J
1j
s ∑∑
==
−−= 1
  (3.9) 
where αjs is the posterior probability that member j comes from latent segments s. 
The posterior probability is also affected by the concomitant variables and is used 
to classify members in a specific segment. It can be calculated for each observation 
vector yj given an estimate of Φ using Bayes’ Theorem 
                                                     
10 A general description of the procedure is given by Wedel & Kamakura (1998).  
11 Formal tests for the number of segments, such as the likelihood ratio test, cannot be applied to this 
class of mixture models because the asymptotic properties of these tests do not hold (Aitkin & Rubin, 
1985; Titterington, 1990). We follow the mixture literature by using the CAIC, which also is bur-
dened by the same difficulty, as a heuristic guide for determining the number of segments. Evidence 
from Monte Carlo and other studies find that the framework works well except when many parame-
ters are estimated and the segments are not well separated (Wedel & DeSarbo, 1995; Pennings & 
Garcia, 2004). Deterioration in performance has been ascribed to convergence to local optima. In 
light of these findings, we use different starting values and determine whether the segments are well 
separated to support our analysis.  
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Es in Equation 3.9 is a relative measure bounded between 0 and 1, and describes 
the degree of separation in the estimated posterior probabilities. Es values close to 1 
indicate that the posterior probabilities of the respondents are close to 1 and 0 and 
therefore the segments are well defined. Es values close to 0 indicate that segments 
are not well defined.  
3.4 Research Design 
Case studies can be useful in developing an in-depth understanding of economic 
behavior of agribusinesses (Sterns et al., 1998) and agricultural co-ops (Cotterill, 
2001). They permit a detailed assessment of the factors affecting behavior which 
often are the maintained hypotheses of more aggregate analysis. The focus of the 
case-study on member preferences for combinations of MC attributes and the fac-
tors that influence their heterogeneity may generate a more comprehensive under-
standing of the behavior of co-op members, and can assist in supporting more 
aggregate analyses. 
To study preferences, complementary qualitative and quantitative methods are 
used. Qualitative data on relevant co-op attributes are collected from archived data 
sources and focus-group discussions with co-op members which later inform the 
design of the conjoint study. Rohner (1977) and Eisenhardt (1989) argue that such 
a research design provides an accurate description and evaluation of preferences 
since data on a topic are collected using independent methods that do not share 
similar potential bias. 
3.4.1 Decision Context 
For empirical analysis, a decision context is required where members have a promi-
nent influence on the internal organization of a co-op as well as the development of 
its marketing strategy. MCs operating in the horticultural sector meet this re-
quirement since members, who produce highly perishable products, are in the 
position to determine the product attributes, and for the most part are able to pro-
vide essential post-harvest handling. We investigate the preferences of co-op mem-
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bers of a Dutch fruit and vegetable MC, VTN/TG. Co-ops are dominant in the 
Dutch economy, particularly in agribusiness sector. In the last decade, Dutch hor-
ticultural co-ops have evolved toward entrepreneurial organizations that increas-
ingly adopt IOF-like structural attributes (Van Bekkum & Van Dijk, 1997). 
VTN/TG is experiencing such a transition. 
The Greenery (TG) sells, distributes, and markets fresh produce. It was estab-
lished in 1996 and its shares are owned by the horticultural co-op Voedings Tuin-
bouw Nederland (VTN) which emerged from a merger of nine vegetable co-op 
auctions because members were dissatisfied with the marketing performance of the 
auction system. The 3,500 producer-owned members of VTN market/sell their 
products through TG (VTN/TG Annual Report, 2003). The co-op VTN is the 
only shareholder of TG whose business goal is to realize for their members the best 
product price/income by an effective and efficient marketing and selling policy. 
VTN/TG sells a wide variety of fresh horticultural commodities, including: pa-
prika, cucumbers, tomatoes, green-salads, apples, and strawberries. The participat-
ing member firms are mostly family owned and the manager is often the owner. 
Based on sales value, VTN/TG is the largest fruit and vegetable company in the 
Netherlands (Bijman & Hendrikse, 2003). Recently, due to a reduction in mem-
bers’ commitment to TG’s operations and growing members’ heterogeneity 
VTN/TG has passed through several re-structuring phases. 
The transformation of co-op auctions, which maintained traditional co-op at-
tributes, into a marketing business entity resulted in a collective venture that com-
bined both collective and IOF-like organizational attributes. VTN/TG offered a 
mix of collective and individual ownership titles to members in order to raise ade-
quate equity capital to support the implementation of its marketing strategy. Its 
residual decision rights were exercised by members, professional management and 
supervisory boards in which both members (represented by VTN’s Board of Direc-
tors - BOD) and market experts participate. Members and managers also partici-
pate in product-market decisions. Adaptation to this organizational form was influ-
enced by diversity in economic interests of participating members. 
Differences in members’ interests led to the establishment of Product Market 
Advisory Committees (PMACs). From the start, members have exercised control 
rights in VTN, and represented themselves in transactions with the TG through 
PMACs. Also, the EU’s subsidizes to establish additional marketing associations in 
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the European agribusiness sector stimulated VTN producers to form various prod-
uct-specific bargaining associations. Hence, VTN producers further splintered into 
subgroups with different crop-specific interests and concerns. The formation of 
these associations was mainly influenced by members’ dissatisfaction with the lack 
of transparency between VTN/TG’s supervisory board and TG’s management 
board, inadequate management of product-related grading, pricing and selling, and 
a benefit system that disproportionately cross-subsidized specific groups (Bijman, 
2002). Members were concerned by a loss of control over TG’s marketing policies 
which they felt were implemented without sufficient producer input (Kyriakopou-
los, 2000). In response, VTN/TG has attempted on several occasions to implement 
policies to reinforce its members’ commitment and to attract members’ invest-
ments for its marketing operations. 
3.4.2 Relevant Attributes: Focus-Groups Findings 
In winter 2003, TG’s sites were visited to develop an understanding of member 
preferences for attributes of VTN/TG. Differences in economic interests among 
members and conflicting views on the organizational structure and strategic behav-
ior of VTN/TG were apparent. The substantive change from a co-op auction sys-
tem to a marketing organization that entails both traditional co-op’ and IOF’s-like 
organizational attributes, was the issue of concern. To identify more precisely the 
relevant attributes, two focus groups sessions were conducted. Fifteen members, 
selected to provide a wide range of characteristics including age, region, differences 
in products, enterprise age and structure, and involvement in the co-op, partici-
pated in each session. Members were asked to discuss VTN/TG’s intra-
organizational and strategic attributes. 
Discussions identified six attributes, each with two levels (i.e., alternatives), as 
important attributes of VTN/TG (table 3.1). Four intra-organizational attributes 
(member benefits, corporate governance, product-related decision making, and 
financial structure) and two strategic attributes (business scope and product qual-
ity/grading) emerged which we summarize below with the alternatives or questions 
that reflect the diversity in members’ preferences.12 
                                                     
12 The research design and date set is identical to Kalogeras et al., 2007 (chapter 2 in this disserta-
tion).  
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Members’ benefits. Members’ opinions on how net income should be allocated 
were split. Some participants supported the traditional notion that performance 
should be based primarily on net price through a well-defined contract between the 
co-op and the member (i.e., based on a proportional pricing mechanism). Other 
members preferred a mechanism based on return on capital invested in addition to 
the product price. 
Corporate governance. The need to ensure corporate control of VTN/TG’s ac-
tivities by effective collaboration among members, the board of directors (BOD-
members’ representatives) and hired managers was important to all participants. 
However the preferred structure of control (governance) varied. One form placed 
corporate control primarily in the hands of the BOD which would directly admin-
ister VTN (co-op) and supervise hired managers who would assume the role of 
board of directors of TG (marketing firm). The alternative form was for hired 
managers to administer VTN under the supervision of the BOD, and for managers 
to also administer TG (as in previous form) but under the supervision of a profes-
sional board. This professional supervisory board of directors (PSB) would include 
external non-member professionals (i.e., experts) and the member representatives 
would be a minority. The general assembly of members would appoint and super-
vise the PSB. 
Product-related decision making. The relevant question here is: Who should de-
termine VTN/TG’s product quality, price setting and sales methods for different 
market segments? Members indicated their dissatisfaction with current pricing 
procedures and marketing strategies. Some members wanted to make decisions 
directly on these product-related issues themselves (through VTN BOD’s, 
PMACs’, and established crop-specific associations’ representation), while others 
indicated that they were more comfortable placing the decisions in the hands of 
knowledgeable market managers. 
Financial structure. Members explained that capitalization was a contentious 
and major problem for implementing VTN/TG’s marketing plan. The introduc-
tion of individual ownership titles gave the residual right to members for cumula-
tive preferential dividends and resulted in low equity/debt ratios for TG through 
2002. Some members indicated that establishment of a traditional general reserves 
system might be the solution for increasing equity capital through retained earn-
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ings. In contrast, others preferred increasing VTN/TG’s equity by issuing individ-
ual ownership titles. 
 
Table 3.1. Intra-organizational and strategic attributes: VTN/The Greenery a 
Attributes  Attribute Levels (Alternatives) b 
Intra-organizational   
1. Product price  Members’ Benefits  
2. Product price and return on capital  
1.VTN: Board of Directors (BOD); 
   TG: Managers supervised by VTN’s BOD 
Corporate Governance 
2.VTN: Managers supervised by VTN’s BOD; 
   TG: Managers supervised by PSBc 
1. Members  Product-Related Decision Making  
2. Managers  
1. General reserves  Financial Structure 
2. Individualized equity  
Strategic   
1. Market-oriented organization  Business Issue/Scope 
2. Intermediary organization  
1. General grading of products  Product Quality 
2. Client-specific grading of products  
a MC refers to the VTN, which is the horticultural co-op Voedings Tuinbouw Nederland. TG is the 
Greenery (marketing firm) that markets fresh produce for the co-op VTN who is its only shareholder. 
b Each attribute has two levels (alternatives). 
c PSB=professional supervisory board. 
 
Business Issue/scope. Members were concerned that the scope of VTN/TG’s 
business operations did not capture their economic interests. Members indicated 
that VTN/TG needs to maintain its user orientation as it increases in economic 
size and managerial complexity. However, there were differences regarding whether 
VTN/TG should solely act as an intermediary channel that buys and sells its mem-
bers’ produce or be active in developing a more comprehensive market-oriented 
firm in its own right. 
Product quality. Finally the critical role of product quality in VTN/TG’s mar-
keting strategy received considerable attention. Two main strategies emerged. Sev-
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eral members felt that the co-op should follow a more traditional path of selling 
rather generic products using the market’s general grading schemes. This strategy 
would be based on competitive prices, efficiency in production and logistics, and 
serve price-conscious consumers. In contrast, other members felt strongly that 
VTN/TG should focus on marketing products to meet client-specific quality 
needs. 
3.4.3 Design of the Conjoint Study 
The findings from the group sessions were used to design the conjoint study. The 
method allows members to evaluate the tradeoffs of VTN/TG’s attributes (Hauser 
& Rao, 2005). The number of identified attributes permits a full-profile conjoint 
design (Green & Srinivasan, 1990). A 2 (Members’ Benefits) × 2 (Corporate Govern-
ance) × 2 (Product-Related Decision-Making) × 2 (Financial Structure) × 2 (Business 
Issue/Scope) × 2 (Product Quality) fractional factorial main-effect-only design gener-
ated a set of eight calibration profiles. Profiles refer to hypothetical MC designs 
described by combinations of attributes’ alternatives identified in table 3.1. A 
main-effects design was selected to keep the number of profiles manageable for 
respondents. 
Members who participated in the conjoint interviews were selected using a 
stratified sample design. Producer degree of involvement in VTN/TG’s decision 
making (holding positions/participating in decision or co-decision making bodies, 
e.g., PMACs), economic size (sales value >75,000 Euros), and primary income 
from on-farm activities were the sample selection criteria. Involvement in decision 
making was seen as important to determine awareness of the situation faced by the 
co-op. The sales value was selected to reflect a level of active market participation, 
while still permitting for a representative range of producers. VTN/TG’s public 
relations office provided us with a list of 500 members satisfying the criteria. Each 
member was contacted twice (via mail and telephone). Initially, 172 members ex-
pressed interest in participation. Later, some members declined to participate when 
informed that the conjoint task required a 45 minutes interview. Other practical 
reasons (i.e., time and cost constraints) led us to conduct the large-scale conjoint 
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interview with 120 members.13 The average age of participating members was 41.6 
and the majority (70.1%) had a college degree (a skilled farm management degree). 
Also, the vast majority of members reported no off-farm business activities 
(81.7%), and a sharing of firm equity among family members (79.2%). 
All interviews were computer-guided and performed on an individual basis. 
Care was taken to build a user-friendly interface. A pilot test based on eight pro-
ducers was conducted to check the degree in which members understood the con-
joint task. Prior to evaluation of the hypothetical MC profiles, members were per-
mitted to study definitions of the attributes and their levels and to ask clarifying 
questions. No serious problems were encountered in the interviews. 
To reflect preferences, members were asked to rate the eight profiles using a 
nine-point rating scale which ranged from one (least preferred) to nine (most pre-
ferred). Members were also asked to indicate the degree of their agreement with 
statements referring to their own risk behavior using a seven-point scale (Appendix 
3.1). 
3.5 Results & Discussion 
Prior to estimating the conjoint mixture model the preference ratings for each 
member were centered. This procedure helps avoid biases that can emerge when 
respondents use different reference points to evaluate the profiles (Dillon et al., 
1985) and can reduce the effects of possible errors that may arise in the measure-
ment of directly unobservable preferences. The conjoint model (Equation 3.1) 
using the mixture regression framework was applied the data allowing for up to 6 
segments, S = 1 to 6. The log-likelihoods, CAIC statistics, R2 and entropy value (Es) 
are reported in table 3.2. 
Based on the minimum of CAIC statistic, we select S = 2 as the appropriate 
number of segments. The solution has a log likelihood of -1846.859 and an R2 of 
0.198. The entropy value (Es) of 0.759 indicates that the segments are well sepa-
rated; the posteriors are close to 1 or to 0. In table 3.3 the regression coefficients 
for each attribute, the coefficients of the members’ business size and risk attitudes 
(concomitant variables), and the relative size of each identified segment are pre-
                                                     
13 The managing director of VTN/TG affairs and secretary to the VTN’s BOD indicated that the 120 
members who participated in the conjoint study maintained average sales values similar to the pro-
ducers identified in our stratified sampling design.  
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sented. For the attributes, the sign of the coefficient indicates which attribute level 
(see table 3.1 for the alternatives) is preferred. A positive sign (the utility weigh is 
increasing) indicates that level 2 is preferred to level 1, while a negative sign (the 
utility weight is decreasing) indicates the opposite. For example, a positive sign for 
the member benefits attribute indicates that the benefit plan that combines prod-
uct price and return on capital is preferred over the plan based only on product 
price.14 For the concomitant variables, positive coefficients indicate higher values of 
business size and/or an increased willingness to accept risk increase the probability 
that a member belongs to segment s.15 
 
Table 3.2 Fit Statistics of the Mixture Models for the Segments, S =1 to S=6 
 Segment (S)  Log likelihood CAICa  Es  R2 
 1 -1921.240 3905.417 1.000 0.023 
 2 -1846.859 3827.456 0.756 0.198 
 3 -1828.403 3861.347 0.749 0.285 
 4 -1807.532 3890.307 0.790 0.327 
 5 -1798.519 3943.184 0.764 0.362 
 6  -1786.457  3989.861 0.791  0.424 
a CAIC is the consistent Akaike’s information criterion and is used to determine the optimal number 
of segments. Es is the entropy statistic which is bounded between 0 and 1, and describes the degree of 
separation in the estimated posterior probabilities. Es values close to 1 indicate that the posterior 
probabilities of the managers belonging to specific segment are close to either 0 or 1; the segments are 
well defined. 
 
Using our procedure, statistical tests can be performed to determine whether an 
attribute effectively explains the preference structure (i.e., drives the utility of indi-
vidual members) in a particular segment (table 3.3). In both segments, members 
demonstrated rather well-defined preferences for attributes as gauged by their sta-
tistical significance (p < 0.05), substantiating the overall structure of the research 
                                                     
14 In table 3.3, we identify the preferred level that corresponds to table 1 below the estimated attribute 
coefficients in brackets. 
15 Business size is a ranking from 1 through 6 to reflect producer annual sales classifications (see table 
3.4) used in the interview. The risk-attitude measure described in the text was validated using confir-
matory factor analysis (Pennings & Smidts, 2000). The reliability measure, which ranges between 0 
and 1 with higher values indicating superior reliability (see: Hair et al., 1998), is 0.78.  
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design and supporting the notion that attributes contribute additively to member’s 
utility. The results demonstrate the existence of two member-segments with dis-
similar preferences for several attributes. In the two segments, three intra-
organizational attributes have different signs while the signs for member benefits’ 
and strategic attributes are the same. Members in segment 1 want VTN/TG to act 
as a market-oriented organization administered mainly by professionals for corpo-
rate and product-related issues that implements a marketing strategy based on cli-
ent-specific product quality. In particular, these members prefer corporate man-
agement delegated to hired managers under the supervision of the VTN’s BOD. 
Hired managers are also preferred to administer TG under the supervision of PSB 
(professional supervisory board) consisting mainly of external non-member profes-
sionals. Also, they prefer to receive benefits through a mechanism that combines 
product price and return on capital. Members in segment 2 have similar prefer-
ences for the strategic attributes and member benefits’ mechanism. However, they 
favor a governance structure where the BOD holds almost full decision control at 
corporate level, and where the members exercise product-related decision making 
through the BOD or PMACs. They also favor opportunity for individualized eq-
uity which was not significant for segment 1. 
The importance of the concomitant variables provides insight into the factors 
affecting the differences in preferences between the two segments. Increases in 
business size and risk attitudes significantly affect but in opposite directions the 
probability of being in the segments. Increases in business size increase the prob-
ability of being in segment 1 than in segment 2. Increases in risk attitude increase 
the probability of being in segment 1, but negatively affect (although not statisti-
cally significant) the probability of being in segment 2. Further, the estimated val-
ues of the regression coefficients of the concomitant variables are larger in segment 
1, implying that these factors have a stronger effect on membership in this seg-
ment. 
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Table 3.3 Mixture Regression Results for the Two-Segment Solution 
 Regression Coefficients a  
Explanatory variables Segment 1 Segment 2  
Intra-organizational Attributes   
Members’ Benefits  0.354* 
   [2]  
 0.444* 
   [2]  
Corporate Governance  0.186* 
   [2] 
-0.604* 
   [1]  
Product-related Decision-Making  0.169* 
   [2]  
-0.778* 
   [1] 
Financial Structure -0.092 
   [1] 
 0.653* 
   [2]  
Strategic Attributes   
Business Issue/Scope -0.308* 
   [1] 
-0.738* 
   [1] 
Product Quality  0.291* 
   [2] 
 0.636* 
   [2]  
Concomitant Variables b   
Business Size 0.995* -0.445* 
Risk Attitude 0.279* -0.126 
Relative Segment Size 0.311  0.688 
a A positive sign for the coefficient of an attribute indicates that alternative 2 is preferred to level 1 
(table 3.1), and a negative sign the opposite. For instance, the positive sign for coefficient of mem-
bers’ benefits indicates that the “product price and return on capital” is preferred to “product price.” 
The preferred attribute level also is displayed below the value of the regression coefficients using [1] 
and [2] for the levels. 
b A positive sign for the coefficient of the concomitant variables indicates that increases in the factor 
increase the probability of being in a segment, a negative sign the opposite. 
* denotes significant at p < 0.05. 
 
To gain further insight, characteristics of the identified segments are presented 
(table 3.4). A clear picture begins to emerge. While the proportions of the mem-
bers in fruit and vegetable production are similar, the segments differ based on 
business size. Segment 1 (n = 37) is characterized by larger-sized enterprises with 
almost 50% percent reporting annual sales of more than 1 million Euros and em-
ploying an average of 26 workers. In contrast, segment 2 (n = 83) contains smaller 
enterprises with an average of 5 workers and almost 75% reporting annual sales of 
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less than 750,000 Euros. These profiles support the significant effect of business 
size as a discriminating factor of the preference structure in both segments. 
 
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Two-Segment Solution  
 Segment 1 
(n = 37) 
Segment 2 
(n = 83) 
Percentage of Member Type in Segments   
 Fruit producers 32.4% (n = 12) 25.3% (n = 21) 
 Vegetable producers 67.6% (n = 25) 74.7% (n =62) 
 Number of employeesa 26 5 
Annual Gross Revenue (in Euros)a   
 < 100, 000 0.0% 8.4% 
 100,000 – 250,000 2.7% 19.3% 
 250,000 – 500,000 15.05% 28.9% 
 500,000 – 750,000 24.3% 19.3% 
 750,000 – 1,000,000 10.8% 4.8% 
 > 1,000,000  48.6% 19.3% 
Risk Attitude b 5.0 4.2 
a The number of employees and average annual gross revenue are for 2002. 
b Risk attitude is measured as the sum score of the risk-attitude scale, where 1 is highly risk averse and 
7 least risk averse. The risk attitudes between the two segments are significantly different (p < 0.05). 
 
The revealed preferences demonstrate that members agree that VTN/TG should 
act as a market-oriented organization from which its members as users and inves-
tors capture benefits from marketing and selling policies that target end-user de-
mand. These findings support and extend the conclusions identified by Van Dijk 
& Mackel (1991), Meulenberg (1979, 2000), Bergman (1997), Kyriakopoulos 
(2000), among others, that co-ops offer higher benefits to participating members 
when focused on long-run planning and invest in aggressive marketing strategies to 
increase their growth and market power. In contrast, the results show a lack of 
consensus between the two segments on issues related to the intra-organizational 
control. Larger-sized members in segment 1 appear to believe that market leader-
ship can be captured only by experts and such a corporate governance plan is better 
suited to TG in its pursuing of market-oriented strategies. Smaller-sized members 
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in segment 2 disagree with this governance scheme, opting for more member-
oriented control for both VTN and TG. The lack of transparency in corporate 
control and product-related management may have made members in segment 2 
realize that their own product-portfolio interests are not well addressed by 
VTN/TG’s governance structure. The findings support the assumptions employed 
in past analytical works (e.g., Vitaliano, 1983; Zusman, 1992; Reynolds, 1997; 
Banerjee et al., 2001) used to determine that subgroups of members with differing 
asset ownership (e.g., landholdings, labor input, or amount of product marketed) 
can lead to conflicting preferences for intra-organizational co-op structure even if 
all subgroups pursue the same strategic goals. The findings are also in line with the 
limited empirical evidence (Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; Banerjee et al., 2001; Grip-
surd et al., 2001) that variance in size of members’ operations is an important de-
terminant of co-op structure. 
In contrast, differences in the statistical importance of the financial structure 
on producer membership in the segments offer another instructive interpretation of 
the relationship among the attributes. The insignificant coefficient in the segment 
1 is likely reflective of the small number of producers in the group and the high 
degree of collinearity that exists between their preferences for members’ benefits 
and financial structure. The positive and significant coefficient in segment 2, indi-
cating small-sized producers prefer individualized equity, may also be informative 
by suggesting that even smaller-sized members can see benefits of developing indi-
vidualized equity opportunities in a highly market-oriented environment like 
VTN/TG. In a more general context, these findings raise the likelihood that the 
member preferences structure is not only multidimensional as postulated but also 
interactive, and underscore the importance of research design for understanding 
economic behavior.16 
Finally, differences in risk-attitude coefficients between the segments seem to 
partially support the notion that heterogeneity in member preferences for 
VTN/TG’s intra-organizational control is affected by risk preferences. Focusing on 
risk attitude, we find that risk-attitude has a positive statistical significant effect on 
                                                     
16 The importance of these relationships can be further developed by recognizing the interdependen-
cies among the unique co-op attributes and, allowing different attributes to interact in the research 
design. Accounting for this possibility by adding profiles can enrich a research design, but at the risk 
of making it more difficult for respondents to effectively complete the conjoint task (Hair et al., 
1998). 
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the probability of membership in segment 1. In conjunction with the results from 
tables 3.3 and 3.4, it appears that larger-sized producers are more willing to risk 
relinquishing direct producer control of the co-op’s operations and direction in 
hope of adding value through professional management. In contrast, smaller-sized 
members in segment 2 who are more risk averse prefer critical corporate and prod-
uct-related decisions control by their representatives. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The heterogeneity in the preferences of co-op members has been recognized as an 
important research topic in the agribusiness economics and marketing-finance 
literature. In this paper we provide a first effort to directly identify and measure the 
structure of member preferences for a mix of intra-organization and strategic at-
tributes, and to measure factors that affect their heterogeneous nature. 
We find that members have rather well-defined preferences for the selected at-
tributes, but value the attributes differently. Most members demonstrate rather 
similar preferences for strategic attributes, but differ with respect to the intra-
organizational attributes of control and management. In general, members with 
large sales who employ a considerable number of workers and exhibit less risk-
averse preferences preferred more involvement of professional managers in corpo-
rate and product-related decisions. Members with smaller sales and fewer employ-
ees and who were more risk averse were more willing to delegate corporate and 
product marketing control to their representatives who presumably promote their 
interests more effectively. The similarity in preferences of strategic attributes sug-
gests that members are willing to take similar collective action to capture market 
advantages. We also find some evidence that strategic and intra-organizational 
attributes may interact, such that even smaller-sized producers see benefits in non-
traditional financial structures. However, the differences in intra-organizational 
preferences highlight the difficulties that co-ops face in allocating resources effi-
ciently and balancing their commitments to their members. 
On balance, the results confirm and extend previous analytical and empirical 
work on the presence of and likely influence of heterogeneous members’ prefer-
ences (e.g., Staatz, 1983; Zusman, 1992; Reynolds, 1997; Banerjee et al., 2001). 
The identified differences in preferences for the control mechanisms support the 
assumptions used to investigate and address co-op organizational inefficiencies in 
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the presence of diverse characteristics. The “large versus small” cost efficiency ar-
gument is indeed an important dimension of member preferences for co-op struc-
ture and behavior, but our findings also support the recent work identifying the 
importance of risk attitudes (e.g., Smidts, 1990; Pennings & Leuthold, 2000; Pen-
nings & Garcia, 2004) and are consistent with the presence and importance of 
managing risk in co-op literature (e.g., Buccola & Subaei, 1985, Sexton, 1986; 
Schrader, 1989; Zusman, 1992). Our findings also indicate that the structure of 
member preferences may be both multidimensional and interactive, and reinforce 
the notion that understanding economic behavior within co-ops is challenging and 
requires careful investigation of the decision context (Zusman, 1982; Cotterill, 
2001). 
Overall, our analysis identifies a high degree of heterogeneity which may be 
problematic for co-op governance and management initiatives. Since the efficiency 
of resources allocation is threatened as members’ heterogeneity increases (Staatz, 
1983), the continuous improvement of governance mechanisms that serve various 
member-segments interests is of value (Reynolds, 1997). Internalization of mem-
bers’ heterogeneous needs and demands enhances co-ops’ ability to avoid outcomes 
associated with declining member commitment and financial pressures (Fulton & 
Giannakas, 2001). At a more practical level reconciling heterogeneous preferences 
on a daily basis is a challenge. Nevertheless, identifying the attributes, levels, and 
factors that influence the preference structure in different member-segments may 
permit decision makers to extract the essential aspects of a situation. With an un-
derstanding of core problems, policies and well-defined ownership structures to 
meet the fundamental needs of the members may be more readily developed. 
Knowledge of the existence of member-segments and an understanding of 
their preferences may be useful also to co-op policy makers to better evaluate ef-
forts by member-subgroups who may strive to influence governance policies. Ac-
quiring such crucial information, conflicting situations that undermine co-op’s 
success in the market may be prevented and continuous development and im-
provement of services that better balance member demands may be achieved. Bal-
ancing members’ demands and avoiding conflicting situations may require the 
creation and maintenance of formal and informal institutions such as common 
norms, formal decentralized decision-making procedures and performance evalua-
tion by outside experts (Hansmann, 1996: 98). Fulton & Gibbings (2000) also 
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propose that the creation of an “umbrella co-op” - a holding organization within 
which a number of different activities could be carried out - may satisfy the need 
for a high degree of integration between members’ heterogeneous interests and co-
op structure. Our results may highlight this need. The diversity in member prefer-
ences regarding corporate control and product management may signal the emer-
gence for a multi-string governance structure that embodies a wide range of owner-
ship agreements and integrates the revealed preference structure of each participat-
ing member-segment. 
Several caveats and challenges should be mentioned. First, co-ops have re-
cently experienced an inherently dynamic re-structuring process, yet our analysis 
provides a cross-sectional assessment of members’ preference structure for co-op 
attributes at a specific time. A deeper understanding of the dynamic impact of 
members’ preferences on the structure of co-ops and how this relationship is af-
fected by different economic conditions and changing members’ characteristics 
awaits further empirical analysis. Second, we conceptualized and measured a mix of 
intra-organizational and strategic attributes in the context of a horticultural MC. 
Further research is needed to determine the relative usefulness of these attributes 
and the factors influencing preference heterogeneity for other types of co-ops. De-
veloping a taxonomy of member preferences by co-op type and the factors that 
affect these preferences will permit a richer understanding of co-op structure and 
behavior. 
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Chapter 4 
CONSUMER RISK BEHAVIOR IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS: A NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
Recent research has argued that by decoupling the risk behavior of consumers into the 
separate components of risk perception and risk attitude, a more robust conceptualiza-
tion and prediction of consumers’ risk responses is possible. Furthermore, it is argued 
that the influence of risk attitudes and risk perceptions on consumer behavior can be 
used to formulate effective marketing strategies in case of a product-harm crisis. The 
question arises whether or not the impact of these risk variables changes over time (i.e., 
due to changes in the decision environment), and what drives these changes. The BSE 
(mad cow disease) crises in the US and Germany in 2001 and 2004 provided us with a 
natural experiment to examine the relationship between risk attitudes and perceptions 
and behavior during different crisis phases. The results show that the relative impor-
tance of risk attitudes and risk perceptions indeed changes during these crisis phases and, 
hence, that marketing strategies need to be adapted. Changes in the relative importance 
of risk attitudes and perceptions are affected by consumers’ knowledge and trust in the 
information provided by their governments about the harmed product. Marketing and 
policy implications are discussed. 
 
 
 
This chapter was presented in Marketing Science/INFORMS, 2010 (Cologne, Germany, EU). A 
shorter version of this chapter was nominated as best paper based on a PhD dissertation by the int/nal 
scientific committee of the European Marketing Academy (EMAC), (EMAC conference, Brighton, 
UK, 2008). 
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4.1 Introduction 
Marketing researchers, financial analysts, industry managers, and public policy 
makers developed a strong interest in understanding the effects of economic or 
product-related crises on the performance of firms and, in particular, in using effec-
tive strategies to manage these crises. Past research indicates that well-publicized 
events may substantially affect business reputations and sales, change consumer 
perceptions and behaviors for a particular product/service or brand, and compro-
mise an entire industry (e.g., Shrivistava et al., 1988; Nilson, 1995; Dawar & Pil-
lutla, 2000). Recently, media attention has focused on the calamities that have 
struck the agri-food markets where various outbreaks of diseases (e.g., foot and 
mouth disease; mad cow disease; avian influenza, swine fever) caused consumer 
panic with a devastating impact on the demand of food products and other services 
(e.g., Jin & Koo, 2003; Cleeren et al., 2007). These crises emphasize the need to 
understand the drivers of consumer risk response to product-harm crises that in-
volve life-threatening design flaws. Knowing the drivers of consumer risk response 
and how they change during a crisis may allow marketers and the industry to make 
more informed strategic decisions to manage the crisis. 
Recent research argued that by decoupling the risk-response behavior of deci-
sion makers into the separate components of risk perception and risk attitude, a 
more robust conceptualization and prediction of consumers’ reactions is possible 
(e.g., Keller, 1985; March a& Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995; Pennings & Wansink, 
2004; Schoeder et al., 2007). Specifically, Pennings et al., (2002) and Schroeder et 
al., (2007) provide evidence that consumer reactions to product-harm crises across 
many nations are driven by the decoupled components of consumer risk behavior: 
risk attitude and risk perception. The results of these studies suggest that, while 
effective communication is sufficient for some countries, other countries require 
more drastic measures with respect to the product supply (e.g., full product elimi-
nation and recalls). The question arises whether or not the influence and magni-
tude of risk variables (i.e., risk attitudes and risk perceptions) change over time 
and, hence, whether marketing strategies must be adapted. This issue is of particu-
lar importance to the marketers and public policy makers since the increasing 
complexity of production systems often causes unexpected and frequent product-
harm crises (Dawar & Pilutta, 2000). These crises become more visible to the pub-
lic globally due to the heightened media attention (Kamins et al., 1997) and lead to 
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puzzling consumer reactions, which are not always consistent with the actual level 
of risk (Viscusi, 1991; 1993). However, in spite of the devastating impact that such 
a crisis might have on the performance of marketing channels in the food industry, 
very limited attention has been devoted to the study of consumer risk reactions to a 
product crisis involving life-threatening design flaws in and across different crisis 
phases. 
Most research on product-harm crises in the marketing-management literature 
are descriptive and case-study based (Mirtoff & Kilmann, 1984, Weinberger et al., 
1993; Schroeder, et al., 2007), their measurements and analyses based on data 
derived from lab experiments (Alhluwalia et al., 2000; Dawar & Pilluta, 2000) or 
they are focused on security-price reactions by using aggregate performance indica-
tors (e.g., Marsh et al., 2004; Chu et al., 2005). Descriptive studies do not quantify 
the extent of the damage incurred and provide little direction for understanding 
the underlying demand mechanisms through which crises harm the channel activi-
ties in an industry (Ahluwalia et al., 2000). Laboratory studies carry limited exter-
nal validity due to their experimentally manipulated hypothetical decision contexts 
(Van Heerde et al., 2007). Studies using performance metrics to capture the dy-
namics of market participants’ dynamic behavior throughout a crisis are based on 
aggregate indicators, which may not be as informative as more disaggregate analy-
sis. They do not account for the fact that different segments of market participants 
may also have reacted differently to the same crisis and across different crisis phases 
(Klein & Dawar, 2004; Griffin et al., 1991). Moreover, existing studies focusing 
on consumer reactions to a product-harm crisis (e.g., Pennings et al., 2002; 
Schroeder, et al., 2007) examine consumer risk behavior at the spot (i.e., at a spe-
cific crisis phase). Although they acknowledge the changing consumer reactions to 
product-harm crises, do not explicitly examine consumers’ risk behavior over time 
(e.g., across the crisis phases). The magnitude levels of consumers risk attitudes and 
perceptions though, may change over time, because they follow a continuous up-
date pattern driven by the conditions occurring in contingent-driven decision envi-
ronments. Also, the influence of risk attitudes and risk perceptions on behavior may 
change during a crisis, which has consequences for firms’ marketing strategies and 
corporate investments. To fill this gap in the literature, we examine how risk atti-
tudes and risk perceptions and their relative influence on behavior change across 
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crisis phases and how these changes influence the adaptation of marketing strate-
gies and public policies. 
We study the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in two major 
economies: the US and Germany. In 2001, the BSE crisis had spread across most 
EU countries including Germany, but it did not reach the US until the end of 
2003. The BSE crisis caused consumer panic and substantially disrupted the meat 
markets worldwide (e.g., Burton & Young, 1996; Fox & Peterson, 2004). The 
main concern of consumers regarding BSE is that contaminated beef may cause 
Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD) in humans. Although the chance of contracting 
CJD by eating beef is very small (less than 1%), it seems that consumer reactions in 
such a product crisis are puzzling since they are not always consistent with the true 
level of risk they face. For instance, beef consumption decreased dramatically in 
Germany when the first BSE case was detected, but it did not happen the same in 
the US. Beef consumption in the US remained at almost the same levels as before 
the outbreak of the crisis. How can these inconsistent reactions of consumer in 
these two countries towards the same product-harm crisis be explained? 
The objectives of this study are to: a) evaluate consumer risk attitudes towards 
and risk perceptions of a harmed product across different countries b) to quantify 
how these attitudes and perceptions affect the consumption of the harmed product 
within and across different crisis phases, and c) to examine how latent factors influ-
ence consumers’ risk attitudes and perceptions within different crisis phases. Build-
ing on recent advances in marketing and management science, we hypothesize that 
the components of consumer risk behavior follow ongoing update patterns and 
hence adapt to the environmental idiosyncrasies (e.g., conditions) of particular 
market settings (e.g., Hogarth, 1981; Klein, 1993, Bettman et al., 1998; Moorman 
et al., 2004). To accomplish the study’s objectives, we propose and illustrate a two-
layered conceptual model showing how risk attitudes and risk perceptions influ-
ence risk behavior within and across crisis phases and how latent factors may ex-
plain the changes in risk attitudes and perceptions between crisis phases. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, building on recent 
risk behavior literature, we introduce a dynamic model that explains consumer risk 
reactions in times of product-harm crisis. The main drivers in the model are risk 
attitudes and risk perceptions. Factors impacting the dynamics of risk attitudes and 
perceptions are also considered and conceptualized. Moreover, we discuss manage-
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rial outcomes of our conceptualized framework. Second, we present our research 
design which includes an extensive qualitative analysis of our decision context and 
the design of the field studies. Third, we explain and present the statistical specifi-
cations of our empirical model. Fourth, we report on the results of the empirical 
study. We conclude by discussing our findings and their theoretical and managerial 
implications. 
4.2 Conceptual Model 
4.2.1 Consumer Risk Behavior 
Risk plays a critical role in human behavior, particularly when a decision maker is 
confronted with uncertainty (Hauser & Urban, 1979; Schoemaker, 1982). A con-
siderable amount of research in marketing, finance and decision sciences literature 
has been devoted to examining the factors that influence decision-making behavior 
in risky decision contexts, which is referred to as risk behavior. In most theoretical 
and empirical studies, risk behavior is conceptualized and analyzed in terms of 
perceived risk (e.g., Bettman, 1973; Taylor, 1974; Dowling, 1986; Srinivasan & 
Ratchford, 1991; Mitchell, 1992; Dowling & Staelin, 1994). Perceived Risk Theory 
was initially introduced by psychologists and marketing researchers to understand 
the individual’s purchasing decisions under conditions that entail high risk and 
uncertainty (Bauer, 1967). Specifically, Cox (1967) and Cunningham (1967) first 
described perceived risk as consisting of two components: uncertainty and adverse 
consequences. The predominant issue of this theoretical approach is the action 
adopted by a decision-maker in order to reduce or avoid the risk related to negative 
outcomes. For instance, a consumer contemplating a purchasing action will think 
explicitly in terms of the a) magnitude of the negative consequences, and b) prob-
abilities that these consequences occur when (s)he consumes a specific product 
(Dowling & Staelin, 1994). However, this conceptualization is limited by the spe-
cific framing of risk behavior with respect to negative outcomes related to the con-
sumption of a specific product (Pennings et al., 2002). This risk-taking behavior is 
shaped more by the severity of the negative consequences than by the probability of 
occurrence (Slovic et al., 1980; Diamond, 1988). 
Recent research argued that, while ‘perceived risk’ has often be used as an ex-
planatory variable in studying risk behavior, the decisions of market participants 
can be better understood by decoupling their risk behavior into the separate com-
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ponents attitude and perception. Such an approach makes possible more robust 
conceptualizations and predictions of individual market participants’ contracting 
(e.g., MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990; Pennings & Wansink, 2004), investment 
(e.g., March & Shapira, 1987; Weber & Milliman, 1997; Nosic & Weber, 2007), 
and consumption decisions (e.g., Pennings et al., 2002, Schroeder et al., 2007). 
Particularly, Pennings et al., (2002) propose a new framework for examining con-
sumer risk behavior as consisting of two dimensions that play a crucial role in how 
consumers make decisions in a product-harm-crisis situation: a) the content of risk; 
and b) the chance of exposure to the risk content. These two dimensions are 
strongly linked to the two fundamental drivers of an individual’s decision-making 
behavior under risk: risk attitude and risk perception. Risk attitude is formed by 
one’s predisposition to the content of the risk in a specific market situation and 
reflects a consumer’s interpretation of this risk content in a consistent way. Risk 
perception is related to second dimension, i.e., the likelihood of one’s exposure to 
the content of the risk. It may be formed on the basis of the consumer’s own as-
sessment of the chance to be exposed to the risk content associated with a particu-
lar market condition or inherent in a product-related risky situation. 
Based on the seminal works of Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964), Pennings et al., 
(2002) and Pennings & Wansink (2004) provide further insights into the separate 
components of consumer risk behavior. They argue that not only risk attitude and 
risk perception, but also their interaction, drive consumer risk behavior (Pennings 
and Wansink, 2004; Pennachi, 2008; Appendix 4.1). The interaction for risk atti-
tude and risk perception reflects that relatively risk-averse consumers may engage in 
behavior that reduces risk, and that this becomes more prominent as consumer 
perceives relatively more risk (Pennings & Smidts, 2000). Based on this risk ap-
proach (i.e., decoupling risk-taking behavior into the separate components of risk 
attitudes, risk perception, and their interaction), we hypothesize that an individual 
consumer’s decision-making behavior (i.e., the decision whether or not to reduce 
consumption of a harmed product due to an unexpected crisis) in a product-harm 
crisis situation (e.g., the BSE crisis) can be formulated as: 
 
)RP*RARPf(RACRB iiiii ++=   (4.1) 
where: i) CRBi is the risk behavior of consumer i, ii) RAi is the risk attitude of con-
sumer i, iii) RPi is the risk perception of consumer i, and iv) RAi*RPi is the interac-
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tion between risk attitude and perception of consumer i. We further elaborate on 
this framework by considering its separated but interdependent dimensions and its 
dynamic features. 
4.2.2 Risk Behavior: A Two-layered Consumer Decision System 
Research in economics has demonstrated that the behavior of market participants 
with respect to consumption and investment may share a separate but interdepend-
ent decision-making structure (e.g., Jones, 1989; Garcia & Labeaga, 1996 Hollo-
way et al., 2002; Pennings, 2002; Ojah & Manrique, 2005; Humphrey et al., 
2009). These types of decisions often deal with both the intentions of individuals 
to participate in economic activities (e.g., food consumption, stock investing) and 
the extent to which these individuals participate in this activity (e.g., the quantity 
of purchasing, the level of investment). Although these two decisions may be 
viewed as separate components of a multi-goal decision problem, they may also be 
interdependent. A decision-maker increases or decreases her/his level of participa-
tion in an activity (e.g., the amount of bank debt), since (s)he has already decided 
to undertake the activity (e.g., incurring a bank debt). Hence, one’s decision about 
the level of activity undertaken is conditional to the decision about participation in 
the economic activity. Separate but interdependent decisions of individuals may 
provide a more parsimonious representation of decision-making behavior (Bucklin 
& Sismeiro, 2003), improve our understanding of the true behavioral patterns, 
lead to correct conclusions, and generate useful policy recommendations (Haines et 
al., 1988). 
In the context of our study, consumer risk behavior may be conceptualized as 
comprising two decisions that share the same decision-making structure: a) the 
decision of a consumer to participate in the consumption of a harmed product 
(participation decision) and b) the decision about the amount of harmed product to 
consume (quantity reduction decision). We therefore consider these two separate 
decisions as reflecting the reduction in the consumption of a harmed product. Al-
though these decisions are separate, they are interdependent at the same time. The 
decision of consumer i regarding the amount of harmed product to consume is 
conditional to the occurrence of her/his decision to reduce consumption due to a 
product-harm crisis (Schroeder, et al. 2007). 
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Figure 4.1 A Framework of Consumer Risk Behavior in a Product-Harm Crisis 
 
We hypothesize that the two consumer decisions are driven by a common set of 
determinants: the components of consumer risk behavior as specified in Equation 
4.1 and displayed in Figure 4.1. Thus, we hypothesize that risk attitude, risk per-
ception and their interaction not only drive a consumer’s decision with respect to 
participation in the consumption of a harmed product, but also his/her decision 
about the amount of harmed product to consume. In addition, the latter decision 
may be driven by the demographic characteristics of decision-makers, as supported 
by a number of articles in the marketing and psychology literature. Flynn et al., 
(1994), Palsson (1996), Byrnes et al., (1998), Laufer and Gillispie (2004), Laufer et 
al., (2005), among others, found differences among male and female as well as 
younger and older individuals’ consumption and purchasing behavior in risky 
situations. Women as well as older consumers often exhibit stronger risk reactions 
to uncertain outcomes of investment risks (Olsen and Cox, 2001) and natural 
hazards (Dosman et al., 2001; Baker, 2003). Therefore, we hypothesize that, apart 
from the separated components of consumer risk behavior, gender and age influ-
ence the quantity-reduction decisions of consumers. The two-stage decision-
making process of consumers in a product-harm crisis can be formulated as: 
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where: i) CRBi is the risk behavior of the consumer i, ii) Di is the participation of 
consumer i in the consumption of a harmed product, iii) Qi is the quantity reduc-
tion decision of consumer i, given that Di > 0 (i.e., consumer i already decided to 
reduce his/her participation - in the consumption - of the harmed product), iii) RAi 
is the risk attitude, iv) RPi is risk perception, v) RAi* RPi is the interaction of the 
risk attitude and perception, vi) AGEi is age and vii) GENi is the gender of con-
sumer i. Consistent with our discussion, the following two sets of hypotheses are 
provided with respect to the: 
 
a. participation decision of consumer i (Di) in the consumption of a harmed 
product 
H1A:  A relatively more (less) risk-averse consumer, will be likely to participate less 
(more) in the consumption of a harmed product. 
H1B: A consumer who perceives relatively high (low) risk from a product-harm crisis, 
will be likely to participate less (more) in the consumption of a harmed product. 
H1C: As a consumer is relatively more (less) risk-averse, (s)he is more likely to partici-
pate less in the consumption of a harmed product when (s)he perceives relatively 
high (low) risk. 
 
b. quantity-reduction decision (Qi) of consumer i, who has already decided to 
participate less in the consumption of the harmed product 
H2A:  As a consumer becomes relatively more (less) risk-averse, the likelihood of reduc-
ing the quantity of consumption of a harmed product increases (decreases).  
H2B: As a consumer perceives relatively high (low) risk, the likelihood of reducing the 
quantity of consumption of a harmed product increases (decreases) 
H2C: As a consumer is relatively more (less) risk-averse, (s)he is more likely to partici-
pate less in the consumption of a harmed product when (s)he perceives relatively 
high (low) risk. 
H2D:  Female consumers are more likely to reduce the quantity of consumption of a 
harmed product.  
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H2E:  Older consumers are more likely to reduce the quantity of consumption of a 
harmed product.  
 
We use these hypotheses (Equation 4.2) to study whether consumers’ risk-
attitudes, risk perceptions and their interaction play a key role in understanding 
consumer participation and quantity-reduction decisions. The model is depicted in 
Figure 4.1. We conceptualized separate but interdependent consumer reactions to 
a product-harm crisis as a two-layered decision system. The first layer refers to the 
consumer’s participation in the consumption of the harmed product, and the sec-
ond layer refers to her/his quantity- reduction decision regarding the amount of 
consumption of a harmed product, given that (s)he already decided to decrease 
his/her (participation in the) consumption of this product. Consumer risk atti-
tudes, risk perceptions, and the interaction of the two are hypothesized to drive 
both decisions. 
Next, we elaborate on the same framework by accounting for the dynamics of 
the decision environment.  
4.2.3 Consumer Risk Behavior in a Dynamic Decision Environment 
In fast-moving market environments, the process of decision-making behavior 
requires analysis on an ongoing basis (Hoffman, 2007). Pennings and Garcia 
(2004) explain that in several decision environments the risk content (e.g., price 
fluctuations) is often well understood by individual decision makers (i.e., individ-
ual traders or investors) in each specific phase of the decision-making process. In 
these decision environments the likelihood that an individual will be exposed to 
the risk content may not follow a random walk due to price fluctuations with equal 
probability over time (e.g., Cargill & Rausser, 1975). The likelihood that individ-
ual investors will be exposed to the risk content associated with the pricing of com-
modities traded in futures exchanges can be formulated over time on the basis of 
concrete probabilities. However, in more uncertain decision environments, such as 
market crisis due to natural hazards, risks are unexpected and probabilities are not 
easy to identify due to high uncertainty (Lipshitz et al., 2001). Consumer decisions 
may change in a later crisis phase because of contingent circumstances in the deci-
sion environment (i.e., more objective knowledge about the risk content is ac-
quired, and, hence, more concrete probabilities regarding the potential outcomes of 
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a product-harm crisis may be identified). A flexible and dynamic model is needed 
to accommodate such behavioral patterns. 
Although most theoretical models of consumer behavior, especially those of an 
information-processing type, acknowledge explicitly or implicitly the effects of 
time on consumer choices (e.g., Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Payne et al., 1993; 
Erdem & Keane, 1996; Bettman et al., 1998; Cleeren et al., 2007), the explicit 
treatment of the effects of time on consumer risk behavior has been sporadic and 
has lacked systematic elaboration (Johnston, 2001). It has been argued though that 
trend in the structure and nature of the marketplace itself may involve time effects 
on several aspects of the decision-making process. Winter (1975) and Bettman et 
al., (1998) supports that the environmental setting, under which information is 
provided in the marketplace, plays a crucial role in consumer information absorp-
tion, and, consequently, affects consumer decision-making behavior. This envi-
ronmental setting may be characterized by contingent conditions (e.g., economic, 
political, technological, cultural) that occur in different time points (i.e., cross sec-
tional instants at which consumer behavior events occur). Contingent conditions 
in the decision environment may result in the dynamic adjustment of the determi-
nants of decision-making behavior. This adjustment may be captured by the im-
pact of time-varying effects on quantity-related purchasing decisions (e.g., Pauwels 
et al., 2002), price promotions (e.g., Nijs et al., 2001), and marketing-mix effec-
tiveness (e.g., Van Heerde et al., 2007). We develop hypotheses regarding the dy-
namic adjustment of the determinants of consumer risk behavior in specific crisis 
phases and over time. 
Consumer Risk Reactions in Specific Crisis Phases 
Public risk concern may change over time in response to fluctuations in problem 
severity (Loewenstein & Mather, 1990). This might imply that consumer risk reac-
tions may change in the different phases of a product-harm crisis. We distinguish 
three main crisis phases: a) pre-crisis phase; b) incipient crisis phase, c) post-crisis 
phase. A country (i.e., a segment of the population) is in a pre-crisis phase when a 
crisis is spread only outside its borders. The industry managers and governmental 
agencies are often concerned with prevention and preparation. The incipient-crisis 
phase starts when a particular harmful incident occurs, which entails considerable 
risks. In this phase, industry management and public policy must urgently and 
actually respond to risk-related threats. The post-crisis phase comes after the first 
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harmful incidents happen in the country and consumers are confronted directly 
with the risks associated with these incidents. In the post-crisis phase public agen-
cies and industry managers look for ways to better prepare for the next crisis and 
fulfill requirements made during the incipient-crisis phase including follow-up 
information. 
More specifically, in a pre-crisis phase consumers are simply confronted with 
news about a novel potential risk and, hence, they may exhibit milder risk reactions 
(e.g., being less risk-averse, perceiving relatively low risk) than in a later phase of a 
crisis (e.g., incipient crisis phase). These mild risk reactions may be caused by the 
consumer’s response to the appropriate disseminated information flows by public 
institutions charged with product-related safety communication (Johansen-
Stenman, 2008) and/or the fact that consumers underestimate life- and health- 
related risks since they are not directly confronted with them (Viscusi, 1993). 
However, after the outbreak of a crisis (i.e., incipient crisis phase), public concern 
is raised as the risk factor becomes a major element of interest in public debate and 
in the media (Pearson & Clair, 1998). When a crisis occurs, individuals may lose 
their sense of control, see themselves as weak and helpless, and their personal as-
sumptions about the “state” of real-world events may change (Jannof-Bulman, 
1992). Thus, individuals’ assumptions about the risk inherent in the consumption 
of an affected product may also change (e.g., what was assumed to be “safe” may 
no longer be safe). In this crisis phase, the change in consumer assumptions may be 
reflected in their attempt to avoid the risk content associated with products and 
services which are found to be defective or even dangerous (Dawar & Pillutla, 
1998). 
Moreover, in the incipient crisis phase, the behavior of consumers is often un-
related to the true level of risk (Pennings et al., 2002) since little is known about 
the risks entailed in the consumption of the affected product (Slovic, 1987) and 
negative news regarding the chance of exposure to risk content is reported fre-
quently and vividly (Weinberger et al., 1993). As a consequence, confusion regard-
ing the true level of risks and negative and intensified publicity about the triggering 
event may lead to exaggerated consumer reactions (Pearson and Clair, 1998). Usu-
ally, in the incipient phase of a product harm-crisis, a substantial reduction in con-
sumption, reflected in sales volume, of the suspect product often occurs (van 
Heerde et al., 2007). 
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Naturally, public response to the risks related to the consumption of the harmed 
product may decrease in a post-crisis phase due to the consumer’s familiarity with 
the level of risk exposure to the product’s affected attributes (Alba & Hutchinson, 
1987). Yet, the results of domain-specific empirical studies show that the food-
safety outbreaks may have both short-term and long-term impacts on consumer 
preferences (e.g., Burton & Young, 1996; Piggott & Marsh, 2004; Mangen & 
Burrel, 2003). The gradual changes in consumer preferences may be attributed to 
trends and seasonality effects (i.e., news intensity during winter) or other socio-
political contingent conditions (i.e., slow information dissemination about the 
risks) existing in the market environment (Mowen, 1980). The lack of accurate, 
timely information regarding the true level of risk entailed in a critical incident 
may amplify the crisis threat (Weick, 1993). In particular, when an organization 
neither confirms nor denies information about the risks entailed in the consump-
tion of a product/service, this may cause chronic low-level anxiety among consum-
ers, even in post-crisis phases. This anxiety may persist and lead to a resurgence of 
the risk factors in a later phase of a product-harm crisis (Beardsworth & Keil, 
1996; Anand, 1998). 
We hypothesize the impact (influence and magnitude) of consumer risk atti-
tudes, risk perceptions and their interaction to be different in specific phases of a 
product-harm crisis. Specifically, we hypothesize that: 
H3A:  The impact of consumer risk attitudes and perceptions and their interaction on 
consumer decisions is more likely to decrease in the pre- and post- phases than in 
the incipient-phase of a product harm crisis.  
Adaptiveness of Risk Behavior: A Contingent-Context Perspective 
Contingent consumer attitudes, perceptions, and decisions reflect the fascinating 
ability of individual decision makers to adapt to a wide variety of environmental 
conditions. Although being adaptive may be hard to define, we generally mean 
consumers’ ability to make decisions or form attitudes and perceptions that are 
affected not purely by the availability of internal resources (e.g., physiological, cog-
nitive) but also through external contingent resources and constraints (e.g., physi-
cal, political, financial, or social). There is a growing research consensus that sup-
ports this view. Scholars have claimed that attitude and perception formations as 
well as change are driven by exposure to episodic events occurring in dynamic 
market environments (e.g., Rogers, 1997; Abelson et al., 1982). This notion is also 
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explicitly addressed in the newly developed field of naturalistic decision-making 
(Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995; Lipshitz et al., 2001). The impact of environmental 
idiosyncrasies (i.e., the contingent context of a particular market situation) on deci-
sion-making behavior is more prominent in this research stream. The decision-
making behavior of individuals claimed to be adaptive to the specificities of “real-
world” contingent market conditions (Klein et al., 1993). 
The specificities of current or concurrent contingent conditions occurring in 
dynamic decision environments may lead to the adjustment and hence adaptive-
ness of consumption, purchase, and investment decisions over time (Lowenstein, 
1992; Vlaev, 2007). When consumers make decisions or judge the attributes of 
choice options (e.g., utilities, probabilities) at different points in time, they are 
often unable to infer absolute magnitudes for these attributes. Instead, they rather 
infer relative magnitudes for their attitudes and perceptions, which are fundamen-
tally context-specific (McCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990; Pennings & Garcia, 2001). 
In economics literature, context specificity has traditionally been regarded as in-
volving the decision-maker’s response to the properties and characteristics of a 
decision task (e.g., Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Benarzi & Thaler, 2001). This 
response may be reflected through the activation of consumer cognitive heuristics 
(e.g., a changing format of a specific task context and/or the availability of time for 
responding to this task). However, context specificity may also being viewed from 
another theoretical perspective as an ongoing update of the components of the deci-
sion-making process that has an incremental and continuous character in contin-
gent, context-based decision-making environments (Hogarth 1981; Kleimuntz, 
1985; Klein, 1993). For instance, a marketing-manager performs a marketing cost 
analysis at a specific point in time and, based on projections, decides to set levels 
for the funding of distributional and promotional strategies for a specific product. 
Next, s(h)e observes the performance of distributional activities and turnover peri-
odically. Subsequently, (s)he may alter his/her decision and adjust the funding 
levels for these strategies in accordance with the available performance figures at 
different points in time. This is a sort of adaptive response that often occurs in con-
tingent-driven decision contexts in which decision makers use their experiences from 
different points in time to make decisions under specific market settings. 
A product-harm crisis involving life-threatening design flaws has many fea-
tures of a contingent-driven decision environment. These events come very sud-
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denly (Johansen-Stenman, 2008), are almost impossible to anticipate (Wansink, 
2004), hence ruling out the presence of a possible self-selection effect on the ab-
sorption of new risk information (Adda, 2007). To account for the dynamic nature 
of consumer risk behavior in such turbulent decision environments, the impact of 
the direct effect of time on the determinants of consumer decisions might be taken 
into consideration (Kotler, 2002). Thereby, one may allow for the longitudinal 
evolution of the determinants of consumer risk behavior by hypothesizing the pres-
ence of time effects that capture the dynamics of the decision environment (i.e., the 
contingent-context) in the different phases of a product-harm crisis (Johnston, 
2001). 
In this work, we recognize that the decision-making behavior of a consumer is 
a part of a dynamic decision problem that does not simply terminate with a deci-
sion at a specific point in time (i.e., in a specific crisis phases). Instead, the behavior 
of an individual consumer during the phases of a product-harm crisis may adapt to 
the contingent conditions (i.e., contingent contexts) occurring in a dynamic deci-
sion environment. One important property of this perspective is that the impacts 
of risk attitudes and perceptions on risk behavior are not based on the evaluation of 
an invariant algorithm (i.e., a weighted adding model), but they are rather sensitive 
to a specific decision context’s contingent conditions. This may imply, in turn, that 
consumer attitudes and perceptions may change as consumers experience more 
local problem structures during the course of making decisions (Hoch & Deiton, 
1989; Bettman et al., 1998). We hypothesize that the decoupled components of 
consumer risk behavior may adapt to the contingent conditions over the different 
phases of a product-harm crisis. Thereby, we place our initial conceptualization 
(see: Figure 4.1/Equation 4.2) in a dynamic context by incorporating the element 
of time effect that captures and reflects the contingent conditions occurring in a 
product-harm crisis situation as: 
⎪⎩
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where: i) CRBit is the risk behavior of the consumer i in crisis phases t; t denotes the 
product-harm’s crisis phases as t = 1, . . . , T , ii) Dit is the participation of con-
sumer i in the consumption of a harmed product in crisis phase t, iii) Qit is the 
quantity-reduction decision of a consumer i for a harmed product in crisis phase t , 
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given that Di > 0 (i.e., the consumer i already decided to reduce his participation in 
the consumption of a harmed product), iv) RAi is the risk attitude, v) RPi is risk 
perception, vi) RAi* RPi is the interaction of risk attitude and risk perception, vii) 
AGEi is the age of consumer i, viii) GENi is the gender of consumer i in crisis phase 
t, viii) the subscript t indicates the dynamics of the determinants (iv – viii) of both 
consumer decisions (Dit and Qit ) over the t = 1, . . . , T crisis phases (e.g., pre-, 
incipient-, and post-crisis phases). This formulation also implies that the impact of 
gender and age may also change over time. This implies that the reactions of a 
consumer segment including older and female consumers may adapt to the chang-
ing conditions of the product-harm crisis since this segment of consumers may 
become more familiar with the risk content over time as their product-related ex-
periences increased (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). Thus, they may exhibit less risk-
averse behavior and perceive relatively lower levels of risk. Equation 4.3 allows the 
formulation of the following hypotheses:  
H4A:  The decoupled components of consumer risk behavior significantly influence 
consumer decisions across phases of a product-harm crisis.  
H4B:  The impact of time effects on the determinants of consumer participation and 
quantity-reduction decisions is significant across phases of a product-harm crisis.  
4.2.4 Risk Attitudes & Perceptions: The Role of Knowledge and Trust 
Although the role of knowledge and trust in consumer decision-making has been 
conceptualized extensively, studies regarding their impacts on risk perceptions and 
attitudes in different crisis phases are scarce. Theory and empirical testing provide 
more insights into the dynamic relationships among beliefs, knowledge, trust and 
risk perceptions rather than risk attitudes. Risk attitudes have been argued to be 
more invariant than risk perceptions due to their definitional pattern: interpreta-
tion of the content of the risk in a consistent way (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 
1990; Weber & Milliman, 1997). Yet, one may assume that the extent of the atti-
tude’s rigidness may not be viewed as a valid assumption if/when consumers may 
modify their preferences as function of whether they expect repeated exposure to 
stimuli and/or as a function of the cost-avoiding aversive stimuli during repeated 
exposure (Gibbs, 1996). Consumers may modify their willingness to accept certain 
levels of risk in order to allow themselves to extract higher utility from subsequent 
choices regarding the consumption of a product or service (e.g., Hoch & Loewen-
stein, 1991; Kahn & Luce, 1997). 
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Research in marketing also suggests that consumers may alter their decision-
making representations because of their increasing experience with the nature of a 
decision event or the attributes of a product (e.g., Hoch & Deiton, 1989). Differ-
ences among these representations arise as consumers acquire more experiences 
over time related to the content of the attributes of a product/service and exhibit 
higher levels of trust in the information provided about this content (e.g., Moor-
man et al., 1992; Alba & Hutchinson, 2000). Although we recognize that risk 
attitude and risk perception are two different concepts, here, we assume that the 
experience-based factors such as knowledge about the risk content inherent in a 
product-harm crisis event and consumer trust in information about safety may 
affect the dynamics of consumer risk attitudes (i.e., the willingness of a consumer 
to accept the risk content) and risk perceptions (i.e., the subjective interpretation of 
consumer of the probability to be exposed to the content of the risk), respectively, 
in different crisis phases. 
The Role of Knowledge 
The role of consumer knowledge in the subsequent information processing and 
decision making has been extensively discussed in consumer research (e.g., Moor-
man & Matulich, 1993; Bettman, et al., 1998; Sen, 1998; Wood & Lynch, 2002; 
Hui et al., 2009). As Moorman et al., (2004) explain, knowledge in consumer re-
search has been assumed to have two facets: objective and subjective knowledge. 
Objective knowledge refers to accurately stored information while subjective know-
ledge refers to the individual’s self-beliefs about their own knowledge. Alba and 
Hutchinson (2000) further explain that objective knowledge is dependent mostly 
on the consumer’s ability or expertise whereas subjective knowledge is based on 
expertise as well as experience. In other words, objective knowledge may reflect 
what a consumers knows, and subjective knowledge may reflect what a consumer 
thinks (s)he knows. Jacoby (1984) argued that the issue of how consumer knowl-
edge affects behavior should the preliminary focus of the entire public policy. 
Marketing theory suggests that consumers with high expertise (objective 
knowledge) and experience (subjective knowledge) may have more detailed knowl-
edge structures (e.g., Hoch & Deaton, 1989). The consumer’s expertise, experience 
and familiarity with the risks associated with the consumption and purchase of a 
specific product may increase the level of accurately stored information and update 
the consumer’s self-beliefs (Brucks, 1985). That is, the objective and subjective 
CHAPTER 4 100 
knowledge are likely to be updated when changes in the decision environment 
occur and due to increases in the consumer’s learning from the dissemination of 
new information about the risk content entailed in a the use or consumption of a 
product/service (Perachio & Tybout, 1996). As a consequence, consumers may use 
new information about the risk content entailed in a specific crisis-phase and they 
may update their prior self-beliefs (Viscusi, 1991, Liu et al., 1998). 
We expect the risk attitude of an individual (i.e., willingness to take the risk) 
in dynamic decision environments (i.e., product-harm crisis) to be subject to in-
creased levels of objective knowledge (i.e., accurately stored information) as well as 
subjective knowledge (i.e., self-beliefs about their own knowledge). Consumers 
may acquire more precise information about the risk content entailed in a product-
harm crisis in the course of making subsequent decisions because of their increased 
expertise on the risk content inherent in particular decision environments over 
time (i.e., subsequent phases of a product harm crisis). Moreover, the release of 
more precise information about the risk content entailed in a product-harm crisis 
situation may alter their self-beliefs about their own knowledge regarding this risk 
content in particular crisis phases. These expectations are consistent with prior 
research in marketing showing that, when more health information regarding the 
low risks inherent in the consumption of a product is disseminated, consumers 
exhibit less risk-averse behavior due to their accelerated expertise and experience 
with the risk content entailed in the consumption of this product (e.g., Smith and 
Johnson, 1988; Roe et al., 1999; Kozup et al., 2003). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H5A:  Greater objective knowledge of consumes will be likely associated with less risk-
averse behavior in the subsequent phases of a product-harm crisis. 
H5B:  Greater subjective knowledge of consumers will be likely associated with less risk-
averse behavior in the subsequent phases of a product-harm crisis.  
The Role of Trust 
Kramer (1999) offers a comprehensive review of the trust literature that emphasizes 
the crucial importance of trust in understanding the consumer decision-making 
process under risk and uncertainty. Trust can be defined as the extent to which one 
party believes that other parties will not act to exploit one’s vulnerabilities (Mayers 
et al., 1995). In a more specific context regarding the transactions developed 
among different parties, trust may be viewed as increasing one’s susceptibility to 
the risk of opportunistic behavior of one’s transaction partner (Zand, 1972). 
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Without susceptibility (i.e., vulnerability) to the risk of opportunism, there is no 
need to trust. That is, some degree of risk must be present to be able to speak of 
trust (Dasgupta, 2009). Moreover, Bradach and Eccles (1989) define trust as a 
belief or expectation that an exchange partner will not engage in opportunistic 
behavior, even in the face of countervailing short- and long- term incentives and 
uncertainty about long-term benefits. These definitions address risk either explic-
itly or implicitly, and it becomes evident that trust is a concept inextricably linked 
to risk behavior. 
Several recent studies have looked at the impact of trust on consumer percep-
tions by distinguishing between specific actors, for example, consumer trust in 
retailers, wholesalers, governmental agencies, and the health system (e.g., Horning 
et al., 2003; Siergist et al., 2003; Van Kleef et al., 2007). Slovic (1992) and John-
son and Slovic (1995) support that the decision-making behavior of consumers is 
likely to alter at different points in time as it depends on the extent to which a 
consumer trusts the information about consumption safety issues provided by insti-
tutions charged with the dissemination of health information. Boker and Hanf 
(2000) have shown that high levels of consumer trust in information provided 
about a potentially harmed product, positively affect consumer behavior under risk 
and uncertainty (i.e., consumers perceive low levels of risk). Also, Eiser et al., 
(2003) suggest that any erosion of public trust in response to products hazards is 
likely to lead to the perception of higher risk levels. These studies imply that the 
impact of trust on consumer perceptions may be different in different phases of a 
product-harm crisis. 
Specifically, in a pre-crisis phase, the information provided by industry institu-
tions and governmental agencies is often not doubted since consumers are not 
directly confronted with the potential hazards and are unaware of or unconcerned 
about the potential risk factors (Beardsworth & Keil, 1996). They may also incur 
higher search and substitutions costs when attempting to find products with cre-
dence attributes or buying non-preferred products (Campo et al., 2000). Consum-
ers often exhibit a degree of tacit trust in the dominant cultural institutions and the 
regulatory-governance mechanisms charged with providing product-related safety 
information and in the accurateness of this information that these institutions pro-
vide (Giddens 1991). Thus, consumers’ trust in the safety information from these 
institutions may result in a relatively low perception of risk in a pre-crisis phase 
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because the probability that they will be exposed to the content of the risk is per-
ceived by them as low. However, the bad publicity surrounding the incipient-phase 
of a product-harm crisis tends to be weighted heavily by consumers when making 
product- purchasing and consumption decisions. This phenomenon is known as 
negativity bias as it is perceived both as diagnostic and surprising (Herr et al., 
1991). Consumer trust in the information provided by the regulatory governance 
mechanisms protecting the public welfare may decrease and influence consumers’ 
risk perceptions negatively. That is, consumers may perceive more risk in the in-
cipient-phase of a product-harm crisis because they consider the chance to be ex-
posed to the content of the risk as higher. In this study, we examine the influence 
of consumers’ trust in the safety information provided by the governmental agen-
cies on consumer risk perceptions since these institutions carry the greatest respon-
sibility in disseminating health information to other market actors throughout the 
supply chain (e.g., Miller, 1999). 
In the course of a crisis (e.g., the post-crisis phases), consumers may regain 
their trust in the product-safety information provided by institutions, having ac-
quired more expertise, experience and more detailed knowledge regarding the pre-
vention of potential health hazards. Familiarity with risk factors may make con-
sumers weight the negative outcomes with the consumption of a potentially 
harmed product and the negative news surrounding these outcomes less heavily 
(Jolly & Mowen, 1985). Recovering of one’s trust may result in increasing con-
sumer confidence and, hence, the perception of lower levels of risk (De Jonge et al., 
2008). That is, the probability that consumers will be exposed to the content of 
risk is perceived by them as lower. However, continuous negative publicity in the 
post-crisis phases as well as cultural susceptibility towards potentially compromis-
ing alliances between science, corporate interests, and government agencies may 
lead to reflexive doubt and a slow recovery of consumer’s trust in food safety in-
formation (Thompson, 2005). Reflexive doubt may be viewed as the public’s skep-
ticism about the level of risk, caused by complex technological systems and socio-
political and economic forces that may affect risk attitudes and perceptions (Beck, 
1999). A slow recovery of consumer trust in food-safety information due to reflex-
ive doubt may lead to the perception of higher levels of risk. We hypothesize that: 
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H6A:  Greater (lower) consumer trust in safety information is associated with the rela-
tively lower (higher) risk perception in the pre- and post-phases than in the in-
cipient phase of a product-harm crisis. 
4.3 Implications of the Proposed Framework 
From a marketing and/or public policy perceptive, the insights that result from 
decoupling risk attitudes and risk perceptions in a dynamic and natural decision 
context as well as the impacts of consumer knowledge on risk attitudes and trust in 
health information on risk perceptions in specific crisis phases, can yield important 
managerial implications for marketers and policy makers coping with puzzling 
consumer reactions in different phases of a product-harm crisis. We consider the 
following six implications regarding potential outcomes of consumer risk behavior 
in the different crisis phases (t1, t2, . . . , tn ) : 
Implication #1: Suppose that risk attitude is the main driver of consumer re-
actions to a BSE crisis in crisis phase t1 (e.g., incipient-crisis phase). In such a case, 
the interest of policy-makers and marketers should be centered on the identifica-
tion of ways to eliminate the risk (e.g., a total recall and elimination of the product: 
testing and slaughtering all suspected cows) because, even if the probabilities of 
being exposed to risk are small, effectively communicating these probabilities will 
have not any substantial influence on consumers’ decisions. However, if at t2 (e.g., 
post-crisis phase) risk attitude does not influence consumers’ risk behavior, the 
marketing strategy has to be adapted to the new conditions and these tough meas-
ures should be gradually abandoned. The extent of gradual-product elimination 
strategies will be based on level(s) of the decreasing magnitude of risk-aversion over 
the different crisis phases. 
Implication #2: Suppose that the risk perception drives consumer decisions in 
crisis phase t1 (e.g., pre-crisis phase). This would suggest that effectively communi-
cating the ‘true’ probabilities of being exposed to the risk (when available) is a use-
ful way to shape the consumers’ risk response to a product-harm crisis in this 
phase. If in a later phase of the crisis, t2 (e.g., incipient-crisis phase), the influence 
and the magnitude of risk perception on consumer behavior will have increased 
substantially, marketers and policy makers should focus on strengthening the 
communication strategies by heightening the budgets that enhance effective com-
munication. If the influence and the magnitude at decreased substantially at t2, 
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policy-makers, industry managers and marketers may focus on other ways (e.g., 
gradual beef recalls, partial product elimination and recall) to decrease the uncer-
tainty of the risk content inherent in this particular crisis phase. 
Implication #3: Suppose that the interaction of risk attitude and risk percep-
tion drives consumer decisions to reduce their beef consumption in crisis phase t1 
(e.g., incipient-crisis phase). The solution in this case may be a combination of the 
2 strategies (implication 1 and 2) mentioned above: both tough policy measures 
and marketing strategies (e.g., product recalls and elimination) and effective dis-
semination of health information are required. If the relative importance of this 
factor to consumers’ decisions diminishes in a later phase of the crisis, t2 (post-crisis 
phase), the emphasis of the marketing strategies has to be placed on influencing 
consumer risk attitudes or risk perceptions, depending on which factor has a higher 
relative importance. 
 
Table 4.1 Managerial Implications based on Changing Consumer Risk Behavior in Different Prod-
uct-harm Crisis Phases 
 Pre-crisis phase  Incipient-crisis phase a Post-crisis phase b 
  Increased influence &  
magnitude 
Decreased influence &  
magnitude  
Risk Attitude (RA) Product elimination and 
recalls 
(e.g., eliminate risk by slaugh-
tering of animals)  
Full product-elimination 
and recall strategies (e.g., 
detection and evaluation of 
all products suspected to be 
“weak”)  
Partial product-elimination and 
recall strategies (e.g., detection 
and elimination of “weak” prod-
ucts only)  
Risk Perception 
(RP) 
Communication strategies 
(i.e., industry and governmen-
tal campaigns to communicat-
ing the “actual” level of risk)  
Investing more in communi-
cation strategies (e.g., heigh-
tening budgets for commu-
nication strategies)  
Investing less in communication 
strategies  
Interaction: RA* 
RP 
Mixture of strategies based on 
the relative importance of RA 
& RP 
Strengthening both product-
elimination and communica-
tion strategies 
Partial product-elimination and 
investing less in communication.  
a The strategies proposed for the incipient-crisis in this table are based on the scenario that the influ-
ence and the magnitude of consumer risk attitude, risk perception, and the interaction of the two, on 
their decisions, increased. 
b The strategies proposed for the post-crisis phase in this table are based on the scenario that the 
influence and the magnitude of consumer risk attitude, risk perception, and the interaction of the 
two, on their decisions, decreased. 
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Implication #4: Suppose that risk attitude is driven by the extent of the con-
sumer’s objective knowledge about the risk content entailed in a product-harm 
crisis phase t1 (e.g., incipient-crisis phase). This would suggest that marketers’ in-
terest may lie in designing strategies to communicate effectively the health-related 
risks (i.e., risk content) evolved in a product-harm crisis situation. These strategies 
may focus on maintaining, ensuring, and increasing the levels of consumers’ accu-
rate information about the risk content, by using intensified and frequent health 
briefings and commercial messages regarding product-related safety (e.g., through 
presentation of scientific facts, advertising, etc). More accurately stored informa-
tion on the risk content among consumers may lead to less risk-averse behavior. If 
in a later phase of the crisis, t2 (e.g., post-crisis phase), the impact of objective 
knowledge on risk attitudes decreases, the storage strategies may require that market-
ers and policy-makers invest more in resources and time and target their efforts to re-
affirm accurate information regarding potential risks in order to further induce the 
accuracy of consumer knowledge. This re-affirmation should make sure that accurate 
information about the risk content is readily available to the consumers. 
Implication #5: Suppose that subjective knowledge drives risk attitude in crisis 
phase t1 (e.g., pre-crisis phase). In such a case, the focus of policy-makers and mar-
keters may be on the development of communication strategies to re-direct con-
sumer’s subjective knowledge about the risk content away from rumor-stimulated 
associations. Thus, consumers’ own interpretation about the risk content may be 
made in a consistent way. In other words, the implementation of strategies that 
eliminate consumers’ negative bias may be the solution. Such a strategy may be 
implemented by using successful message framing and through the development of 
consumer (health-) educational programs. These messages and programs may pre-
vent the association of a harmed-product threat with imprecise information flows. 
If in a later phase of the crisis, t2 (e.g., incipient-crisis phase), the influence and the 
magnitude of subjective knowledge on risk perceptions diminishes, adaptation 
towards more intensive communication efforts for selective persuasive messages 
regarding the risk content may be required in order to alter consumer self-beliefs 
about what they know (e.g., public announcements that focus mainly on commu-
nicating the low level of risk - factors - in the consumption of a product and fur-
ther investing in appealing product presentations in retail outlets). 
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Implication #6: Suppose that consumer trust in information about safety is-
sues provided by governmental institutions drives the risk perception in crisis phase 
t1 (e.g., pre-crisis phase). Greater trust in this source of information may result in a 
relatively low perception of risk because consumers consider the chance (i.e., prob-
ability) to be exposed to the content of the risk as low. One way to maintain the 
high levels of consumer trust in the information provided by governmental institu-
tions is to avoid mismatching of crucial information  
Table 4. 2. Managerial Implications based on the Factors Impacting Risk Attitude (RA) and Risk 
Perception (RP) in Crisis Phases  
 Pre-crisis phase  Incipient-crisis phase a Post-crisis phase b 
  Decreased influence & 
magnitude of OK, SK, 
TRUST 
Increased influence & 
magnitude 
of OK, SK, TRUST 
 RA  RP  RA RP RA RP 
Objective 
Knowledge 
(OK) 
Storage strate-
gies for com-
municating the 
“actual” level 
of risk 
 Reaffirmation 
of accurate 
risk informa-
tion 
 Less extensive 
use of storage 
strategies 
 
Subjective 
Knowledge 
(SK) 
Retrieval 
strategies for 
eliminating the 
negativity bias 
associated with 
the risk con-
tent 
 Intensive 
communica-
tion & ap-
pealing 
product 
presentations 
in retail 
outlets 
 Less intensive 
communication 
for guarantee-
ing the elimina-
tion of negativ-
ity bias.  
 
Trust in 
Information 
provided by 
Government 
(TRUST) 
 Open & trans-
parent commu-
nication strat-
egy targeting 
confidence & 
social em-
beddedness.  
  Increase 
public in-
vestments in 
communica-
tion & syner-
gies among 
government, 
industry & 
media.  
 Gradual 
decrease of 
investments in 
communica-
tion strategies 
at the level that 
consumer trust 
is maintained.  
a The strategies proposed for the incipient-crisis in this table are based on the scenario that the influ-
ence and the magnitude of OK and SK on RA and TRUST on RP decreased 
b The strategies proposed for the post-crisis phase in this table are based on the scenario that the 
influence and the magnitude of OK and SK on RA and TRUST on RP increased. 
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regarding the potential health risks associated with the consumption of a harmed 
product. The public dissemination strategy should always rely on concrete, open 
and transparent information. Hence, a signaling strategy containing cues of confi-
dence (assurance) and social embeddedness may be adopted in order to maintain 
consumer trust (e.g., investing in the creation of logos that endorse the credibility 
of information). If in a later crisis phase, t2 (e.g., incipient crisis phase), consumer 
trust decreases and, as a consequence, consumers will perceive relatively more risk, 
policy-makers may consider further increasing public investments and developing 
synergies with other market actors (media and industry managers) in order to en-
hance consumer confidence and eliminate their disappointment and negative emo-
tions related to the consumption of a harmed product. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the managerial implication of our proposed framework 
with respect to the impact of risk attitudes, risk perceptions and their interaction 
on consumer decisions between different crisis phases. This table does not cover 
the managerial implications of demographics (i.e., gender and age). That is, the 
gender and age of populations are factors that public policy and industry managers 
may have limited influence on. However, their changing impact on consumer deci-
sions across the crisis phases may reveal useful information for marketers to im-
prove product placement in retail outlets and the design of segmentation strategies 
during the phases of a product harm-crisis. Finally, table 4.2 summarizes the ma-
nagerial implications with respect to the impacts of consumer knowledge on risk 
content and trust in information on risk attitudes and perceptions. 
Next, we discuss the research design of our empirical study which allows the 
testing of the proposed framework and may reveal important information for mar-
keters and policy-makers. 
4.4 Research Design 
To address whether consumers’ risk behavior adapts to the changing conditions of 
decision environments in and across the phases of a product-harm crisis, we exam-
ined the risk reactions of consumers to the BSE crisis in the US and Germany in 
the different crisis phases during 2001 and 2004. As displayed in Figure 4.2 the 
risk reactions of American consumers were examined in the pre- (2001) and incipi-
ent-BSE crisis phases (2004) and the Germans in the incipient- (2001) and post-
crisis phases. 
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The selected decision context entails high uncertainty namely the possibility of a 
deadly outcome for consumers due to the spread of unexpected life-threatening 
design-flows. Hence, it provides a unique opportunity for carrying out natural 
experiments which allow the evaluation of consumers’ reactions to a market crisis 
in and across different crisis phases. Several types of natural-hazards, such as food 
scares, disease epidemics, weather calamities, and terrorist attacks, are unexpected, 
can destroy corporate businesses and disrupt the consumption of an entire product 
category (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Thus, the current decision context also provides 
the opportunity to observe and analyze consumers’ risk reactions to a market crisis 
that involves an entire product category, in our case, beef. 
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Figure 4.2 BSE Crisis Phases for the US and Germany in 2001–2004. 
 
Many governmental agencies (e.g., Economic Research Service USDA; Canadian 
Animal Health Coalition, EU Commission) and scholars (e.g., ) have focused heav-
ily on the assessment of the economic impact of the BSE crises on beef and other 
meat prices and on the effectiveness of a series of measures to safeguard health and 
restore confidence in beef (e.g., Byrne, 2002). However, there are no systematic 
reports focusing on the BSE crisis developments and consumer reactions to the 
BSE crisis in different countries in different phases (i.e., pre-, incipient-, and post-
crisis phases). In this section we discuss our decision context regarding the ramifi-
cations of the BSE crisis on a timeline basis. We attempt to shed light on the con-
tingent conditions occurred in the marketplace of the two countries in each crisis 
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phase. Table 4.3 summarizes the results of this qualitative study by displaying the 
different BSE crisis developments (risk assessments, management and communica-
tion strategies, as well as consumer reactions) in the US and Germany for the pe-
riod 2001 – 2004. 
4.4.1 Decision Context 
Consumer concerns with the BSE crisis are aligned with the scientific fact that 
contaminated beef can cause the fatal “Creutzfeldt–Jacob Disease - (CJD)”. Al-
though the World Health Organization confirms that the chance of contracting 
CJD by eating beef is extremely small, it seems that the behavior of consumers in 
such a product crisis is not always consistent with the true level of risk they face. 
For instance, beef consumption decreased dramatically in Germany when the first 
BSE case was detected (November 26, 2000). At the height of the rush to fill fes-
tive Christmas tables and despite the fact that German beef and meat consumption 
used to reach its annual peak in December, butchers reported plunges of up to 90 
percent in the sales of beef and sausages (Reuters, 2000; Gfk, 2001). At the same 
time, poultry and horse meat prices surged. Figure 4.3 shows that in the next three 
years, beef consumption recovered slightly in Germany maintaining an overall 
decreasing trend, undoubtedly, due to the ramifications of the well-publicized BSE 
crisis events, which put intense pressure on governmental agencies, industries, and 
marketers globally. 
Only two years after the BSE outbreaks in Germany, the US lost access to its 
traditional export markets (e.g., Japan) following a BSE discovery on December 
23, 2003. In contrast with the German case, American consumption remained at 
almost the same level as in 2002. It is indeed striking the inconsistency in reactions 
among the American and German consumers towards the same product-harm 
crisis entailing the same risk content. How can this inconsistency in risk reactions 
be explained? 
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Figure 4.3 American and German Gross Consumption of Beef from 1998–2005 
               (Source: Eurostat & USDA, 2007) 
 
In order to gain a complete and informative view of the situation in each country, 
we first discuss the developments in the two countries in the light of: a) risk as-
sessment, b) risk management, and c) risk communication (FAO/WHO, 1997). 
Risk assessment focuses on the efforts made in each country to estimate the risk that 
BSE will negatively affect a population or subpopulation. Risk management’s pri-
mary goal is the protection of public health by controlling risk associated with the 
BSE as effectively as possible through the selection of appropriate policies and 
strategies. Risk communication refers to the interactive exchange of information and 
opinions concerning risk and risk management among risk assessors, risk managers, 
consumers, and other interested parties. Second, we provide descriptive informa-
tion regarding consumer reactions to the BSE crises in each country over the exam-
ined period. These descriptions are based on a systematic collection of relevant 
information by using archived press releases, media announcements and govern-
mental factsheets and reports over the period 2001–2004. We accessed relevant 
information from more than 50 web-pages and 100 business-, regulatory-, and 
country-specific reports, and popular articles regarding the developments of BSE 
crises in both countries for the period 2001–2004.17 
Below, we discuss in more detail how the political and market actors re-
sponded to the BSE crisis in the two countries by using (and displaying) selected 
                                                     
17 The information collected from on-line sources and business reports is available upon request to the 
author.  
       United States                  Germany
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sources, which allow us to make-up a coherent synthesis of the BSE crisis develop-
ments during the period 2001–2004.  
US : Atmosphere of High Surveillance 
Under the cloud of fear created by a wave of European BSE outbreaks, American 
policy-makers took proactive measures to prevent the introduction and potential 
spread of BSE in the US Surveillance measures targeted those cattle populations 
where the disease was most likely to be found (APHIS, 2006). In late 2001, a study 
conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Assessment supported that the imple-
mentation of these measures, which were initiated by the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA), was largely responsible for keeping the BSE out of 
the US, and it would have prevented the BSE from spreading on the American beef 
market, if it had ever entered the country (Cohen et al., 2001). 
The US Food and Drug Administration estimated a loss of $15 billion in sales 
revenue, resulting from a 24 percent decline in beef sales and 80 percent decline in 
beef and live cattle exports, if a BSE incident were to occur in the county (FDA, 
2001). Moreover, slaughter and disposal costs of infected cattle would amount to 
about $12 billion. To prevent BSE from entering the American food supply chain, 
the public administration expanded its surveillance activities, including testing an 
increased number of cattle samples and inspections at US entry ports (GAO, 
2005). 
Policy-makers and meat industry managers supported the implementation of 
the effective surveillance programs aimed at the elimination of infected beef and its 
byproducts from the food chain. Although the level of testing in US was minus-
cule, only 20.000 tests were conducted in the US in 2002 compared to 8.5 million 
animals tested in Europe (Fox & Peterson, 2004), the administration invested 
substantial resources to strengthen BSE protection systems, including significant 
funding increases for risk analysis, education, and public-awareness programs. A 
series of educational seminars on the BSE-related risks were organized for cattle 
producers, veterinarians, industry groups, and the general public through numer-
ous briefings and press conferences. The wide distributions of fact sheets, video-
tapes on the causes and harms of BSE, guidelines for compulsory notification re-
quirements, on-line web support, and information packets to veterinarians, exten-
sion offices, universities and industry groups, attempted to strengthen precaution-
ary programs to keep the BSE out of the US (USDA, 2002). The level of surveil-
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lance in the US increased steadily after 2000 and jumped significantly at the be-
ginning of 2004 when the USDA and the US Department of Health and Human 
Services (USDHHS) enhanced surveillance activities following the first BSE dis-
covery of December 23, 2003. 
The detection of the first BSE infected cow in the US sparked the instant im-
plementation of an action plan under the supervision of the USDHHS. This plan 
included several activities such as the protection of consumer health which was 
assigned to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as its primary responsibility, 
and risk analysis which was conducted by the National Institute of Health (NIH). 
The FDA investigators also assisted the USDA officers in meat recalls checks at 
retail stores, and they witnessed the destruction of beef and byproducts at landfills 
(FDA, 2004). At the same time, the American government provided daily briefings 
to update the public on the BSE status (USDA, 2003). To protect the public 
health and maintain the confidence of consumers, industry, and trading partners, 
the government announced the implementation of stricter regulations in order to 
further prevent human exposure to BSE. In addition, the government appointed 
an international panel of scientific experts to provide an objective review of the US 
response actions and areas for potential enhancement and to recommend appropri-
ate strategies for communicating to the general public the low probability of ad-
verse health effects associated with beef consumption. 
Only one day after the BSE discovery in the US, stock prices for restaurants 
and other food-related companies fell sharply. The stock prices of McDonald’s 
Corp. and Wendy’s fell 6% and 4.5% respectively (Goldstein & Wilson, 2005). 
Figure 4.4 shows that other barometers indicating market expectations, such as the 
index Feeder Cattle Futures (FCF) of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
and the Thomson-Reuters Live Cattle index, shaded approximately by 9% and 6% 
respectively, within the first two weeks after the outbreaks of BSE in the US.18 Jin 
and Kim (2008) provide empirical evidence that the security values of firms in the 
beef sector were negatively affected by the BSE event for a period of about three 
months. Pritchet et al., (2005) summarize estimates using agribusiness-level studies 
                                                     
18 CME Feeder Cattle Futures contracts are risk management instruments to hedge risks arising in the 
cattle commodity markets due to natural hazards caused by weather conditions, crop diseases, etc. 
The level of trade in these contracts also gives an indication of market participants’ expectations and 
risk taking behaviour (see: Pennings, 1998; Tse & Hackard, 2006).  
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that show that the BSE’s outbreak in the US lowered beef prices by 13% between 
December 22nd and January 8th , while fed cattle prices fell by about 20% during 
the same time period and the negative impact on the slaughter industry persisted 
until 2004. However, the reactions of American consumers were limited and dissi-
pated within two weeks after the first media announcements of the first BSE case 
in the US (Kuchler & Tegene, 2006). 
 
  
Figure 4.4 Percentage of Changes in CME Feeder Cattle and Thomson-Reuters Live Stock 
Cattle (TRLC) Indexes: December 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004 
 
A CNN/USA TODAY/Gallup Poll taken from January 2–5, 2004 revealed that 
most Americans believed that BSE was a minor problem (63%) and insisted that 
they did not cut back or stop eating beef as a result of BSE in the US (81%). Like-
wise, various press releases reported that BSE had not set any panic in the sales of 
beef in American restaurants and grocery stores and they remained steady (Wahl-
reng, 2004). For instance, the American McDonalds restaurants did not show any 
decrease in beef consumption due to the BSE events, contrary to double-digit de-
creases in Europe and Japan after BSE had broken out (Leung, 2004).  
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Table 4.3 Risk Analysis and Consumer Reactions in the US & Germany during 2001–2004 
 Risk Assessment Risk Management  Risk Communication Consumer Reactions 
USa Pre-phase: active 
surveillance and early 
(homeland) protec-
tion measures.  
Pre-phase: testing of 
selected cattle samples 
and high investments to 
strength BSE protec-
tion systems. 
Pre-phase: intensive educa-
tion of producers, industry 
groups and general public 
on the BSE risks.. 
Pre-phase: unchanged 
consumer behavior and 
confidence to American 
food system. 
 Incipient phase: 
continuing robust 
surveillance programs.  
Incipient phase: product 
recalls and checks at 
retail stores and land-
fills; scientific expertise 
for regulatory and 
consumption-related 
issues. 
Incipient phase: daily 
briefings on the BSE status 
by governmental agencies 
and industry groups 
Incipient phase: beef retail 
sales remained almost 
steady; a slight decline in 
the stock prices of food-
related and beef compa-
nies. 
Germany b Incipient phase(s): 
increased audit 
capacity and industry-
led initiatives for 
quality assurance.  
Incipient Phase: exten-
sive product elimina-
tion. 
Incipient phase: highly 
publicized event by media 
only.  
Incipient phase: hysteric 
reactions ; tremendous 
decline in consumption 
and sales 
 Pos- phase(s): uncoor-
dinated actions 
between government 
and federal states: non 
transparent auditing 
capacity and industry-
led initiatives. 
Post- phase(s): inspec-
tions and tests 
throughout the beef 
supply chain (e.g., 
farms, processing units, 
super-markets) 
Post- phase(s): moderate 
communication efforts by 
governmental agencies, 
industry and media: BSE as 
a proportion to general 
food safety issues 
Post-phase(s): consumer 
moderately regained trust 
but blamed the govern-
ment and the industry 
for low communication 
transparency. 
a The BSE was fanned out in the US in December 2003. The risk analysis dimensions and consumer 
reactions to the BSE crisis refer to pre- and incipient BSE crisis phases (before and after December 23, 
2003). 
b The first BSE outbreak in Germany was on November 26, 2000. The risk analysis dimensions and 
consumer reactions refer to the incipient and later BSE crisis phases (from the November 2001 - first 
BSE outbreaks in Germany - to 2004).  
 
Therefore, it appears that the atmosphere of high surveillance in the pre-crisis 
phase prevented consumer panic and disruption of the retail beef markets in the 
US (Thilmany et al., 2004). At the end of 2004, the US administration claimed to 
be strongly committed to this very robust surveillance program for public health 
protections against BSE. Despite this, the future of the US surveillance programs 
has not yet been decided. Several calls were made by industry groups and officials 
to scale back measures and actions which were costly for both government and 
industry. However, in the light of continuous BSE crises and other food-related 
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scares (e.g., Avian Influenza) spreading globally, some consumer advocacy groups 
favor testing on a wider scale (Fox et al., 2005). 
Germany: Fragmented Market Reactions 
Germany was considered as “free to BSE” until 2000 as a result of political conflict 
between diverse economic interests in the country. Protection of different market 
actors (e.g., food producers, wholesalers, retailers, consumers) was attempted at the 
political level by the growing divergence between ministries. The interest of the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture was to protect farmers against economic losses 
while the Federal Ministry of Health protected of consumer health (Lenz, 2006). 
Political, agribusiness, and food- industry managers simply showed a lack of 
awareness regarding EU policies on import restrictions. The BSE crisis was treated 
as an external event until 2000. Policy makers and industry leaders sustained the 
view that if Germany were to face BSE crisis, attempts would have to be made to 
solve the problem within the subsequent stages of the German food chain without 
drawing public attention (Luhmann, 2001). 
At the end of 2000 (November-December), the first BSE cases were discov-
ered in Germany. The first BSE outbreaks resulted in an almost eight-percent re-
duction in beef sales in Germany by mid-February 2001 and German beef exports 
plunged by up to 50% due to the fact that 34 countries globally banned German 
beef imports (Gfk, 2001). Shortly after the outbreaks in January, 2001, the minis-
ters of agriculture and health resigned from their positions under the pressure of 
the panic stricken consumers and allegation from the meat industry and farmers’ 
associations (Weber, 2001). The German government initially responded by 
slaughtering of 400.000 dairy cows during March-June, 2001, with estimated 
losses of more than $2 billion Euros (Klett-Aktualitatendienst, 2002). Next, the 
government announced the reform of the German agribusiness sector under the 
motto “Class not Mass” (Kunast, 2001), seeking to change the agricultural policy 
towards a more organic-oriented model. The most prominent change, however, 
was the renaming of Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry into the Federal 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture in 2001. This change was 
accompanied by a strengthened audit capacity of the German government as well 
as the establishment of more quality-assurance schemes, which shifted regulations 
away from the publicly mandated food-safety regulations toward industry-led ini-
tiatives. The Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) was established in order to 
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enforce these industry-led initiatives along with a series of measures regarding ex-
tensive information rights for consumers. Risk assessment and scientific advice was 
considered the domain of BfR while the German states were responsible for the 
enforcement and supervision of the inspections on a municipal level (GAO, 2005). 
Moreover, the establishment of the Federal Agency for Consumer Protection 
and Food Safety (BVL) aimed at improving coordination of crisis communication, 
for which the federal states were also assumed to provide increased support, and 
improving BSE-related research. To further communicate and assure (greater) 
safety to consumers, other actions were introduced by the German government: 
food controllers were sent to supermarkets to inspect the safety and quality stan-
dards of the beef (DPA, 2001), and the minister of health initiated (the expansion 
of) drastic and preemptive measures for coping with the BSE crisis in the beef sup-
ply chain (e.g., the tests were expanded to cover more and younger animals) (PIB, 
2001). 
These risk-management actions and changing regulations were communicated 
through press releases of the different administrative districts in the country. The 
policies introduced and actions taken by the government seemed, at least to a cer-
tain extent, to regain the confidence of the consumers since beef consumption 
started to increase again slowly in 2001 (DPA, 2001). However, the political lead-
ership in the state’s ministries did not support the co-ordination of activities in the 
beef supply chain, and the meat industry considered these changes as disadvanta-
geous because producers felt that only consumers’ concerns had been prioritized 
(BVDF, 2001). In 2002, the minister of consumer protection increased political 
pressure on the states responsible for deficient BSE tests in Germany due to the 
strict remarks of EU officials (Focus, 2002). The tightening of the reins was again 
quickly communicated to the public via the media because the government and 
meat industry feared that publicity about inaccurate tests might damage regained 
consumer trust (Dausend, 2002). The media highlighted that the German public 
was disappointed with regard to information transparency and that the expectation 
of an effective information system regarding consumer health had not actually been 
fulfilled (Der Spiegel, 2002). Moreover, the German media and governmental 
press releases used to simply treat the BSE-related issues as just another food-
related problem (NABU, 2001). 
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The lack of coordination in risk-management actions between the federal govern-
ment and the states regarding the implementation of BSE-tests and the establish-
ment of a crisis communication framework was an issue of great concern for Ger-
man politicians and industry groups during the period 2001–2003 (Lenz, 2006). 
Consumers exhibited skepticism with regard to the states’ abilities to protect con-
sumers against life threatening design flaws or food contamination (PIB, 2003). 
The German government came under pressure again due to the allegations of inef-
ficient management and communication measures from the industry and consumer 
associations. In 2004, the government communicated that it had fulfilled its duties 
and that the responsibility for the appropriate actions lay with the states (PIB, 
2004). Furthermore, the participation and involvement of German states in the 
actions of new federal institutions, which were supposed to deal with risk commu-
nication, among others, had focused on the development of research and pricing 
policies, rather than on communication of the real probabilities of food contamina-
tion to the public, even by the end of 2004. In an effort to regain consumer trust 
in the German food system, the minister of consumer protection announced that 
his ministry aimed to include the consumer protection in constitutional law (An-
ders, 2004). 
To sum up, four years after the incipient phase of the BSE crisis in Germany, 
the public and private sector administrators and managers still had to cope with the 
severe effects of the crisis and design strategies aimed at increasing consumer trust 
in beef products. The lack of transparency in communication and the fragmented 
policy actions of federal and state auditing and food-safety authorities led to rather 
moderate results with respect to increasing consumer trust and, consequently, beef 
consumption in the country. 
Overall, one may observe that the US government and industry groups were 
quite well-prepared for a potential spreading of the BSE crisis in the country, 
which might have lessen consumers’ suspicion of domestic beef. At the incipient 
face of the crisis, the US public administration and industry managers were even 
able to tighten the already existing surveillance programs in every stage of the beef 
chain while briefing the general public on the status of BSE on a daily basis. Thus, 
firms did not cope with the crisis shock in the long-term. In contrast, the lack of 
auditing transparency and the fragmented actions of the federal government and 
the states might have led to hysterical consumer reactions and a dramatic decline in 
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beef consumption and sales just after the first BSE outbreaks in Germany. Al-
though the federal government attempted to increase the audit capacity of public 
services and organizations several times throughout the examined period (2001–
2004), consumer trust was only moderately regained, and the BSE crisis was com-
municated to the general public as a part of general food-safety issues. Below, we 
elaborate on a research design that operationalized the way in which consumers in 
both countries reacted to these different conditions in the American and German 
food retailing markets. 
4.4.2 Field Studies Design 
To measure consumer risk behavior in different crisis phases, we developed a longi-
tudinal between-subjects research design. That is, we used an identical research 
design for conducting field studies in each crisis phase. This research design allows 
for evaluation of consumer risk behavior within and across different crisis phases, 
in which the contingent conditions of the decision environment changed due to 
contingent conditions in the American as well as the German markets. In order to 
measure risk attitudes and perceptions of individual consumers in specific crisis 
phases, the psychometric approach was utilized. The individual consumers were 
asked about the extent to which they (dis)agreed with specific statements (i.e., 
items) on psychometric scales. The advantage of this approach is that it is very easy 
for individuals to comprehend the selected items and express their relative risk 
aversion and perception (Churchill, 1979; Pennings and Smidts, 2000). In addi-
tion, the questions can be placed in the context of the decision environment (i.e., 
consumer risk behavior to the BSE crisis within and across specific crisis phases). 
Measures 
The respondents were asked to state their decisions with respect to the reduction in 
beef consumption and respond to a number of items. First, they were asked to state 
whether they had reduced their beef consumption due to the BSE crisis. This was 
measured with a dichotomous variable (yes-no). Given that a consumer stated a 
reduction in beef consumption, (s)he was then asked to state the percentage (%) of 
her/his quantity reduction in beef consumption. 
Building on the work of MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990), Pennings et al., 
(2002) and Pennings and Wansink (2004), the scales (i.e., constructs) used in the 
field studies were consistent with the definitions of our two key-variables: risk atti-
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tude and risk perception. Specifically, each construct used in the final surveys con-
sisted of a 9-point semantic differential scale and included 3 items. For the risk 
attitude scale, we measured the following three items: (1) For me eating beef is 
worth the risk (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”); (2) I am “not willing to 
accept” to ‘willing to accept” the risk of eating beef, and 3) I do not accept the risk 
of eating beef (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). The measures of risk per-
ception consisted of the following three items: (1) When eating beef, I am exposed 
to “much risk” to “not much risk”, 2) I think eating beef is risky (“strongly dis-
agree” to “strongly agree”, and 3) For me, eating beef is . . .”risky” to “not risky”. 
All measures, used in the field studies conducted in 2001 and 2004, were reliable, 
exceeding α = 0.7 (Hair et al., 1998). The psychometric validity of our constructs 
was satisfactory since all factor loadings were greater than 0.4 and significant (p < 
0.05) in 2001 and 2004, supporting the convergent validity of the constructs 
(Churchill, 1979; Pennings & Smidts, 2000). 
Considering the time availability of our respondents (i.e., we aimed at inter-
viewing consumers while they were shopping), we measured other variables by 
using single-item measures (Robins et al., 2001).19 The extent of objective knowl-
edge was measured through a single-item question in which knowledge was meas-
ured as consumers responded to the following statement: “What do you think the 
Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD) will do to you?” The answer of the respondents 
was ranging from 1 (= I would simply feel ill, but recover fast); 2 = I would get ill, 
and will recover after some time; 3 = I would get very ill and the illness would be 
chronically; 4 = I might die, but there is a treatment and a chance of surviving) to 5 
(= I would definitely die, there is not treatment). Consumers’ subjective knowledge 
was measured by asking: “How much knowledge do you have about BSE/CJD?”, 
with values ranging from 1 (= no knowledge) to 9 (= much knowledge). Likewise, 
trust was measured directly by the question “Do you trust the information that the 
government provides?” ranging from the value 1 (= do not trust at all) to 9 (= fully 
trust). 
                                                     
19 Single-item measures have several practical virtues. They are advantageous in large-scale surveys, 
longitudinal studies, and other research contexts in which time constraints limit the number of items 
that can be administered. Moreover, a single-item measure may eliminate item redundancy and, 
hence, it may reduce frustration and boredom associated with answering highly similar questions 
repeatedly when the time at the respondent’s disposal is limited (Robins et al., 2001) 
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Data Collection 
The first set of data was collected during the first months of 2001. At that time, 
several cases of infected cattle had been reported in Germany (with the first case 
reported on November 26, 2000), but no case had been reported in the US The 
second data set was collected in the first two months of 2004, just after BSE had 
also reached the US: December 23, 2003. Hence, we collected data in the pre- 
(2001) and incipient-crisis (2004) phases of BSE in the US and in the incipient- 
(2001) and post-crisis (2004) phases in Germany. 
We assumed that consumers were likely to be under time constraints, so we 
maintained an average interviewing time of 8 minutes. We conducted the field 
studies at grocery malls in several US and German states in 2001 and 2004, per-
mitting for a representative sample of consumers in both countries. A total of 228 
American and 298 Germans were interviewed in 2001; 595 Americans and 301 
German consumers were interviewed in 2004. American consumers who partici-
pated in the field studies had an average age of 41 in 2001 and 38 in 2004. Ger-
mans had an average age of 38 in 2001 and 47 in 2004. The percentage of Ameri-
can women was 60% in the 2001 sample and 58% in 2004. The percentage of 
German women was 51% and 58% in the 2001 and 2004 samples, respectively. 
All interviews were held on an individual basis and special care was taken to 
maintain the precise wording through backward translation since the same ques-
tionnaire was being used in two countries with different languages. The backward-
translation procedures were conducted by academic experts. A pilot test on ten 
consumers in each country was conducted to check the degree to which consumers 
could easily understand the content of the questions. No serious problems were 
encountered in these interviews. 
4.5 Empirical Modeling Approach 
The objective of our modeling approach is twofold. The first objective is to capture 
the changing influence and magnitude of the components of risk behavior, which 
are hypothesized to influence consumer decisions regarding reduction in beef con-
sumption due to the BSE crisis. We model consumer decisions in each BSE crisis 
phase (i.e., in 2001: the pre- crisis phase for the U.S. and the incipient crisis phase 
for Germany; and in 2004: the incipient crisis phase for the US and the post-crisis 
phase for Germany) and, also, by accounting directly for the effect of time during 
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the crisis (i.e., 2001–2004). The second objective of our modeling approach is to 
capture the changes in influence and magnitude of the unobservable drivers of 
consumer risk attitudes and perceptions in each crisis phase. Table 4 displays the 
three major steps of our modeling approach. 
Step 1: With respect to the first objective, we specified two consumer decisions 
regarding changes in beef consumption: Firstly, the consumer decision of whether 
or not to consume beef due to the BSE crisis was specified, the so-called participa-
tion decision. Secondly, the quantity-reduction decision of an individual consumer 
was specified, measuring the percentage of reduction in beef consumption. To 
examine whether differences in the influence and magnitude of the components of 
consumer risk behavior in 2001 and 2004 are related to stated changes in beef 
consumption, we estimated a two-stage model including both consumer decisions. 
In the first stage, we modeled the factors hypothesized to drive the participation 
decision of consumers: risk attitude, risk perception, and their interaction. In the 
second stage, we modeled the factors hypothesized to drive the quantity-reduction 
decision of consumers: risk attitude, risk perception, their interaction, age and 
gender.  
Step 2: In order to gain more insight into the dynamics of the factors influenc-
ing the participation and quantity-reduction decisions of American and German 
consumers, we accounted for the effect of time by expanding the list of the ex-
planatory variables for both consumer decisions by accounting directly for the ef-
fect of time and its interaction with each explanatory variable determining these 
decisions. 
Step 3: With respect to the second objective, we modeled the factors (i.e., con-
sumer objective and subjective knowledge and trust in information provided by 
governmental agencies) hypothesized to influence the two critical determinants 
(i.e., risk attitude and perception) of consumer decisions, through the formulation 
of a bivariate censored model. The utilization of such an empirical model allows us 
to examine changes in the influence and magnitude of the drivers of consumer risk 
attitudes and perceptions between the two crisis phases that may be driven by un-
observable factors such as consumer knowledge and trust in safety information. 
Yet, in order to control for the other unobservable factors discussed above (con-
sumer expertise and familiarity with product-related safety issues and attributes, 
intensity and frequency of safety news, reflexive doubt, exposure to negative news) 
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that may affect both risk attitudes and perceptions, we applied a bivariate simulta-
neous equation system containing censored two-limit tobit models (e.g., Van der 
Laan, 1996; Van der Laan & McKeague, 1998). This modeling approach ensures 
that the extent to which other, for instance, latent factors (i.e., unmeasured charac-
teristics of individuals) may have an impact on risk attitudes and perceptions is 
taken into account and measured empirically (Cornick et al., 1994; Yoo, 2005). 
 
Table 4.4 Empirical Modeling Approach for Consumer Risk Behavior in Product-harm Crises (e.g., 
BSE) 
Decision Problem  Dependent Variable Independent Variables Model  Model 
Specification 
Step 1: consumer risk 
behavior in each crisis 
phase 
Stage 1: Consumer 
participation decision 
(Di)  
Risk Attitude (RA); Risk 
Perception (RP); Interac-
tion: RA * RP 
Double-hurdle Probit  
 Stage 2: Consumer 
quantity-reduction 
decision (Qi)  
RA; R;, RA*RP; Gender; 
Age 
 Double-
bounded tobit  
Step 2: Two-stage consumer 
risk behavior over time  
Stage 1: Consumer 
participation Decision 
(Di)  
RA; RP; RA*RP, Time 
(T); RA*T; RP*T; 
RA*RP*T 
Double-hurdle Probit  
 Stage 2: Consumer 
quantity-reduction 
decision (Qi) 
RA; RP; RA*RP; Gen-
der; Age; T); RA*T; 
RP*T; RA*RP*T; Gen-
der*T; Age*T 
 Double-
bounded tobit 
Step 3: Factors impacting 
risk attitude and perception 
in each crisis phase 
Risk Attitude (RA) Objective Knowledge; 
Subjective Knowledge  
Bivariate simul-
taneous regres-
sion 
Censored two-
limit tobit  
 Risk Perception (RP) Trust Bivariate simul-
taneous regres-
sion 
Censored two-
limit tobit 
 
Our modeling approach includes both the modeling of separate but interdepend-
ent consumer decisions (participation and quantity-reduction decisions) and the 
modeling of the most prominent drivers (risk attitude and perception) of these 
decisions. Such an approach determines the changing risk behavior of consumers in 
a dynamic context. Below, we discuss in detail the specifications of these empirical 
models. First, we specify the two-stage model for the two consumer decisions. Sec-
ond, we discuss the expansion of this model by accounting directly for the effect of 
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time. Third, we present the simultaneous regression of the censored two-limit tobit 
models, which allows the estimation of the impacts of the unobservable factors that 
drive consumer risk attitudes and perceptions in each crisis phase. 
4.5.1 Modeling Consumer Participation & Quantity-Reduction Decisions 
Several generalizations of the models which divide the decision-making process of 
market participants in two separate steps were first introduced by Cragg (1971) 
and later applied and further developed by Lin and Schmidt (1984), Blundel and 
Meghir (1987), Jones (1989), Kenskel (1991), DeSarbo and Choi (1999), and 
Smiths et al., (2001), among others. In this paper, we employ a variation of Cragg’s 
(1971) double-hurdle model for estimating separate but interdependent consumer 
decisions in different crisis phases. This modeling framework permits for no bias, 
which might be involved if the two decisions are naively assumed to be independ-
ent (Blundel & Meghir, 1987), and, hence, allows us to test whether the separate 
components of risk behavior drive separate but interdependent decisions regarding 
changes in beef consumption in each crisis phase. Both consumer decisions were 
modeled and estimated simultaneously. That is, a probit part determines the par-
ticipation decision (i.e., a binary choice to participate in beef consumption due to 
the BSE crisis), and a double-bounded tobit part determines the quantity reduction 
decision (i.e., the percentage of reduction in beef consumption).20 
Specifically, to observe reduction in beef consumption decisions, two hurdles 
must be passed. The first hurdle specifies the participation decision of consumers. 
In the first stage of our model, this decision is given by: 
iii εβXD +′=   (4.4) 
where: Di is a binary discrete variable (Di = 1 if consumer i reduced beef consump-
tion in each crisis phase, = 0 otherwise), Xi is a vector of explanatory variables (risk 
attitude, risk perception, and their interaction), β is a coefficient vector to be esti-
mated, and ε is a random error ε ~ N (0, σD2). 
                                                     
20 Cragg’s specifications separate a probit model (for 0–1) and then apply a truncated regression for 
the non-limit (non 0) observations only. The advantage of this approach is that the probability of a 
non-limit observation is determined apart from the level of the non-limit outcome. So, a variable may 
have a positive effect on the probability that an observation is non-limit and a negative probability on 
its outcome (its size, if it is non-limit). 
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The second hurdle specifies the quantity-reduction decision of an individual con-
sumer. That is, for each consumer indicating a reduction in beef consumption due 
to BSE (i.e., Di = 1 at each crisis phase), his/her quantity-reduction decision was 
modeled in a second stage as: 
ii
*
i υθZQ +′=   (4.5) 
where: Qi* is a latent, unobserved variable representing beef-consumption reduction 
(i.e., the optimal percentage of reduction in beef consumption), Zi is a vector of 
explanatory variables (risk attitude, risk perception, the interaction of risk attitude 
and perception, age, and gender), θ is a coefficient vector to be estimated, and is a 
random error term υ ~ N(0, σD2). We actually observed Qi in a censored fashion 
between 0 and 100 as: 
0Qi = iff 0Q
*
i ≤   (4.6) 
*
ii QQ = iff 0Q
*
i >   (4.7) 
The Qi is censored at 0 as only positive levels of beef reduction are observed by 
a subset of consumers in our sample. The errors of these two equations are assumed 
to be normally distributed. When these two equations are jointly estimated, the 
double-hurdle model has a bivariate normal error covariance with COV(ε,υ)=ρ. 
The model is estimated using a maximum likelihood, and its correlation coefficient 
(Rho) indicates whether the error terms (ε and υ) in the two equations, which un-
derlie the specification of a double-hurdle model, are significantly related. If Rho is 
not statistically different from zero, then the specification of a double-hurdle model 
is not necessary (Greene, 2003). In addition, Blundel and Meghir (1987) and 
Jones (1989) suggest a log-likelihood-ratio test statistic for testing the specification 
of a tobit model by omitting the participation decision (the first hurdle). This log-
likelihood-ratio test statistic is based on the comparison of the two maximum like-
lihood estimators generated by maximizing the constrained and unconstrained 
likelihood function, which is asymptotical x2(r) (Lin & Schmidt, 1984).21 Further, 
                                                     
21 Practically speaking, in order to estimate the log-likelihood-ratio test statistic (LRT), a four-step 
analysis has to be performed (Lin & Schmidt, 1984). First, the log-likelihoods are derived by estima-
ting a tobit model. Second, the log-likelihoods are estimated by utilizing a probit model given the 
binary nature of the decision (between 0 and 1 observations; where 1 type of observations are all those 
observations with a non 0 response). Third, the log-likelihoods of a truncated regression for those 
with a non 0 response, are derived. Finally, the estimation of the likelihood-ratio test statistic is con-
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McFadden’s pseudo R2 measure or rho-square (ρ2) is usually reported as a good-
ness-of-fit measure for the probit model (the first hurdle) based on the log-
likelihood-ratio test statistic (Maddala, 2006). McFadden (1979) suggested that ρ2 
values of between 0.2 and 0.4 should be taken to represent a very good fit of the 
model. 
To account for the changes in probabilities of observing both participation 
and quantity-reduction decisions of consumers in each crisis phase, we estimated 
the marginal effects of each explanatory variable included in the first and second 
hurdle of our model. Marginal effects of each independent variable are evaluated 
on sample means, denoted by 
__
X and 
__
Z , and provide more useful information 
than simple coefficient estimates (Maddala, 2006). The marginal effects of the 
continuous variables (risk attitude, risk perception, and their interaction) for the 
first hurdle (probit model) were calculated using sample means (Greene, 2003; 
p.668) as:  
k
__
k
__
β)βXφ(
X
X]|E[D
′=
∂
∂
                                                                                 (4.8) 
where: E[·] denotes the expectations operator and φ[·] is the standard normal den-
sity. For the second stage of our model, the double-bounded tobit, the marginal 
effects of the continuous variables are identified as: 
)
σ
θZF(θ
Z
Z]|E[Q i
k
k
_
*
i ∗=
∂
∂
  (4.9) 
where: F[·]  is the cumulative normal distribution. The marginal effects of the bi-
nary variables (e.g., gender) are calculated by taking the difference in the predicted 
values with the binary variable equal to 0 and 1 (Greene, 2003, pp. 764–766): 
)σλθ(Z*)
σ
θZ
F()Z|E[Q iiii
*
i +=
  (4.10) 
where: )
σ
θZ
)/F(
σ
θZ
φ(λ iii =   (4.11) 
                                                                                                                                  
ducted as: LRT = 2(log for probit + log for truncated – log for tobit). If the result indicates that the 
Cragg’s specification holds, one may employ a double-hurdle or a sample selection model (Heck-
man’s or other type).  
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4.5.2 Dynamics of Consumer Decision Drivers 
Using the derivations specified in the previous subsection (Equations 4.4 to 4.11), 
we estimated the marginal effects of the explanatory variables which are hypothe-
sized to drive the participation and quantity-reduction decisions of consumers in 
both countries in different crisis phases. Using this procedure, statistical tests (e.g., 
Chow test) were performed to determine whether the differences in the magnitude 
of the marginal effects of explanatory variables for both consumer decisions be-
tween the crisis phases are gauged with statistical significance. 
To gain further insight into the dynamics of the determinants of participation 
and quantity-reduction decisions of consumers in both countries, we performed 
additional analyses that account directly for the effect of time. That is, we ex-
panded our modeling framework by accounting directly for the effect of time (T) 
and the interaction of it with each of our explanatory variables that are hypothe-
sized to influence consumers’ participation and quantity-reduction decisions due to 
the BSE crisis. By performing such an analysis, one can gain insights as to whether 
consumers’ risk behavior in each country changed between the two phases of the 
crisis and whether the magnitude of these changes was gauged with statistical sig-
nificance, hence influencing the consumers’ separate but interdependent decisions 
over time. That is, we estimated the marginal effects of the determinants of Di and 
Qi not only separately in each crisis phase (t1=2001 and t2=2004), but also through 
a dynamic modeling specification. We included a dummy variable T defined as T = 
[0, 1], where 0 and 1 indicate the first (2001: the pre-phase for the U.S. and the 
incipient phase for Germany) and second crisis phase (2004: the incipient phase 
for the US and the post-phase for Germany), respectively. We accounted for the 
interaction of the time (dummy) variable with each of our explanatory variables in 
each stage of the double-hurdle specification (Equations 4.4 to 4.11). 
4.5.3 Modeling Factors Impacting Risk Attitudes & Perceptions in Crisis Phases 
As discussed, we expect various factors such as knowledge (objective and subjective) 
and trust in product-related safety information to impact the risk attitudes and risk 
perceptions of consumers in each crisis phase. To account for these impacts, we 
estimated bivariate censored-regression (two-limit tobit) models for two reasons. 
First, our dependent variables (risk-attitude and risk-perception scales) are cen-
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sored.22 Second, other unobservable factors omitted from our model (e.g., con-
sumer expertise and familiarity with product-related safety issues and attributes, 
intensity and frequency of safety news, reflexive doubt, exposure to negative news) 
are also accounted. The formulation of the two-limit tobit models takes the form 
(Greene, 2003, p. 764): 
,εβXy i
'
i
*
i +=   (4.12) 
0yi =  if  0,y
*
i ≤   (4.13) 
*
ii yy =  if  ,8y0
*
i <<   (4.14) 
8yi =  if  8y
*
i ≥   (4.15) 
where: *iy  is a latent variable (i.e., risk attitude or perception) which is associated 
with each individual consumer i, xi is a 1 x k vector of explanatory variables (objec-
tive knowledge and trust for risk attitude; and subjective knowledge and trust for 
risk perception), β is a coefficient vector that has to be estimated, and ε is an error 
term following a bivariate normal distribution which has a zero mean, standard 
deviations σ for risk attitude and risk perception, and correlation ρ. If ρ is not zero, 
the use of a simultaneous system of censored two-limit tobit regressions is sufficient 
(Van der Laan, 1996). Both equations were estimated simultaneously by using the 
log-likelihood function: 
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where: Φ is the cumulative normal distribution and φ is the density function. Util-
izing derivations provided by Greene (2003, p. 765), the marginal effects of the 
continuous explanatory variables for each individual consumer can be identified by 
using: 
8]yProb[0*
x
βx
x
]x|E[y
ME *i
ik,
i
ik,
ii
ik, <<== ∂
∂
∂
∂
  
                                                     
22 Our risk attitude and risk perception scales from values of 1 to 9. However, our utilization of 
LIMDEP NLOGIT 4 (Greene, 2008) to estimate the presented models required the adjusting of 
these scales to range from 0 to 8. 
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Equation (4.17) is a derivation based on McDonald and Moffitt’s (1980) decom-
position of the marginal effects for a two-limit tobit model. This decomposition 
allows a change in xk to affect: a) the conditional mean of *iy  in the positive part of 
the distribution and b) the probability that the ith observation will fall in that part 
of the distribution (Newman et al., 2003). 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Risk Measures with Respect to Beef Consumption 
In this section we present descriptive results regarding consumers’ risk attitudes, 
risk perceptions with respect to beef consumption in the US and Germany in each 
crisis phase. Risk attitude, ranges from relatively risk-seeking (i.e., preference for a 
risky outcome) to relatively risk-averse (i.e., not willing to accept risk under any 
conditions) while risk perception ranges from perceiving relatively low risk to per-
ceiving relatively high risk. We assume that the interaction between the risk atti-
tude and risk perception of a consumer reflects that relatively risk-averse consumers 
may engage in behavior that reduces risk, and that this becomes more prominent as 
a consumer perceives relatively more risk (Pennings & Smidts, 2000). 
Based on descriptive findings, Germans are significantly (p < 0.05) more risk-
averse than American consumers. Specifically, German consumers appear to be 
significantly more risk-averse (risk attitude score of 5.40 in the incipient-crisis 
phase - 2001 - and 6.51 in the post-crisis phase -2004) than Americans (2.02 in the 
pre-crisis phase - 2001- and 2.45 in the incipient-crisis phase - 2004). They also 
seem to perceive significantly more risk (risk perception score of 5.15 in 2001 and 
4.9 in 2004) than American consumers (scores of 3.72 in 2001 and 3.81 in 2004). 
With respect to the knowledge of consumers, table 4.5 shows that the objec-
tive knowledge of both American and Germans increased across the crisis phases 
(Americans’ score is 2.11 in 2001 vs. 3.82 in 2004 and Germans’ score is 3.73 in 
2001 vs. 4.75 in 2004). Although the reactions of German consumers have become 
milder over time (e.g., concern with eating beef decreased from 6.27 in 2001 to 
4.93 in 2004), they still remain stronger than Americans. The milder reactions of 
Germans might due to the slight increase of their trust in the information that the 
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German government provides (i.e., 3.42 in 2001 vs. 3.83 in 2004). In contrast, 
American consumers’ trust toward the information provided by the US govern-
ment has decreased (5.93 in 2001 vs. 4.65 in 2004). This decrease might be caused 
by the fact that the spread of the BSE crisis in the US after December 2003 erode 
American consumers’ confidence about governmental food safety policies. 
 
Table 4.5 Cross-Country Differences about CJD and Beef Consumption Over Time 
 United States  Germany 
 2001 2004 2001 2004 
Risk Attitude 2.02 2.45  5.40 6.51 
Risk Perception 3.72 3.81  5.15 4.09 
What do you think contracting CJD from eating beef will do to you? a     
(1=I would simply feel ill, but recover fast; 7 I would die, there is not 
treatment). 
2.11 3.82 3.73 4.75 
What do you think is your chance of getting CJD of eating beef? 
(1=small; 9=large) b 
2.92 2.39 3.42 3.22 
Are you concerned with eating beef? (1=not concerned; 9= very con-
cerned) b 
3.74 3.55 6.27 4.93 
Do you trust the information that your government provides? (1=do not 
trust; 9=fully trust) b 
5.93 4.65 3.42 3.83  
Do you eat less beef because of BSE contamination? a 17.8% 8.9% 58.1% 29.0% 
By what proportion have you reduced beef consumption? a 54.6% 43.5% 77.7% 66.5% 
a The differences in knowledge; reduction of beef consumption; proportion of reduction; and switch-
ing to other substitutes, among countries were significant. The chi-square tests on the independence 
among countries resulted in p-values less than 0.03 in 2001 and 2004. 
b The hypotheses that the means of these variables in each crisis phase were equal was rejected at the 
5% level using ANOVA. 
 
The descriptive results show some consistency in risk behavior of different seg-
ments (i.e., at county level) of the population over time and confirm Hofstede’s 
(1980; 1983) and Pennings et al., (2002) findings that Germans score higher with 
respect to the uncertainty avoidance index than Americans. Further, we analyzed 
the relationship between demographic variables (age and gender) and the risk 
measures for both countries and in each crisis phase. We found that they did not 
significantly differ. These findings further substantiate the work of Hofstede 
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(1983). That is, risk behavior is partially culturally driven rather than demographic 
driven. 
4.6.2 Consumer Decisions in Different Crisis Phases 
The empirical double-hurdle model of Equations (4.4) – (4.11) was estimated 
using the LIMDEP NLOGIT 4.0 statistical package (Greene, 2008). Results of the 
maximum-likelihood estimations are presented in table 4.6. We first test whether 
the yes/no decision to consume beef due to the BSE crisis (i.e., the first hurdle or 
participation decision) and the reduction percentage of beef (i.e., the second hurdle 
or quantity-reduction decision) are based on the same decision-making structure. 
Significance of the correlation coefficient (ρ) in each model suggests that employ-
ing a univariate framework would be insufficient. In addition, the log-likelihood 
ratio test is highly significant with scores of 134.6 in 2001 and 143.2 in 2004 for 
American consumers and 161.3 and 131.6 for German consumers, respectively. 
Thus, the log-likelihood-ratio test estimations overwhelmingly reject using a tobit 
model by omitting the participation decision (first hurdle). We also find that 
McFadden’s R2 values of the probit model (the participation decision) range be-
tween 0.29 to 0.33. 
These results suggest a satisfactory goodness of fit of our estimated models for 
each country in each crisis phase and suggest that employing a double-hurdle mod-
el for analyzing the changes in consumers’ decisions in different phases of the 
product crisis in both countries is sufficient. This finding implies that the hypothe-
sized determinants drive both separated and interdependent consumer decisions 
since the probability of consumers reducing their participation in beef consump-
tion has the same decision-making structure as quantity-reduction. Thus, we main-
tain the double-hurdle specification over potential alternatives (e.g., single-
equation model approach). 
The Influence of Changing Risk Attitudes & Perceptions on Consumer Decisions 
Although the results that can be readily interpreted are those of marginal effects, 
the comparison of the estimated risk-attitude and risk-perception coefficients in the 
participation equation with those in the quantity-reduction equation reveals inter-
esting insights. Significant variations were found between the interdependent deci-
sions of American and Germans consumers among the different crisis phases. Table 
4.6 shows that the determinants of consumer risk behavior (risk attitude; risk per-
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ception and their interaction) influence significantly, though in varied ways, the 
risk behavior of consumers in both countries in both years. However, the influence 
of the determinants of consumer decisions, as reflected by the absolute values of the 
regression coefficients, differ between the examined crisis-phases for both countries. 
Risk attitude (αp1 = - 0.186; p < 0.02) and the interaction of risk attitude and 
risk perception drive (αp3 = 0.024; p < 0.00) the participation decisions of American 
consumers in 2001 (pre-crisis phase). However, the participation decision of Amer-
icans in 2004 (incipient-crisis phase) was driven only by their risk perception (αp2 = 
0.234, p < 0.00) and the interaction of risk attitude and risk perception (αp3 = 
0.145; p < 0.00). The quantity-reduction decision of Americans in 2001 was influ-
enced by their risk attitude (αq1 = - 1.596; p < 0.02) and the interaction of risk atti-
tude and risk perception (αq3 = 1.770; p < 0.03). The age of consumers (αq4 = 0.298; 
p < 0.02), also influenced the quantity-reduction decisions of Americans in the pre-
crisis phase. In the incipient-crisis phase, the quantity-reduction decisions of Amer-
ican consumers were driven by risk perception (αq2 = 2.180; p < 0.02), the interac-
tion of risk attitude and risk perception (αq3 = 1.960; p < 0.03), age (αq4 = 0.667; p < 
0.03), and gender (αq5 = 1.199; p < 0.03). Interestingly, the consumer decisions of 
Americans between the two crisis phases share some similarities: in the pre-crisis 
phase, both decisions were driven by risk attitude and the interaction of risk atti-
tude and risk perception while risk perception and the interaction of risk attitude 
and perception drove their decisions in incipient-crisis phase. 
The participation decision of German consumers in 2001 (incipient-crisis 
phase) was driven by risk attitudes (αp1 = - 0.535; p < 0.02) and risk perceptions 
(αp2 = 0.680; p ≤ 0.00 ). In 2004 (post-crisis phase), the Germans’ participation 
decision was driven by all the separate components of consumer risk behavior: risk 
attitude (αp1 = - 0.649; p < 0.01), risk perception (αp2 = 0.342; p < 0.000), and the 
interaction of risk attitude and perception (αp3 = 0.148; p < 0.02). 
In the incipient-crisis phase, the quantity-reduction decision of German con-
sumers was influenced by their risk attitude (αq1 = -2.791; p < 0.01) risk perception 
(αq2 = 12.814; p < 0.04), age (αq4 = 0.839; p < 0.02), and gender (αq5 = 3.750; p < 
0.03). In the post-crisis phase, this decision was driven by risk perception (αq1 = 
9.084; p < 0.01), the interaction of risk attitude and risk perception (αq3 = 2.712; p 
< 0.02), and age (αq4 = 1.231; p < 0.02). 
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Table 4.6 Double-Hurdle Model of Consumer Decisions in 2001 and 2004 a 
 American Consumers German Consumers 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004 
Stage 1: Participation 
Decision  
pre-phase incipient-
phase 
pre-phase incipient-
phase 
incipient-
phase  
post-phase incipient-
phase  
post-phase  
Intercept -1.180 -0.860   -3.290 -3.178   
Risk Attitude (RA; αp1)    0.186*  0.039 0.037* 0.021  0.535*  0.649* 0.181* 0.261* 
Risk Perception (RP; αp2)   0.126  0.234* 0.043 0.084*  0.680*  0.342* 0.273* 0.132* 
RA x RP (αp3)    0.024*  0.145* 0.012 0.019*  0.440  0.115* 0.149* 0.071* 
McFadden’s R2   0.31  0.31    0.32  0.33   
 
Stage 2: Quantity-Reduction Decision  
Intercept -16.198 -12.126   -31.132 -21.963   
Risk Attitude (RA; αq1)   1.596*  3.756 -1.184* -1.478  2.791*  0.353 5.307* 2.151* 
Risk Perception (RP; αq2)  1.697  2.180*  1.472*  1.761*  12.814*  9.084*  7.219*  6.084* 
RA x RP (αq3)  1.770*  1.960*  0.427  1.385*  4.934  2.712*  2.501  1.665* 
Age (αq4)  0.298*  0.667*  1.112*  0.248*  0.839*  1.231*  0.471*  0.486* 
Gender  (αq5)  1.052  1.199*  0.054  0.040*  3.750*  0.159  1.501*  0.679 
Sigma 18.972* 29.006*   66.970* 27.010*   
Rho 0.450* 0.830*   0.814* 0.740*   
Log-Likelihood function -1736 -1505   -1926 -1655   
Log-Likelihood ratio test 134.601* 143.204   161.302* 131.643*   
Number of observations 228 595   298 301   
a An asterisk indicates that each parameter is statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
Thus, both consumer participation and quantity-reduction decisions are driven by 
the components of consumer risk behavior in varied ways in the U.S. as well as in 
Germany among the different crisis phases. Returning our attention to the impact 
of risk attitudes and risk perceptions and the interaction of the two based on their 
marginal-effect estimations reveals additional insights. Below, we discuss these 
results with respect to each consumer decision separately. 
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Participation Decision: Results in 2001 & 2004 
The results in table 4.6 show that the probability that American and German con-
sumers reduced beef consumption due to BSE events in each crisis phase is associ-
ated, in varied ways, with the three main components of consumer risk behavior. 
In the pre-crisis phase (2001), each one-unit increase on the risk-attitude scale 
caused a 3.7% increase in the likelihood that American consumers reduced their 
participation in beef consumption due to the BSE crisis. However, the picture 
changed in the US when the BSE crisis reached its incipient phase in 2004 as: a) 
each unit increase on the risk-perception scale caused an 8.4% increase in the like-
lihood that American consumers reduced their beef consumption and b) each unit 
increase in the scale for the estimated interaction of risk attitude and risk percep-
tion caused a 1.9% increase in the probability that Americans decreased their beef 
consumption due to the BSE crisis. These results confirm the hypotheses that the 
risk attitude drives the participation decision of American consumers in both the 
pre- and post-crisis phases (H1A) and that the interaction of risk attitude and risk 
perception drives the participation decision of American consumers in the incipi-
ent-crisis phase (H1C). 
In Germany in the incipient-crisis phase (2001), each unit increase in the risk-
attitude scale increased the likelihood that German consumers decreased their par-
ticipation in beef consumption due to BSE crisis by 18.1%. In addition, each unit 
increase in the risk-perception scale increased the likelihood that they decreased 
their participation in beef consumption by 27.3% in the incipient phase of the 
BSE crisis (early 2001). Each unit increase in the scale measuring the interaction of 
risk attitude and perception also increased the probability that Germans reduced 
their participation in beef consumption by 14.9%. In the post-crisis phase (2004), 
each unit increase in the risk-perception scale and the scale for the estimated inter-
action of risk attitude and risk perception caused an increase of 13.2 % and 7.1%, 
respectively in the probability that Germans reduced their participation in beef 
consumption. Thus, the hypotheses H1A (risk attitude drives the participation deci-
sion of German consumers in the incipient crisis phase), H1B (risk perception drives 
the participation decision of German consumers in both the incipient- and post-
crisis phases), and H1C (the interaction of risk attitude and risk perception drives 
German consumers participation decision in both the incipient and post-crisis 
phases) are confirmed. 
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The results in table 4.6 show that, for each unit increase in the determinants of 
participation decisions, the likelihood of consumers’ reducing their participation in 
beef consumption due to the BSE crisis is higher for Germans than for Americans 
in the incipient-phase of the BSE crisis in each country. 
Quantity-Reduction Decisions: Results in 2001 & 2004 
Results from estimating the marginal effects of the determinants of the quantity-
reduction decision have similarities with the results of the consumers’ participation 
decisions for both countries. Risk attitude, risk perception and their interaction are 
not only important determinants of the participation decisions of American and 
German consumers, but also of their quantity-reduction decisions (though in var-
ied ways) in each crisis phase. 
The key variables of consumer risk behavior drive the quantity reduction of 
American consumers in the pre- and incipient- phases of the BSE crisis in the US. 
Each unit increase on the risk-attitude scale increased the probability that Ameri-
can consumers reduced the quantity of their beef consumption by 1.1 %, and each 
unit increase on the risk-perception scale is associated with a 1.4% quantity reduc-
tion in the pre-crisis phase (2001). In the incipient-crisis phase in the US (2004), 
each unit increase in the risk perception scale increased the probability that Ameri-
can consumers decreased the quantity of their beef consumption by 1.7%, and 
each unit increase in the interaction of risk attitude and perception increased the 
likelihood that they reduced their beef quantity by 1.3%. These results confirm 
that as a consumer becomes more risk-averse the likelihood of reducing the con-
sumption of a harmed product increases (H2A); as consumer perceives relatively 
high risk the likelihood of reducing the consumption of harmed product increases 
(H2B); and as consumer is more risk averse and perceives relatively high risk the 
likelihood of reducing the consumption of harmed product increases hypotheses 
(H3C) in the incipient-phase (2004) of the BSE crisis in the US. 
Among the American consumers that reduced the quantity of their beef con-
sumption, older consumers reduced their quantity of beef consumed more. More 
specifically, each additional 10 years of age increased the probability that American 
consumers reduced the quantity of their beef consumption by 1.1% in the pre-
crisis phase (2001) and by 2.5% in the post-crisis phase (2004). These results sup-
port that older consumers are more likely to reduce the quantity of consumption of 
a harmed product (H2E). Finally, the results indicate that the gender of the con-
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sumers influences the quantity-reduction decision, too. Each unit increase in the 
gender (i.e., discrete variable: 1: male; 2: female) increased the probability that 
American consumers reduced the quantity of their beef consumption in the incipi-
ent-phase of the BSE crisis by 0.4% in 2004. That is, women reduced their beef 
consumption more than men in the incipient phase of the BSE crisis in the U.S. 
This result confirms that female consumers are more likely to reduce the quantity 
of consumption of a harmed product (H2D). 
The results (table 4.6) show that the impact of risk attitude and perceptions 
on the quantity-reduction decisions of consumers is greater for German consumers 
than Americans in the incipient-phase of the BSE crisis. Each unit increase in risk 
attitude increased the likelihood that Germans reduced the quantity of their beef 
consumption by 5.3%, and each unit increase on the risk-perception scale was 
associated with a 7.2 % decrease in the incipient-phase of the BSE crisis in Ger-
many (2001). In the post-phase of the BSE crisis, in 2004, each unit increase in the 
risk attitude of Germans increased the probability that they reduced the quantity of 
their beef consumption by 2.1%, and each unit increase in their risk perception 
increased the probability that they reduced their quantity of beef consumption by 
almost 6.1%. The interaction of risk attitude and risk perception increased the 
probability that Germans reduced the quantity of their beef consumption by ap-
proximately 1.7% in the post-phase of the BSE crisis in Germany. These results 
confirm (although in varied ways) the hypotheses about the influence of the risk 
attitude (H2A), risk perception (H2B) and the interaction of the two (H2D), on the 
quantity-reduction decision of German consumers in the incipient- and post-
phases of the BSE crisis. 
Further, the results indicate that, for German consumers, the impact of age on 
the quantity-reduction decision is higher than for consumers in the US. Each addi-
tional 10 years of age resulted in about a 5% quantity reduction in beef consump-
tion in the incipient- and post-phases of the BSE crisis. The gender of Germans 
drove, also, their quantity-reduction decision: each unit increase in gender in-
creased the probability that German consumers reduced the quantity of their beef 
consumption at the incipient-phase of the BSE crisis in the country by 1.5%. Thus 
the hypotheses H2D and H2E are confirmed. 
In order to identify whether the magnitude of the parameters of the hypothe-
sized determinants of the participation and quantity-reduction decisions are equal 
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for each country among the examined crisis phases, we performed a Chow test 
(Wooldridge, 2006, p.251). The null hypothesis was rejected at the 5% level for 
Germany (F = 25.6) and at the 10% level for the US (F = 3.9). Hence, these results 
show that the participation and quantity-reduction decisions of German consumers 
had substantially changed between the incipient- and post-crisis phases whereas 
American consumer behavior had changed to a lesser extent. The hypothesis (H3D) 
that the impact of consumer risk attitudes and perceptions and their interaction on 
consumer decisions is likely to be lower in the pre- and post-phases than in the 
incipient-phase of the BSE crisis is confirmed. 
4.6.3 Results of the Effect of Time on Consumer Decisions 
To gain further insights into the dynamics of the influence of consumers’ risk atti-
tudes, risk perceptions and their interaction on participation and quantity-
reduction decisions, we performed additional analyses that account directly for the 
effect of time. That is, we pooled our data from 2001 and 2004 per country and 
accounted for the impact of time (T) and the interaction of it with each of our 
explanatory variables hypothesized to influence consumers’ participation and quan-
tity-reduction decisions. Table 4.7 shows that our model has a satisfactory fit. The 
log-likelihood ratio tests are significant for each country’s pooled sample over time, 
and the significance of the correlation coefficient in each model suggests that em-
ploying a univariate framework would be insufficient. The value of McFadden’s R2 
is 0.24 for the US and 0.37 for Germany. 
With respect to the participation decisions, each unit increase in the risk per-
ception over time increased the likelihood that American consumers decreased 
their participation in beef consumption by roughly 4%, and each unit increase in 
the interaction of risk attitude and perception increased the likelihood that they 
reduced their participation in beef consumption by 1.7%. German consumer reac-
tions over time were found to be stronger than those of Americans. The three 
components of consumer risk behavior influenced substantially their participation 
in beef consumption throughout the period 2001–2004. Each unit increase on the 
risk-attitude scale increased the likelihood that Germans participated less in beef 
consumption by 8% over time. Each unit increase on their risk-perception scale 
increased the likelihood that they decreased their participation in beef consump-
tion even further by 14.1%. Each unit increase in the interaction of risk attitude 
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and risk perception was found to be associated with a 7.8% decrease in their par-
ticipation in beef consumption over time. 
 
Table 4.7 Double Hurdle Model of Consumer Decisions Over Time a 
 American Consumers German Consumers 
  Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Stage 1: Participation Decision over Time   
Intercept  -0.225   -0.127  
Risk Attitude (RA)    0.186*  0.037*   0.535*  0.649* 
Risk Perception (RP)   0.126  0.043   0.680*  0.342* 
RA x RP    0.024  0.072   0.440  0.115* 
Time (T)   1.262*  0.024*   3.742*  0.138* 
RA x T    0.225  0.116   0.114*  0.080* 
RP x T    0.108*  0.041*  -0.338* -0.141* 
(RA x RP) x T    0.121*  0.017*   0.325* -0.078* 
McFadden’s R2   0.24   0.37 
Stage 2: Quantity-Reduction Decision over Time   
Intercept  -4.082   -9.269  
Risk Attitude (RA)   1.596* 1.184*  2.791  5.307* 
Risk Perception (RP)  1.697  1.472 12.814*  7.219* 
RA x RP  1.770*  0.427  4.934  2.501 
Age   0.298*  1.112*  0.839*  0.471* 
Gender  1.052  0.054  3.750*  1.501* 
Time (T)  1.067  0.021  3.373*  0.131* 
RA x T   2.160  0.294  2.438*  3.156* 
RP x T   0.483*  0.289*  3.730*  -1.135* 
(RA x RP) x T   0.190*  0.958* -2.222*  -0.836* 
Age x T   0.369*  -0.086*  0.392*  0.015 
Gender x T   0.148* -0.012  3.591*  0.177* 
Sigma 31.005*  38.891*  
Rho 0.799*   0.868*  
Log-Likelihood function  -2621  -1968  
Log-Likelihood ratio test 179.107*   161.221*  
Number of Observations 823   599  
a An asterisk indicates that each parameter is statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
The results for the direct effect of time on the quantity-reduction decisions of 
American and German consumers also reveal interesting insights. For Americans, 
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each unit increase on the risk-perception scale and the interaction of risk attitude 
and perception was associated with a 2.8% and 9.5% decrease in the quantity of 
their beef consumption over time. For Germans, each unit increase in their risk 
attitude, risk perception and interaction of risk attitude and risk perception were 
associated with a respective 3.1%, 1.1% and 8.3% decrease in the quantity of their 
beef consumption over time. Finally, the results also show that, among the Ameri-
can consumers, older consumers reduced the quantity of beef consumed more than 
young consumers over time. Among the German consumers, women reduced their 
beef consumption more than men over time. 
Overall, these findings support our prediction (H4A) that the decoupled com-
ponents of consumer risk significantly influence both consumer decisions (though 
in varied ways) across the crisis phases. In addition, we performed a joint test to see 
whether the subgroup of our explanatory variables interacting with the time effect 
explains the variation in the decision to reduce beef consumption and the quantity 
of beef consumed. Thus, the subset of these regression coefficients is jointly as-
sumed to be zero (see: Pindyck and Lubinfeld, 1996, pp.128–129). The null hy-
pothesis that the time effect does not influence risk attitudes and risk perceptions 
was rejected at the 10% level of significance for the US and the 5% level for Ger-
many. These results imply that the impact of time effects on the determinants (i.e., 
risk attitudes, risk perceptions and their product) of consumer participation and 
quantity-reduction decisions with respect to the BSE crisis events over time is sig-
nificant, and thereby confirm the hypothesis H4B.  
4.6.4 Results of Factors Impacting Risk Attitudes & Perceptions in Crisis Phases 
The results of the maximum-likelihood estimations of the bivariate censored mod-
els that are laid out by Equations 4.11–4.17 are presented in table 4.8. In both 
risk-attitude and risk-perception models, the marginal-effect estimates of objective 
and subjective knowledge about the content of risk entailed in eating beef and trust 
in information provided by the governmental agencies were statistically significant 
in varied ways in each crisis phase. We reject the hypothesis of independence be-
tween risk-perception and risk-attitude regressions as the bivariate model’s correla-
tion (ρ) coefficient is significant in the estimated models, for each country, in each 
crisis phase, and for each criterion variable. For the American segment of consum-
ers, ρ equals 0.281 in 2001 and 0.347 in 2004 for the risk-attitude model and 
0.237 in 2001 and 0.345 in 2004 for the risk-perception model. For the German 
CHAPTER 4 139
segment of consumers, ρ equals 0.249 in 2001 and 0.254 in 2004 for the risk-
attitude model, and 0.213 in 2001 and 0.277 in 2004 for the risk-perception mod-
el. All these coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The 
positive signs of the estimated correlation coefficients indicate that other unobserv-
able factors that have not been modeled explicitly have the same influence on risk 
attitudes and risk perception as those which have already been included. 
A look at the regressors of the estimated models reveals that the results are for 
the most part consistent with our hypotheses. Our hypothesized determinants (ob-
jective knowledge and subjective knowledge about the content of risk, and trust in 
information provided by the governmental agencies) significantly drive the risk 
attitudes (H5A and H5B) and risk perceptions (H6A) of consumers, respectively, in 
each country in each crisis phase. 
 
Table 4.8 Factors Impacting Risk Attitude and Risk Perception in 2001 and 2004a,b 
 American Consumers German Consumers 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004 
Factors Impacting Risk Attitude     
Intercept  1.270  1.458    1.895  2.172   
Obj. Knowledge   0.116*  0.323*  0.108* 0.181*  0.237*  0.347* 0.197 * 0.227* 
Subj. Knowledge   0.153  0.218*  0.032 0.094*  0.067  0.249* 0.020 0.047* 
Sigma  1.578*  2.178*    1.631*  1.848*   
Rho  0.281*  0.347*    0.249*  0.254*   
Log-likelihood function -1229 -1207   -1678 -2879   
Factors Impacting Risk Perception      
Intercept  3.201  3.581    2.194  4.054   
Trust -0.377* -0.174* 0.221* 0.107* -0.206* -0.417* 0.126* 0.277* 
Sigma  1.756*  1.943*    1.782*  1912*   
Rho  0.237*  0.345*    0.213*  0.277*   
Log-likelihood function  -3.017  -3792                   -2903  -3794   
Number of Observations     228     595       298     301   
a The RA ranges from 0 (relatively high risk aversion); to 8 (relatively low risk aversion) the RP ranges 
from 0 (relatively low risk perception) to 8 (relatively high risk perception). Objective knowledge 
ranges from 1 (= I would simply fall ill, but recover fast) to 5 (= I would definitely die, there is not 
treatment), subjective knowledge ranges from 1 (= no knowledge) to 9 (= much knowledge). Trust in 
information provided by governmental agencies for BSE/CJD ranges from 1 (= no trust at all) to 
(=fully trust) 
b An asterisk indicates that each parameter is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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Based on the estimates of the marginal effects, several interesting insights are re-
vealed. American consumers’ risk attitudes are influenced by both objective knowl-
edge and subjective knowledge about the about CJD’s impact on human health. 
Each unit increase in objective knowledge increased the likelihood that Americans 
became less risk averse by almost 11% in the pre-phase and by almost 18.1% in the 
incipient-phase of the BSE crisis in the US Each unit increase in subjective knowl-
edge increased the likelihood that American consumers perceived relatively low risk 
by almost 9.5% in the incipient-phase of the BSE crisis. With respect to the risk 
perception of Americans, the results show that each unit increase in trust in infor-
mation about safety, Americans’ likelihood to perceive relatively less risk increased 
by 22.1% in pre-phase and by 10.7% in incipient-phase of the crisis. We thus see 
that the likelihood that consumers perceived relatively low risk decreased in the 
incipient-phase compared to the pre-phase of the BSE crisis in the US due to con-
sumers’ eroded trust in the information about beef safety provided by the Ameri-
can governmental agencies. 
Further, the results indicate that German consumers showed different reac-
tions than their American counterparts in the corresponding crisis phases. That is, 
each unit increase in objective knowledge increased the likelihood that Germans 
became relatively less risk-averse by almost 19.7% in 2001 (incipient-crisis phase) 
and by almost 23% in 2004 (post-crisis phase). Each unit increase in the subjective 
knowledge increased the likelihood that German consumers were more likely to 
perceive low risk by 4.7% in the post-crisis phase of the BSE crisis (i.e., 2004). 
Thus, we see that both greater objective and subjective knowledge is associated 
with relatively less risk-averse behavior in the subsequent phases of the BSE-crisis. 
Finally, with respect to risk perception, our results show that for each unit increase 
in their trust in information about food safety increased the likelihood that con-
sumers in Germany perceived relatively low risk by almost 13% in the incipient-
phase, and by almost 28% in the post-phase. Thus, the likelihood of Germans 
perceiving relatively lower risk in the post-phase than in the incipient-phase grew 
which might be due to the fragmented risk management strategies followed by the 
German government and industry managers after the incipient-phase of the BSE 
crisis in the country. 
By performing a Chow test, we found that the parameter estimates and mar-
ginal effects of the explanatory variables for both the American and German con-
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sumers substantially changed between the crisis phases (the null hypothesis was 
rejected at the 5% level for each country). This result further validates our choice 
to examine the variance in impacts that risk attitude and risk perceptions had on 
the consumers’ participation and quantity-reduction decisions within and across 
the BSE crisis phases. 
4.7 Discussion & Conclusions 
This study was designed to address the following questions: Do the separate com-
ponents of consumer risk behavior, namely risk attitudes, risk perceptions, the 
interaction of risk attitudes and perceptions, and demographics drive consumer 
decisions which share the same decision-making structure in a product-harm crisis 
which involves life-threatening design flaws? Does this framework provide a robust 
conceptualization and prediction for studying consumer risk behavior in and across 
the phases of a product-harm crisis? Finally, what drives consumer risk attitudes 
and risk perceptions in different phases of a product-harm crisis? Table 4.9 displays 
our research hypotheses associated with each of the above-mentioned research 
questions and also provides information on whether these hypotheses were sup-
ported by our empirical findings (i.e., yes, implies support, no implies lack of sup-
port, a dash implies no relevance for the specific phase/time period). 
4.7.1 Theoretical Contributions 
Our results indicate that risk consumer behavior towards risks entailed in a global 
market crisis appears to lead to inconsistent risk reactions among the segments (i.e., 
countries) of the population (Hofstede, 1983). Specifically, our findings confirm 
and extend previous work on consumer risk behavior in several ways. First, our 
findings confirm the hypothesis that the participation and the quantity-reduction 
decisions of consumers in both countries and in as well as across each crisis phase 
share the same decision-making structure. That is, the participation in consump-
tion and quantity-reduction decisions in a product-harm crisis have a common 
bivariate error covariance term and hence can be viewed as separate but interde-
pendent parts of a two-layered decision system. Risk attitudes, risk perceptions, 
and the interaction between them drive (albeit in varied ways) both decisions in the 
US and in Germany in and across different crisis phases. These results confirm 
hypotheses H1A – H2B and provide support for our conceptualization.  
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Table 4.9 Summary of Empirical Evidence *  
Research Question:   Hypothesis American 
Consumers 
German 
Consumers 
   Pre-
phase
Incipient 
phase 
Over 
Time
Incipient 
phase 
Post-
phase 
Over 
time 
What drives consumers’ 
participation decision 
in a product-harm 
crisis? 
H1A:  A relatively more (less) risk-averse con-
sumer, will be likely to participate less 
(more) in the consumption of a harmed 
product. 
Yes Yes - Yes No - 
 H1B: A consumer who perceives relatively high 
(low) risk from a product-harm crisis will 
be likely to participate less (more) in the 
consumption of a harmed product. 
No No - Yes Yes - 
 H1C:  As a consumer is relatively more (less) 
risk-averse, (s)he is more likely to partici-
pate less in the consumption of a harmed 
product when (s)he perceives relatively 
high (low) risk.  
No Yes - Yes Yes - 
What drives consumers’ 
quantity-reduction 
decisions in a product-
harm crisis? 
H2A:  As a consumer becomes relatively more 
(less) risk averse, the likelihood of reducing 
the quantity of consumption of a harmed 
product increases (decreases).  
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
 H2B:  As a consumer perceives relatively high 
(low) risk, the likelihood of reducing the 
quantity of consumption of a harmed 
product increases (decreases) 
No Yes - Yes Yes - 
 H2C:  As a consumer is relatively more (less) 
risk-averse, (s)he is more likely to reduce 
the quantity of consumption of a harmed 
product when (s)he perceives relatively 
high (low) risk.  
No Yes - No Yes - 
 H2D:  Female consumers are more likely to 
reduce the quantity of consumption of a 
harmed product. 
No Yes - Yes No - 
 H2E: Older consumers are more likely to reduce 
the quantity of consumption of a harmed 
product.  
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
What drives consumer 
decisions in specific 
phases of a product-
harm crisis? 
H3A:  The impact of consumer risk attitudes and 
perceptions and their interaction on 
consumer decisions is likely to be lower in 
the pre- and post-phases than in the 
incipient phase of a product-harm crisis.  
 
 
 
 
Yes Yes a - Yes a Yes - 
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Research Question:   Hypothesis American 
Consumers 
German 
Consumers 
   Pre-
phase
Incipient 
phase 
Over 
Time
Incipient 
phase 
Post-
phase 
Over 
time 
What drives consumer 
decisions over time 
(across the crisis phas-
es)?  
H4A:  The decoupled components of consumer 
risk behavior significantly influence 
consumer decisions across the crisis phases. 
- - Yesb - - Yesb 
 H4B:  The impact of time effects on the determi-
nants of consumer participation and 
quantity-reduction decisions is significant 
across the crisis phases.  
- - Yesc - - Yesc 
What drives risk 
attitude and risk 
perceptions in different 
phases of a product-
harm crisis? 
H5A:  Greater objective knowledge of consumers 
is likely to be associated with relatively less 
risk-averse behavior in the subsequent 
phases of a product-harm crisis.  
- Yes - - Yes - 
 H5B:  Greater subjective knowledge of consumers 
is likely to be associated with relatively less 
risk-averse behavior in subsequent phases 
of a product-harm crisis.  
- Yes - - Yes - 
 H6A:  Greater (lower) consumer trust in safety 
information is associated with relatively 
lower (higher) risk perception in the pre- 
and post-phases than in the incipient 
phase of a product-harm crisis 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
*A dash indicates that the hypothesis is not applicable for the specific crisis phase (period). 
a The hypothesis is confirmed for the risk attitude (RA) and the interaction of risk attitude and risk perception 
(RA*RP) that determine the participation decision, and for the risk perception (RP) and RA*RP that determine 
the quantity-reduction decision of Americans in the incipient crisis phase in the US (2004). The hypothesis is also 
confirmed for the RP, RA*RP that determine the participation decision and RA and RP that determine the quan-
tity-reduction decisions of German consumers in the incipient-phase of the BSE crisis (2001). 
b The hypothesis is confirmed for the RP, RA*RP which determine the participation decision, and for the RA, RP, 
and RA*RP, which determine the quantity-reduction decision of Americans across the crisis phases. The RA, RP, 
RA*RP are significant determinants of the participation decision and the RA, RP, RA*RP of the quantity-
reduction decision of German consumers over time. 
c The hypothesis is confirmed for the RP, RA*RP which determine the participation decisions and the RA, 
RA*RP, and AGE which determine the quantity-reduction decisions of American consumers over time. The 
impact of time effects is significant for the RA, RP, RA*RP on the participation decisions of Germans. The time 
effect also has a significant impact on RA, RP, RA*RP while GENDER impacts the quantity-reduction decisions 
of German consumers. 
 
 
As such, these results emphasize the relevance of examining consumer risk behavior 
by decoupling its components and extend recent work by March and Shapira 
(1987), Pennings et al., (2002), Pennings and Wansink (2004), Wansink (2004), 
Schroeder et al., (2007), among others, which argued that the decoupling of con-
CHAPTER 4 144 
sumer risk behavior into risk attitudes, risk perceptions and their product provides 
a more robust conceptualization and prediction framework. Also, the results related 
to the significance of consumers’ age and gender for their quantity-reduction deci-
sions (H2D and H2C) in both countries are consistent with work in psychology and 
marketing (e.g., Byrnes et al., 1999; Laufer & Gillespie, 2004; Laufer et al., 2005) 
arguing that older and female individual market participants exhibit higher risk-
aversion and perceive relatively high risk, particularly in highly risky and turbulent 
market situations (e.g., food scares, economic crises).  
Second, we demonstrate that the impact (influence and magnitude) of the de-
coupled components of consumer risk behavior differs between crisis phases. We 
find evidence that the impact of consumer risk attitudes, risk perceptions and the 
interaction of risk attitudes and perceptions is higher in the incipient phase than in 
the pre- and post-phases of a product-harm crisis. The impact of risk attitudes and 
the interaction of risk attitudes and risk perceptions on the participation decisions 
of American consumers was higher in the incipient phase (2004) than in the pre-
phase (2001) of the BSE outbreak in the US. The same holds for the impact of 
Americans’ risk attitudes, risk perceptions and their interaction on quantity-
reduction decisions. Moreover, all three components of risk behavior were found to 
have a higher impact on the participations and quantity-reduction decisions of 
German consumers in the incipient-phase of the BSE crisis in Germany (2001). 
These results reflect that individuals’ assumptions about the “state” of safety in beef 
consumption changed (e.g., Jannof-Bulman, 1992), probably due to negative, 
frequent and vivid publicity about the triggering event (e.g., Pearson & Clair, 
1998) and consumers’ attempts to avoid the risk content associated with a product 
category found to be defective or even dangerous for human health (e.g., Dawar & 
Pillutla, 1998). 
Third, we find that the risk attitudes, risk perceptions and their interaction 
significantly influence the participation and quantity-reduction decisions of con-
sumers (albeit in varied ways) across the crisis phases (H4A). This is reflected in the 
significance of the differences in magnitude between the determinants of consumer 
decisions (H4B). That is, the behavior of consumers adapts to the contingent mar-
ket conditions, which reflect the dynamics of the decision environment (e.g., so-
cial, political, economic, cultural, or technological changes). Previous marketing 
research suggests (the presence of) an impact of time varying-effects on consumers’ 
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behavior across the phases of a product-harm crisis (e.g., Pauwels et al., 2002; Van 
Heerde et al., 2007, Cleeren et al., 2007). These effects are likely to be attributed 
to consumers’ sensitivity towards contingent conditions occurring in the decision 
environment. Consumer behavior may change as consumers experience more of 
the local problem structures in the course of making decisions (e.g., Hogarth, 
1981; Lowenstein, 1992; Bettman et al., 1998). Thus, the relative importance of 
risk attitudes and perceptions follows a continuous updating pattern, which is sub-
sequently played out on their impact on consumer decisions. Therefore, the results 
of this study not only confirm and extend recent risk theory based on the decoup-
ling of components of risk behavior (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987; Pennings et al., 
2002; Pennings & Wansink, 2004), but also places this framework into a dynamic 
context: risk attitudes and perceptions of consumers adapt to contingent-driven 
decision contexts. 
Finally, we show what drives the adaptive response of consumers (their risk at-
titudes and perceptions) during different crisis phases. We follow recent theory in 
marketing and consumer behavior, which supports the notion that consumers may 
modify their decision-making representations due to increasing experience with the 
nature of a decision event (e.g., Hoch & Deiton, 1989) and their expectations of 
repeated exposure to stimuli and/or the avoidance of aversive stimuli during re-
peated exposure (e.g., Gibbs, 1996). We find that the increased objective and sub-
jective knowledge about potential health-hazards led American and German con-
sumers to exhibit relatively less risk-averse behavior in the subsequent phases of the 
BSE crisis (H5A and H5B). In addition, we find that greater consumer trust in prod-
uct-safety information made Americans perceive relatively lower risk in the pre-
crisis phase (2001) and Germans in the post-crisis phase (2004). Hence, the hy-
pothesis H6B is confirmed, which is in agreement with several marketing and 
health-economics studies supporting that consumers often modify their risk behav-
ior because of changes in their health beliefs and the extent of these changes de-
pends on increasing expertise, experience and familiarity with the chance to be 
exposed to the risk content (e.g., Viscusi, 1991; Bonker & Hanf, 2000; Moorman 
et al., 2004; Alba & Hutchinson, 2000). One may note that consumer trust in the 
information provided by governments eroded in the incipient-phases of the BSE 
crisis in both countries. This may be attributed to the negativity bias that consum-
ers exhibit in the incipient crisis phase of a product-harm crisis due to the bad pub-
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licity surrounding this phase (Herr et al., 1991; Cleeren et al., 2007). Although we 
have not explicitly modeled and addressed these factors in our analysis, our model-
ing specification allowed for capturing their effects across the crisis phases. 
Overall, the results confirm and extend previous analytical and empirical work 
on the decoupling of consumer risk behavior into the separate components of risk 
attitudes, risk perceptions and their interaction, the diversity in the impact of these 
factors on consumer decisions in different phases of a product-harm crisis, the 
separate and interdependent nature of consumer decisions in a dynamic (risky) 
decision contexts, the presence of time effects on the determinants of consumer 
risk behavior, and, finally, on the impact of latent factors impacting risk attitudes 
and perceptions in different crisis phases of a product-harm crisis. In general, we 
show that the decoupled components of consumer risk behavior provide a robust 
conceptualization and prediction of economic behavior in contingent-driven deci-
sion environments. 
4.7.2 Managerial Contributions 
The results of this study reveal information that may be useful to marketers, indus-
try managers, and public policy makers to design effective corporate, marketing, 
and supply-chain-management strategies in and across the phases of a product-
harm crisis. Our results show differences among the impact (influence and magni-
tude) of risk attitudes, risk perceptions, their interaction and demographics on 
consumer decisions as well as differences among the impact of consumer knowl-
edge on risk attitudes and trust in product-safety information on risk perceptions 
in different crisis phases in the US and Germany. This suggests the need for strate-
gies to be adapted: a) If the impact of risk attitude increases in the incipient phase, 
strategies should focus on doing whatever is necessary to eliminate the risk from 
the supply chain (e.g., full product-elimination, processing auditing, and product 
recalls from retail outlets); b) if the impact of risk perception increases across the 
crisis phases, strategies and policies should center their attention on effectively 
informing consumers of the low probability of the hazard and reassuring them that 
they have accurately assessed the level of the food-safety risk; c) if the interaction 
between risk attitudes and risk perceptions increases across the crisis phases, this 
implies that relatively risk-averse consumers may engage in behavior to reduce risk, 
which becomes more prominent as a consumer perceives relatively more risk. Thus, 
a combination of strategies focusing on both the elimination of the risk content 
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and the effective communication of the low probability of the hazard may be the 
solution; d) if female and older individuals reduce their risk-taking behavior across 
the crisis phases, this signals the need for an adaptation of the strategies regarding 
the product placement of the food product in the retail stores in order to maintain 
product demand for specific market segments; e) if the objective knowledge of 
consumers decreases across the crisis phases, marketers and policy makers need to 
intensify their communication efforts with daily health briefings and campaigns to 
endorse the storage of accurate information among consumers f) if the subjective 
knowledge of consumers decreases across the crisis phases, the application of inten-
sive (retrieval) communication strategies may be required to eliminate the negativ-
ity bias in the market; and g) if trust in the information provided by governments 
erodes, especially in the incipient phase of a crisis, policy makers should increase 
public investments in communication and create synergies among governmental 
agencies, industry groups, consumer associations, and media in order to regain the 
trust of the consumer. 
A key take away from this paper is that it is not only important to assess the 
components of consumer risk behavior in specific crisis phases and make compari-
sons between them, but also to look across the crisis phases and find the impact of 
latent factors impacting these changes. 
4.7.3 Limitations & Further Research 
Our study has several limitations, so several issues should be addressed in future 
research. First, we did not utilize an economically based data-gathering instrument 
(e.g., a choice experiment using a lottery - trade-off - technique) to elicit the com-
ponents of consumer risk behavior. Instead, we utilized a scaling procedure to 
measure risk attitude and perception. Although detailed and crucial information 
can be gathered by eliciting behavior through a lottery technique, these experi-
ments are extremely costly and time intensive, and they require great efforts from 
the respondents. Our current data-gathering instrument allowed us to conduct 
large-scale field studies in grocery malls within the time frame of an interview, 
which prevented reluctance to cooperate among our respondents. Second, we 
measured risk behavior by using a longitudinal between-subject design. The unex-
pected nature of BSE outbreaks did not allow us to measure the behavior of the 
same subjects across the crisis phases. Future research may attempt to replicate our 
framework and measure risk attitudes and perceptions by using a within-the-
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subject design if the nature of the decision context allows so. A within-the-subject 
design may reveal more detailed insights (e.g., discrete differences in the relative 
importance of risk attitudes and perceptions of the same subjects) into the decoup-
ling of consumer risk behavior over time. Third, we measured consumer risk be-
havior in two countries which experienced the incipient phase of the same safety 
outbreak at different points in time. We examined seemingly inconsistent behav-
iors of consumers in two major economies that were confronted with different 
contingent conditions throughout the product-harm crisis. However, accounting 
for inconsistent risk responses of consumers in countries that experience the same 
crisis phases at the same points in time may permit a more systematic contingent-
driven context analysis on the basis of cross-cultural sensitivities of consumers. 
Finally, we measured knowledge and trust in information by using single-item 
measures. Using multi-dimensional measures and accounting for the potential 
variation of consumers’ knowledge derived from various sources, as well as trust in 
the information provided by various market actors, will enrich our understanding 
of the factors impacting the changing consumer risk attitudes and perceptions in 
the different phases of a market crisis. 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to examine the determinants of the underlying 
decision-making process of individual market participants (i.e., producers and consum-
ers) who are actively engaged in the food supply chain. This chapter serves to conclude 
this dissertation by providing a brief recap of the findings of the empirical studies and 
discussing implications for theory and practice. We end this chapter with a set of rec-
ommendations for further research.  
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5.1 Introduction 
The overall focus of this study relies on the identification and understanding of the 
drivers of the latent decision-making process of “real” individual market partici-
pants in turbulent, complex, and dynamic decision environments. To address this 
topic, each chapter presents an empirical assessment of aspects of relevant issues. 
Across the three main chapters, the context pertains to the revealed economic be-
havior of individual food producers and consumers who are market participants at 
upstream and downstream stages of the food supply chain, respectively. Chapter 2 
focuses on the member-investor perspectives for the structure of marketing co-
operative (MC). Specifically, it assesses the subjective utility (i.e., preferences) that 
member-investors attach to particular organizational and strategic attributes of 
MCs. Chapter 3 focuses on the identification of the heterogeneity in member-
investors’ preferences (i.e., utility) for intra-organizational and strategic attributes 
of an MC, and we examine the effects of business size and risk attitude on these 
preferences. Finally, chapter 4 focuses on consumer risk behavior in times of a 
market crisis by studying consumer risk attitudes towards and risk perceptions for a 
harmed product across different countries, in which different contingent market 
conditions occur. We study the determinants of consumer risk behavior (risk atti-
tude and risk perception) within and across different crisis phases and we examine 
how latent factors (i.e., knowledge, trust) influence these determinants within dif-
ferent crisis phases. The theoretical, methodological, and modeling approaches 
used in each study are rooted in economics, the marketing-finance interface, and 
psychology. 
In the following three sections the major findings of each study will be pre-
sented and theoretical and managerial implications will be drawn. Finally, we pro-
vide a set of recommendations for further research. 
5.2 Discussion: Summary of Results, Theoretical & Managerial Implications 
This dissertation contributes to literature on decision-making of individual market 
participants in several ways. In response to the changing economic environment in 
the primary sector, such as the rapid changes in agricultural policy, technology, 
producers individualism, consumer concerns about food quality and safety, and the 
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globalization of food markets, we focus on: a) how the organizational structures of 
MCs can meet the challenges that changing market conditions pose to satisfying 
member-investors needs, and b) how the puzzling consumer reactions to a market 
crisis situation may highlight the need for designing and implementing different 
marketing strategies across different segments of the population (i.e., countries). 
Existing studies that deal with the revealed economic behavior of several individual 
market participants in the agribusiness sector are scarce and still dominated by 
theoretical, normative, and aggregate approaches, which cannot directly observe 
and capture the dynamics of the latent decision-making process of individuals in 
the turbulent agri-food markets (Smidts, 1990; Camerer et al., 2004). We ac-
knowledge that the quantification of latent behavior of individual market partici-
pants at a highly disaggregate level requires the study of the revealed economic 
behavior of “real” decision makers familiar with non-hypothetical decision contexts 
in which their decisions have real consequences for them (Heckman, 2001; Smith, 
2003; Pennings et al., 2005). The identification and understanding of the latent 
decision-making processes of “real’ food producers and consumers in dynamic 
decision contexts, help to relax the strong assumptions included in the theoreti-
cal/normative approaches, better predict (economic) phenomena, develop success-
ful corporate strategies, and suggest better and updated public policies (Steenkamp, 
2000; Pennings, 2008). The three empirical studies of this dissertation thus pro-
vide deeper insights into various aspects of these processes. We summarize the find-
ings of each study and we discuss theoretical and managerial implications based on 
these findings.  
5.2.1 Member-investors’ Perspective on the Structure of an MC 
In response to the changing economic environment, the structures of many MC 
firms and the relationships with their member-investors have changed considerably 
during the last two decades. MCs abandon their passive service-oriented role and 
move towards an active customer-oriented role by adopting more “member-
investor”-oriented and/or “individualized” organizational structures. At the same 
time, the dissatisfaction of member-investors seems to have increased as new forms 
of governance and strategic behavior have led producers to question whether MCs 
are acting in their best interest. In contrast to past research in MCs that tended to 
mingle co-op intra-organizational attributes with market strategy, our conceptuali-
zation delineates institutional arrangements to rely on both intra-organizational 
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and strategic attributes, and a range of values of each attribute level. We support 
the notion that the subjective utility (i.e., preferences) that member-investors at-
tach to particular attributes signals the level of their commitment to the MC’s or-
ganizational and strategic business activities. We examine how member-investors 
evaluate the intra-organizational and strategic attributes that make-up a MC’s 
structure and that are hypothesized to be important for member-investors’ com-
mitment. 
We show that both intra-organizational and strategic attributes related to the 
internal organization and strategic behavior of the MC, respectively, drive mem-
bers’ preferences (utility) regarding the MC’s structure. Though, member-investors 
assign higher utility to strategic rather than intra-organizational attributes of an 
MC. They prefer to participate in a market-oriented organization which will in-
volve them in long-term relationships and develop a more direct link between its 
members and market segments. The identification and evaluation of attributes that 
compose the structure of an MC are issues of strategic importance for the re-
structuring of co-ops firms and their success in the marketplace. The overall utility 
that individual member-investors attach to these structural aspects signals the de-
gree that the co-op is perceived to act as an agent that captures their economic 
interests. The great importance that members attach to the strategic attributes sug-
gests that member-investors prefer to benefit from market opportunities via the 
vertical integration offered by an MC. This may be an element which substantially 
reinforces their commitment toward participation in a voluntarily marketing insti-
tution (VMI) and willingness to invest in collective actions. Such information may 
be utilized by co-op policy makers when re-structuring an MC. Recent research in 
behavioral economics (Bettman et al., 1998; Penings & Smidts, 2003) shows the 
importance of the information revealed through market participants’ preferences. 
Preferences are constructed, hence driven, by variables that describe the environ-
ment such as the competitive environment. 
Therefore, relying on this kind of information, managers of voluntarily mar-
keting institutions (VMIs) such as MCs may develop policies that satisfy member-
investors’ demands. Likewise, member-investors’ commitment and willingness to 
invest in collective activities may be reinforced by adjusting internal organization 
and strategic behavior. 
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5.2.2 Heterogeneous Preferences of MCs’ Member-investors 
Member-investors involved in collective action often strive to influence corporate 
structure and decisions to reflect their preferences, resulting in organizational poli-
cies that fail to benefit the membership as a whole. Agribusiness economics and 
marketing-finance literature recognize the essence of increasing heterogeneity in 
member-investors’ preferences. Conflicting preferences can generate problems in a 
MC’s setting. They may result in declining member commitment, decreasing 
member willingness to provide equity capital, increasing costs related to damaging 
influence activities, laborious decision-making processes, and incoherent strategic 
focus. We show that member-investors have rather well-defined preferences for the 
selected attributes, but value the attributes differently. Most member-investors 
demonstrate rather similar preferences for strategic attributes, but differ with re-
spect to the intra-organizational attributes of control and management. In general, 
member-investors with large sales who employ a considerable number of workers 
and exhibit less risk-averse preferences preferred more involvement of professional 
managers in corporate and product-related decisions. Member-investors with 
smaller sales and fewer employees and who were more risk averse were more willing 
to delegate corporate and product marketing control to their representatives who 
presumably promote their interests more effectively. 
The similarity in preferences of strategic attributes suggests that member-
investors are willing to take similar collective action to capture market advantages. 
Yet, the differences in intra-organizational preferences highlight the difficulties that 
co-ops face in allocating resources efficiently and balancing their commitments to 
their member-investors. The results confirm and extend previous analytical and 
empirical work on the presence of and likely influence of heterogeneous preferences 
of participating member-investors in a VMI. The identified differences in prefer-
ences for the control mechanisms support the assumptions used to investigate and 
address co-op organizational inefficiencies in the presence of diverse characteristics. 
The “large versus small” cost efficiency argument is indeed an important dimen-
sion of member-investors preferences for co-op structure and behavior, but our 
findings also support the recent work identifying the importance of risk attitudes 
and are consistent with the presence and importance of managing risk in VMI’s 
literature. 
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Overall, our results contribute to the recognition and formalization of the hetero-
geneous makeup of an MC firm. That is, they importantly contribute to the litera-
ture on group-choice (e.g., Zusman, 1992; Banerjee et al., 2001) and governance 
structure choices (e.g., Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002) by identifying a high degree of 
heterogeneity which may be problematic for co-op governance and management 
initiatives. Since the efficiency of resources allocation is threatened as member-
investors’ heterogeneity increases, knowledge of the existence of member-investor 
segments and an understanding of their preferences may be useful also to co-op 
policy makers to better evaluate efforts by member-investors subgroups who may 
strive to influence governance policies. Acquiring such crucial information, con-
flicting situations that undermine co-op’s success in the market may be prevented 
and continuous development and improvement of services that better balance 
member-investor demands may be achieved. The diversity in member-investor 
preferences regarding corporate control and product management may signal the 
emergence for a multi-string governance structure that embodies a wide range of 
ownership agreements and integrates the revealed preference structure of each par-
ticipating member-investors’ segment. Therefore, the findings of the current study 
advance our understanding of how the design of MCs’ governance bylaws, collec-
tive-choice rules (i.e., the joint minimization of transaction costs and individual 
members’ risk premia), and contractual relationships among co-op stakeholders, 
may be adjusted to the relative importance that heterogeneous member-investors 
assign to them. 
5.2.3 Decoupling Consumer Risk Behavior Over Time 
The last empirical chapter focuses on the evaluation of the drivers of consumer risk 
behavior toward a harmed product across different countries. Specifically, we quan-
tify how these attitudes and perceptions affect the consumption of the harmed 
product within and across different crisis phases. Also, we examine how latent fac-
tors influence consumers’ risk attitudes and perceptions within different crisis 
phases. Building on recent advances in marketing and management science, we 
hypothesize that the components of consumer risk behavior follow ongoing update 
patterns and hence adapt to the environmental idiosyncrasies (e.g., conditions) of 
particular market settings. We propose a two-layered conceptual model showing 
how risk attitudes and risk perceptions influence risk behavior within and across 
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crisis phases and how latent factors may explain the changes in risk attitudes and 
perceptions between crisis phases. 
The results indicate that relevance of examining consumer risk behavior by de-
coupling its components (i.e., risk attitudes and risk perceptions) and confirm 
recent work which argued that the decoupling of consumer risk behavior into risk 
attitudes, risk perceptions and their product provides a more robust conceptualiza-
tion and prediction framework. Further, we demonstrate that the impact (influence 
and magnitude) of the risk attitudes and perceptions differs between crisis phases. 
We show that the behavior of consumers adapts to the contingent market condi-
tions, which reflect the dynamics of the decision environment (e.g., social, politi-
cal, economic, cultural, or technological changes). Consumer behavior may change 
as consumers experience more of the local problem structures in the course of mak-
ing decisions. Thus, the relative importance of risk attitudes and perceptions fol-
lows a continuous updating pattern, which is subsequently played out on their 
impact on consumer decisions. Therefore, the results of this study not only con-
firm and extend recent risk theory based on the decoupling of components of risk 
behavior (e.g., Weber & Milliman, 1997; Pennings & Wansink, 2004; Schroeder 
et al., 2007) as two-layered decision system, but also place this conceptual frame-
work into a dynamic context: risk attitudes and perceptions of consumers adapt to 
contingent-driven decision contexts (Hogarth 1981, Payne et al., 1993; Cleeren et 
al., 2007). 
Finally, we show what drives the adaptive response of consumers (their risk at-
titudes and perceptions) during different crisis phases. We show that consumers 
may modify their decision-making representations due to increasing experience 
with the nature of a decision event and their expectations of repeated exposure to 
stimuli and/or the avoidance of aversive stimuli during repeated exposure. These 
results may reveal information that may be useful to marketers, industry managers, 
and public policy makers to design effective marketing and supply-chain-
management strategies in and across the phases of a product-harm crisis. Our re-
sults show differences among the impact (influence and magnitude) of risk atti-
tudes, risk perceptions, their interaction and demographics on consumer decisions 
as well as differences among the impact of consumer knowledge on risk attitudes 
and trust in product-safety information on risk perceptions in different crisis phas-
es across countries. These differences suggest the need for marketing strategies (e.g., 
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full vs. or partial product elimination and recall) and public policies (e.g., investing 
more vs. less in communication strategies and consumer education) to be adapted 
throughout the crisis phases. 
5.3 Research Challenges 
Specific research suggestions have been discussed at the end of each empirical 
study. Yet, in this section we would like to recap these suggestions and point out 
some rather general directions for future research in the area of decision-making of 
individual market participants (i.e., producers-investors, consumers) regarding the 
restructuring of MC institutions and risk behavior in and across the phases of a 
product harm-crisis. 
We investigated the latent decision making process of producers and consum-
ers engaged actively in dynamic decision contexts. Although, we studied the prefer-
ences of members-investors of an MC that has recently experienced an inherently 
dynamic restructuring process, yet our analysis provides a cross-sectional assess-
ment of member-investors’ preference structure for MC attributes at a specific 
time. Thus, future research should advance our understanding of the dynamic 
impact of member-investors’ preferences on the structure of co-ops and how this 
relationship is affected by different economic conditions and changing members’ 
characteristics (observable and latent). This would extend current insights on how 
to make-up MC structures by satisfying the need for a high degree of integration 
between member-investors’ heterogeneous interests and collective organizational 
structures. In addition, we conceptualized and measured a mix of intra-
organizational and strategic attributes in the context of a horticultural MC. Further 
research is needed to determine the relative usefulness of these attributes and the 
factors influencing preference heterogeneity for other types of co-ops operating in 
different industries and sectors such as dairy MCs, credit co-op associations, ser-
vices co-ops. Developing a taxonomy of member-investors’ preferences by co-op 
type in each sector and industry and the factors that affect these preferences will 
permit a richer understanding for the setting-up of co-op structure and strategic 
behavior. Specifically, we may better recognize, predict and explain the nature and 
drivers of formal (e.g., contractual relationships) and/or informal transactions and 
behavior that member-investors develop among them and with their co-ops. 
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The puzzling consumer risk behavior in times of product-harm crises gives rise to 
several research challenges. These evolve around how best to communicate with 
each consumer segment of the population the “actual” content of risk entailed in a 
product-harm crisis situation. We examined the impact of American and German 
consumers risk attitudes and perceptions on their behavior throughout the differ-
ence phases of a product-harm crisis as well as the drivers of these attitudes and 
perceptions in each crisis phase. Although, we identified the drivers of puzzling 
consumer reactions to this type of market crisis, several research caveats and chal-
lenges should be mentioned. The unexpected nature of BSE crisis did not allow us 
to measure the behavior of the same subjects across the crisis phases. Future re-
search may attempt to replicate our framework and measure risk attitudes and 
perceptions by using a within-the-subject design if the nature of the decision con-
text allows so. A within subjects design may reveal discrete differences in the rela-
tive importance of risk attitudes and perceptions of the same subjects over time. 
Further, we measured consumer risk behavior in two countries which experi-
enced the incipient phase of the same safety outbreak at different points in time 
(i.e., 2001 and 2004). We examined seemingly inconsistent behaviors of consum-
ers in two major economies that were confronted with different contingent market 
conditions throughout the product-harm crisis. However, accounting for inconsis-
tent risk responses of consumers in countries (e.g., segments of the population) 
that experience the same crisis phases at the same points in time may permit a more 
systematic contingent-driven context analysis on the basis of cross-cultural sensi-
tivities of consumers. Finally, we assumed that consumer reactions might have been 
different among segments of the population (i.e., countries) using geography as a 
basis for market segmentation. Hence, we assumed that consumers behave differ-
ently in different countries, wherein other contingent market-constitutions occur. 
Yet, future research may relax this assumption by segmenting the population based 
on the underlying decision- making process within and across countries. For in-
stance, the identification of potential variations of consumers’ knowledge derived 
from various sources, as well as trust in the information provided by various market 
actors, within and across different countries, may be factors that play a crucial role 
in segmenting the national and global markets in times of crisis. Such a research 
approach will enrich our understanding of the factors impacting the puzzling reac-
tions of segments of market participants in different contexts (i.e., product con-
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sumption, investment decision) in and across the different phases of a national 
and/or global market (e.g., product harm, financial) crisis. 
5.4 A Final Thought 
The overall focus of this study was on identifying and understanding the nature 
and the drivers of the latent decision-making process of “real” individual producers 
and consumers. Current economic thought puts forward the notions that the un-
derlying decision-making process of market participants drives the heterogeneity in 
their behavior and that risk behavior of individuals is driven by both their willing-
ness of individuals to accept risks as well as their interpretation of being exposed to 
the content of these risks. Firms in the agribusiness and food markets are chal-
lenged with identifying and copying with the needs of their rapidly changing inter-
nal (e.g., producers) as well as external market segments (e.g., consumers). This 
dissertation attempts to contribute to business economics and marketing-finance 
literature by using as decision contexts the agribusiness and food markets and by 
integrating theoretical, methodological, and modeling approaches from economics, 
the marketing-finance interface, and psychology. Overall, the understanding of 
revealed economic behavior (e.g., preferences, decisions) of individual market par-
ticipants engaged in the opposite, upstream and downstream, stages of the supply 
chain of an industry or a sector may provide a more accurate picture of the devel-
opment of the decision-making process of the key-participants in specific decision 
contexts. The general take-way is that it may imperative for marketers, financial 
analysts, and public policy-makers to understand both individual producers’ and 
consumers’ underlying decision-making processes, when it comes to the design and 
update of successful corporate investment, marketing, supply-chain management, 
and public policies. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 3.1: DESCRIPTION OF RISK 
ATTITUDE SCALE 
Member-investors were asked to indicate their agreement with each item of risk 
attitude construct (adapted from Pennings and Smidts, 2000) on a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7): 
 
Risk Attitude Scale: 
I am willing to take higher financial risk to realize higher profit. 
I am willing to take large financial risks. 
I am willing to take large financial risks when selling my products to realize higher 
than average sales. 
I like to ‘play it safe’ in general. 
 
Prior to calculation, the range of responses to 4) was inverted so that the most pro-
nounced risk-averse response assumed a value of (1). 
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APPENDIX 4.1: DECOUPLING RISK-TAKING 
BEHAVIOR 
Building on Pennings and Wansink (2004) and Pennacchi (2008; pp. 11–14), 
risk-taking behavior can be decoupled into the separate components of risk atti-
tude, risk perception, and their interaction. In Pratt and Arrow’s work, risk man-
agement, reflected in the risk premium π is a function of risk attitude (risk aversion 
r), the situation (base wealth W) and perceived risk (with a mean of ε  and vari-
ance σ2 of source of additional wealth ε). In their analysis, risk management is de-
termined by the statement that the risk premium leaves the decision-maker indif-
ferent between holding the perceived risky asset or holding its mean value minus 
the risk premium. That is, EU(W+ ε)=EU(W+ ε- π),where EU is the expected 
utility. In the expected utility model this translates into: 
∫ ∫ −+=+=+ ))(()()( πεεεεεεε dfWUdfWU)EU(W                    (4.1.1) 
where: U(.) is the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function and f(.) the probabil-
ity density function of additional wealth ε. By taking Taylor series approximation 
around W, the behavioral equation is approximately equivalent to: 
εεεεεεε dfWUdfWUWU )()(''
2
1)()(')( 2∫ ∫++=+ )EU(W  
{ }∫+= πεεε -dfWUWU )()(')(                                                              (4.1.2) 
For simplicity, assume that ε = 0, then, solving for the behavioral risk premium, we 
obtain: 
∫ )(' )(''-(21= 2 WU WUdf εεεπ )                                                               (4.1.3) 
which can be written as: 
),W(rσ
2
1
=π 2                                                                                             (4.1.4) 
where: r(W) = -U''(W)/U'(W) is the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aver-
sion. From (4.1.1) to (4.1.4), it follows that risk management behavior depends on 
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the interaction of perceived risk and risk aversion. The right hand side of expres-
sion (4.1.4) for the behavioral risk premium equals the interaction of risk aversion 
(i.e., risk attitude: RA) and risk perception (RP), that is RA x RP = σ2r(W). In the 
context of our study, we consider that the risk behavior of a consumer is reflected 
through his/her decision to participate less in beef consumption in times of prod-
uct-harm crisis as well as his/her decision regarding the quantity reduction of beef 
in times of crisis (given that (s)he decided already to participate less in beef con-
sumption in times of crisis). We hypothesize that both decisions are driven by the 
RA, RP and the RA x RP. 
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
In dit proefschrift erkennen we dat bij het bestuderen van economisch gedrag (i.e., 
voorkeuren, beslissingen) van individuen met betrekking tot investeren en consu-
meren rekening dient te worden gehouden met hun latente besluitvormingsproces, 
zowel vanuit een adequaat theoretisch als methodologisch gebaseerd perspectief. 
We gebruiken en integreren theoretische, methodologische en modelbenaderingen 
uit de bedrijfseconomie, het grensgebied van de marketing en financiën en de psy-
chologie. 
We onderzoeken het aan het licht gebrachte economische gedrag van indivi-
duele voedselproducenten en consumenten die respectievelijk marktpartijen in de 
keten van voedselvoorziening zijn. We trachten bij te dragen aan het begrip van het 
economisch gedrag van individuele producenten en consumenten in de voedings-
middelen industrie, die dynamische strategische processen ondergaan. De voe-
dingsmiddelen industrie is dynamisch en verandert voortdurend. De achtereenvol-
gende liberalisering van voedselmarkten (in het kader van het Gemeenschappelijk 
Landbouwbeleid) dwingt de voedingsmiddelen industrie te reageren op snelle en 
radicale veranderingen in de markt door middel van globalisering en grootschalige 
operaties. Het begrijpen van veranderend economisch gedrag in verschillende stadia 
van de voedselvoorzieningsketen is belangrijk bij het formuleren van bedrijfsinves-
teringen en marketingstrategieën. 
Eén van de hoofddoelen van dit proefschrift is het bestuderen van het onder-
liggend besluitvormingsgedrag van individuele marktpartiijen aan de hand van de 
gedrags- en experimentele micro-economische denkrichting. Experimentele micro-
economie omvat het empirisch onderzoek van het besluitvormingsgedrag van “ech-
te” individuen. Dit proefschrift bundelt drie empirische onderzoeken over econo-
mische gedrag van individuele marktpartijen en de latente en waarneembare facto-
ren die tot dit gedrag aanzetten/dit gedrag voeden. De belangrijkste schakel tussen 
deze drie onderzoeken is de totale focus op het identificeren en begrijpen van de 
aard en de oorzaken/drijfveren van het latente besluitvormingsproces van “echte” 
individuele marktpartijen. Voortvloeiend uit de denkwijze van Vernon, L. Smith, 
Nobelprijswinnaar in de economie in 2002, omvatten de drie empirische onder-
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zoeken de volgende onderscheidende kenmerken in hun besluitcontexten: de rele-
vantie van het beslis proces;; de hoge mate van vertrouwdheid van ‘echte’ individu-
ele besluitvormers met de ‘besluitcontexten’; de betrekkelijk grote steekproeven; en 
de gecombineerde toepassing van directe meettechnieken (kwalitatieve en kwantita-
tieve) op een gedesaggregeerd niveau. 
De gegevens voor deze onderzoeken zijn verzameld in grootschalige veldon-
derzoeken van de Nederlandse agro-industrieële sector en in de Amerikaanse en 
Duitse markten van de voedingsdetailhandel. In hoofdstuk twee wordt het algeme-
ne nut vastgesteld dat mede-investeerders ontlenen aan de multidimensionale struc-
tuur van het marketinginstituut coöperatie. Hoofdstuk drie identificeert en analy-
seert de heterogene voorkeuren van mede-investeerders voor de kenmerken die ten 
grondslag liggen aan de structuur van een marketinginstituut, evenals de factoren 
(economische omvang en risicogedrag) die heterogeniteit veroorzaken. Ten slotte 
worden in hoofdstuk vier de drijfveren van risicogedrag van de consument bestu-
deerd binnen en via de fases van productschade crises en de factoren die de veran-
deringen van deze drijfveren in de loop der tijd beïnvloeden. Hieronder worden de 
bevindingen van elk onderzoek uitvoeriger besproken. 
In hoofdstuk twee wordt onderzocht hoe mede-investeerders de aspecten evalu-
eren die de structuur vormen van een vrijwillig marketinginstituut (VMI), zoals 
een Marketing Coöperatie (MC), en die verondersteld worden belangrijk te zijn 
voor de loyaliteit van mede-investeerders. Wij hypothetiseren dat het nut dat leden 
ontlenen aan de kenmerken van de structuur van een MC ons inzicht vergroot in 
de loyaliteit van de leden. Door gebruik te maken van conjoint experimenteel ont-
werp brengen we het nut dat producenten aan de kenmerken van een MC hechten 
aan het licht. Deze kenmerken houden verband met de interne organisatorische 
structuur en het strategische gedrag van de MC. De resultaten van 120 producen-
ten van een Nederlandse tuinbouw-MC laten zien dat de geselecteerde MC-
kenmerken belangrijke drijfveren zijn van het nut van de leden. Leden hechten met 
name groot belang aan strategische kenmerken en ze geven de voorkeur aan een 
meer geïndividualiseerde bedrijfsstructuur. Het grote belang dat leden hechten aan 
de strategische kenmerken suggereert dat leden er de voorkeur aan geven te profite-
ren van marktmogelijkheden via de verticale integratie die een MC biedt. Dit zou 
een element kunnen zijn dat hun loyaliteit ten opzichte van deelname in een vrij-
willig marketinginstituut, en bereidheid te investeren in collectieve acties, aanzien-
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lijk versterkt. Zulke informatie zou kunnen worden gebruikt door co-op beleids-
makers bij het herstructureren van een MC. Recent onderzoek in de gedragseco-
nomie toont het belang van de informatie die door de voorkeuren van de markt-
partijen aan het licht is gebracht. Voorkeuren worden gevormd en derhalve gedre-
ven door omgevingsfactoren, zoals de concurrentie omgeving. Vertrouwend op dit 
soort informatie zouden managers van VMI’s, zoals MC’s, daarom beleid kunnen 
ontwikkelen dat voldoet aan de eisen van mede-investeerders. Op dergelijke wijze 
zou de loyaliteit van mede-investeerders en hun bereidheid te investeren in collec-
tieve activiteiten kunnen worden versterkt door de interne organisatie en het strate-
gische gedrag aan te passen. 
Hoofdstuk drie onderzoekt de heterogene voorkeuren van de mede-
investeerders van een MC. Dit onderzoek is geïnspireerd door Heckmans Nobelle-
zing (2001), waarin wordt benadrukt dat de heterogeniteit in economisch gedrag 
slechts kan worden begrepen wanneer men het onderliggende besluitvormingspro-
ces van individuele marktpartijen (bijv. producenten, investeerders, consumenten) 
identificeert en bestudeert. We bestuderen de heterogeniteit in de voorkeursstruc-
tuur van coöperative leden. Door middel een conjoint analyse wordt het nut dat 
mede-investeerders hechten aan intra-organisatorische en strategische kenmerken 
van hun bedrijf geïdentificeerd. Rekening houdend met het feit mede-investeerders 
niet homogeen zijn, wordt een mixture regressie model gebruikt waarmee voorkeu-
ren vrij kunnen variëren voor verschillende ledensegmenten. Uit gegevens van 120 
coöperatieve mede-investeerders blijkt dat de meeste leden betrekkelijk gelijkende 
voorkeuren voor strategische kenmerken vertonen, maar dat zij verschillen daar 
waar het gaat om intra-organisatorische controle- en managementgerelateerde 
kenmerken. Voorkeursstructuren van leden worden beïnvloed door bedrijfsgrootte 
en houdingen ten opzichte van risico. In het algemeen dragen onze resultaten bij 
aan de erkenning en formalisering van de heterogene structuur van een MC. Ze 
dragen in belangrijke mate bij aan de literatuur over groepskeuze en keuzes met 
betrekking tot bedrijfsstructuur door de heterogeniteit te identificeren in de voor-
keursstructuren van leden. Daar de efficiëntie van de verdeling van middelen wordt 
bedreigd naarmate de heterogeniteit van de mede-investeerders toeneemt, zou ken-
nis over het bestaan van segmenten en begrip van hun voorkeuren nuttig kunnen 
zijn voor co-op beleidsmakers om pogingen van leden-subgroepen om het bestuur-
lijk beleid te willen beïnvloeden beter te evalueren. Door het verkrijgen van zulke 
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informatie zouden conflicterende situaties die het succes van co-ops in de markt 
ondermijnen kunnen worden voorkomen en kan een continue ontwikkeling en 
verbetering van diensten die beter beantwoorden aan de behoeften van leden wor-
den bereikt. 
Hoofdstuk vier onderzoekt “consumer risk behavior” in tijden van een pro-
duktcrisis, zoals een crisis door BSE besmetting in de rundvleesmarkt. Uit recent 
onderzoek blijkt dat we de “risk responses” van consumenten beter kunnen begrij-
pen wanneer we “risk behavior” uiteenrafelen in de onderliggende componenten 
risicoperceptie en risico-attitude. Tevens wordt benadrukt dat de invloeden van 
risico-attitude en risicoperceptie op het consumentengedrag kunnen worden ge-
bruikt om effectieve(re) marketingstrategieën te formuleren wanneer dergelijke 
crises optreden. Nu rijst de vraag of de impact van deze variabelen door de tijd 
verandert, en waarom. De BSE crises in de V.S. en Duitsland in 2001 en 2004 
stellen onderzoekers in de gelegenheid om middels een natuurlijk experiment de 
relaties tussen risico-attitude, risicoperceptie, en consumentengedrag tijdens ver-
schillende fases van een crisis te onderzoeken. De bevindingen in dit hoofdstuk 
tonen aan dat de relatieve effecten van risico-attitude en risicoperceptie van tijd tot 
tijd sterk onderhevig zijn aan verandering, hetgeen benadrukt dat marketingstrate-
gieën hierop moeten worden afgestemd. Deze verandering is het gevolg van zowel 
de kennis van de consument alsmede haar vertrouwen in de informatie van over-
heid en industrie. Hiermee bevestigt dit onderzoek dus niet alleen de recente theo-
rieën over risico, die pleiten voor een opsplitsing van “risk behavior”, maar laat het 
daarnaast ook zien dat risico-attitude en risicoperceptie door dynamiek in de beslis-
singscontext gevormd worden.  
Over het algemeen kunnen we concluderen dat het geobserveerde economi-
sche gedrag van individuen in de markt (op verschillende plaatsen in supply chain) 
ons belangrijke inzichten verschaft in hoe beslissingsprocessen van marktparticipan-
ten zich ontwikkelen in een specifieke beslissingscontext.  Dergelijke inzichten in 
het beslissingproces van consumenten en producenten hebben mogelijk belangrijke 
praktische consequenties voor marketers, financiële analisten en beleidsmakers. Ze 
vormen een belangrijke ingrediënt in het samenstellen en updaten van bedrijfsin-
vesteringen, marketing, supply chain management, en overheidsbeleid.   
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